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THE PUBLIC-INTEREST PROXY CONTEST: 
REFLECTIONS ON CAMPAIGN GM 
Donald E. Schwartz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Year of the Guerrilla Fighter 
PROXY contests are generally fought for control of a corporation. The rules1 governing this form of corporate combat seek to pro-
vide shareholders with adequate information about the rival forces 
for control so that they can intelligently choose between them. The 
information furnished in proxy materials and discussions at annual 
meetings have traditionally been devoted almost entirely to subjects 
such as finance, production, acquisitions, and the like. 
The past year saw new uses made of the proxy machinery and 
the shareholder meeting. Advocates of social reform, who had here-
tofore made the corporation a major target of their discontent over 
social conditions, tried instead to use the corporation as a vehicle for 
reform. What suddenly exploded in the unlikely arena of the annual 
meeting was the kind of debate over social issues that is usually re-
served for political campaigns. The debate was often forcefully and 
dramatically asserted before unwilling audiences. It was the year of 
the "corporate guerrilla fighter."2 
The problems of the 1960's produced bitter dissent; while the 
problems grew more serious, our national temper grew hotter. Anger 
and frustration over the prolonged war in Indochina and a gnawing 
malaise over our inability to solve increasingly complex problems 
at home characterized the national mood. Presidential commissions 
gave discouraging reports on racism and domestic violence.3 There 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1952, Union College; 
LL.B. 1955, Harvard University; LL.M. 1966, New York University.-Ed. 
The author was counsel to Campaign GM during the campaign described, and 
while he has attempted to write this account of the campaign and the legal issues 
objectively, he cannot be sure that it is free from bias. All he can do is warn the 
reader. The author is grateful for the assistance of Mr. Peter O Safir, A.B. 1967, 
Princeton University, a special student at Georgetown Law Center, on military leave 
from Yale Law School. 
1. SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1969), promulgated pursuant to Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) [hereinafter 1934 Act]. 
2. The phrase was first used by Saul Friedman in the Detroit Free Press to describe 
the General Motors proxy contest. Friedman, Campaign GM: The Leaders and Their 
Battle Plan, Detroit Free Press, May 17, 1970, § B, at 43, col. 1. See Flint, G.M. Will 
Win Proxy Battle with Nader, But the War May Just Be Starting, N.Y. Times, May 
22, 1970, at 18, col. 3. 
3. See NATL. ADVISORY CoMMN. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (1968); NATL. CoMMN. 
ON THE CAUSES 8e PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, PROGRESS REPORT (1969). 
[ 421] 
422 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:419 
were confrontations at the Pentagon, seizures and shutdowns of 
universities, and riots in the streets of Chicago as the backdrop for a 
national political convention. Corporations, along with our other 
institutions, were targets of dissenters. 
But in the spring of 1970 a new tactic was adopted by some dis-
senters who saw corporations to be the core of the problem. They 
analogized corporations to the state, and saw them as the maker of 
economic policy.4 To affect national policy, the dissenters concluded, 
required them to influence economic policy, and this in tum meant 
that they had to work within the organizations that make such 
policies. Therefore, the plan evolved to oppose corporate policies 
not as outsiders, but as participants in the process. In the spring of 
1970 it was only natural that the main problems on which the dis-
senters- focused were the corporation's relationship to the war in 
Vietnam and to the environment. 5 
Starting with the annual meeting of the BankAmerica Corpora-
tion in March, 6 corporate executives spent much of their time at 
annual meetings parrying the thrusts of dissident shareholders who 
questioned not profit performance but the social impact of the com-
pany's activities. Protest was subsequently expressed at the annual 
meetings of United Aircraft Corporation,7 American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company,S Columbia Broadcasting System, Incorporated,9 
General Electric Company,10 Union Carbide Corporation,11 Com-
monwealth Edison Company, 12 Gulf Oil Corporation, 13 and Honey-
well Corporation.14 Often the protest was so intense that the pro-
testers were thrmvn out of the meetings. Both sides occasionally lost 
4. There is nothing original in this idea. The position that there exists in the 
United States a private economic state was expounded as early as 1932 in A. BERLE 8: 
G. MEANS, THE PRIVATE CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
5. See Wall St. J., April 7, 1970, at 40, col. 1. 
6. See McAllister, Protesters Disrupt BankAmerica Meeting; Fail in Bid To Get 
Vote on Vietnam Policy, Wall St. J., March 18, 1970, at 11 col. 2. 
7. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1970, at 63, col. 4. 
8. N.Y. Times, April 16, 1970, at 63, col. 1. 
9. N.Y. Times, April 16, 1970, at 63, col. 5. 
10. N.Y. Times, April 23, 1970, at 55, col. 5. 
11. N.Y. Times, April 23, 1970, at 55, col. 6. 
12. James, Pollution Protests Fill the Air as 1,000 Pack Commonwealth Edison's 
Meeting, Wall St. J., April 28, 1970, at 16, col. 3; Bus. WEEK, May 2, 1970, at 94. This 
was a more organized group than that of the other protesters since it was supported 
by Saul Alinsky, who led a group known as FIGHT against Eastman Kodak in 1967. 
See id.; Gottschalk, Kodak's Ordeal-How a Firm That Meant Well Won a Bad Name 
for Its Race Relations, Wall St. J., June 30, 1967, at 1, col 1. 
13. Wall St. J., April 29, 1970, at 4, col. 2. 
14. Wall St. J., April 29, 1970, at 8, col 2; Bus. WEEK, May 2, 1970, at 98. 
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their composure. At the Gulf meeting, management, in its heat, 
forgot to nominate its slate of candidates to the board of directors, 
and overlooked the election of independent accountants. At the 
Honeywell meeting the dissidents clamored for recognition to nomi-
/ nate their candidates for directors as soon as the meeting was called 
to order, although they had been promised an opportunity to speak 
at the appropriate time. As a result, the chairman promptly ad-
journed the meeting. 
The reform effort at General Motors Corporation was conducted 
by a group known as the Campaign To Make General Motors Re-
sponsible, more popularly known as Campaign GM.15 It utilized 
not only the annual meeting to express its views, but also the proxy 
machinery. While Campaign GM focused on some of the issues 
raised at other meetings, it also raised issues pertinent to the struc-
ture of the decision-making process of corporations. Campaign GM's 
methods were probably the "most polished"16 of any of the dissident 
groups, and the techniques used and the issues raised are likely to 
arise in the future. If the corporation is to be a focal point for social 
action and its decision-making process a forum for social questions, 
then the efforts of Campaign GM offer an opportunity for critical 
analysis. A study of public-interest confrontations with corporations, 
and of the public-interest aspect of corporation law, should include 
a study of Campaign GM. 
B. What Was Campaign GM? 
Campaign GM was an effort to obtain shareholder approval of 
several resolutions through the solicitation of proxies. These resolu-
tions were formally offered by the Project on Corporate Responsi-
bility (Project), a Washington-based nonprofit corporation that 
owned twelve shares of General Motors common stock. The Project 
was formed in late 1969 to promote corporate responsibility and to 
educate management and the public about the social role of corpo-
rations. Project leaders believed that a proxy contest with General 
Motors would afford them an opportunity to gain attention for their 
efforts and would provide a test of the ability of the corporate and 
economic system to reform itself. Campaign GM, directed by four 
young lawyers known as "coordinators," was a specially formed unit 
to carry out this program. Although nine resolutions were proposed 
15. In this Article "Campaign GM" will be used both to refer to the group of 
people involved in the project and to the project itself. 
16. Bus. WEEK, May 2, 1970, at 94. 
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to management,17 the campaign was mainly an effort to obtain 
support for two of them. 
The first was a proposal to amend the bylaws of the company to 
increase the number of directors by three persons.18 The proposal 
did not define the types of persons who would be eligible for those 
seats. Thus, no effort was made to classify public-interest directors. 
Campaign GM revealed that, if this proposal passed, it intended to 
nominate for the three newly created directorships Miss Betty 
Furness,19 Dr. Rene Dubos,20 and the Reverend Channing Phillips.21 
It also made clear that these persons would not be nominated unless 
the board was enlarged so that none of management's candidates was 
challenged. 
The second was a proposal to create a Shareholders Committee 
for Corporate Responsibility (Committee).22 This Committee was to 
consist of fifteen to twenty-five representatives of a variety of interest 
areas, and it was to be selected by a three-member selection com-
mittee consisting of a representative of the board of directors of 
General Motors, a representative of the United Auto Workers, and 
a representative of Campaign GM.23 It was to act in the nature of a 
commission, serving for a period of one year and submitting a report 
directly to the shareholders-rather than to the board of directors-
in time for the 1971 annual meeting. The Committee was supposed 
to gather facts and make recommendations on some basic questions 
concerning the corporation, such as its role in modern society and 
its prospects for and possible means of achieving a proper balance 
between the interests of shareholders, employees, consumers, and 
the general public. The Committee was also supposed to make rec-
ommendations on how the decision-making base of the company 
could be broadened, and specifically on how directors would be 
nominated and elected and board committee members selected. 
17. The resolutions are reproduced in Appendix B to this Article. 
18. See Appendix B infra, proposal 2. 
19. Former advisor to President Johnson on consumer affairs. 
20. Professor of Environmental Biomedicine, Rockefeller University. 
21. Community leader in Washington, D.C. Reverend Phillips was the first black 
man to be nominated for President at a major-party convention at the Democratic 
Convention in August 1968. 
22. See Appendix B infra, proposal 3. 
23. This process was criticized by various sources during the campaign as being 
unfair to management. See Wall St. J., April 14, 1970, at 13, col. 2. Campaign GM 
agreed to relinquish its right to participate in the selection process if a better process 
was suggested, and said that it would designate a public-spirited citizen to act as its 
representative in the committee selection process. Eventually it designated John D. 
Rockefeller, IV, as its representative. See Washington Star, May 13, 1970, at I, col. I. 
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Finally, the Committee would evaluate the company's past and pres-
ent efforts regarding air pollution, safety, mass transportation, and 
the manner in which General Motors had used its economic power 
to contribute to the social welfare of the Nation. In effect, the Com-
mittee was designed to conduct a social audit of the company's per-
formance and make recommendations for the future. 
The campaign was announced on February 7, 1970, by Ralph 
Nader at a press conference in Washington, D.C.24 Nader had no 
affiliation with Campaign GM or the Project, but he supported their 
goals. He disclosed that three shareholder resolutions (including the 
two described above)25 were being submitted to management for 
inclusion in the proxy statement to be sent to the shareholders of 
General Motors. After commenting that the legal structure of the 
corporation contributed to the growing gap between corporate per-
formance and corporate responsibility, he called for "a new defini-
tion of the corporation's constituency."26 Commenting then upon 
the position of the shareholders, he stated that in theory they owned 
the corporation; in fact, they were treated as creditors. The result 
was that "[t]he procedures, the information, the organization, the 
manpower and the funds are management's to deploy. But the fiction 
of shareholder democracy continues to plague the reality. By high-
lighting the fiction a new reality can be borne that will tame the 
corporate tiger."27 
Two weeks later, the Project submitted to General Motors its 
six other proposals, which it said that it intended to present at the 
shareholder meeting, and which it requested management to include 
in its proxy statement. These additional proposals offered specific 
courses of action dealing with mass transportation, air pollution, 
auto safety, employee safety, product warranties, and minority op-
portunity.28 
The nine resolutions were the distillation of several months' 
effort, beginning in September 1969, to search for means whereby 
24. The speech was widely reported in the press. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1970, 
§ 1, at 44, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1970, at 8, col. 2; Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1970, 
§ A, at 2, col. 1. It was also inserted in the Congressional Record by Representative 
Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York. 116 CoNG. R.Ec. E1266 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1970). 
25. The third resolution, for which proxies were solicited, but which was not 
offered at the meeting, would have amended the certificate of incorporation to prevent 
General Motors' corporate purposes from being implemented in a manner that 
violated the law or that was detrimental to the public health, safety, or welfare. See 
Appendix B infra, proposal I. 
26. 116 CONG. R.Ec. El266 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1970) (statement by Ralph Nader). 
27. Id. 
28. See Appendix B infra, proposals 4-9. 
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General Motors could be squarely confronted on the issues of cor-
porate responsibility. General Motors was selected, Nader explained, 
because of "its massive size and pervasiveness."29 The initial plan 
of the coordinators of the campaign had been to nominate Nader 
for election to the board of directors. A working group to promote 
Nader's candidacy was formed, consisting of the coordinators, law-
yers, researchers, press aides, and the administrative staff of the 
Project. In mid-January 1970, Nader decided that he would not be 
a candidate for the board of directors, although he agreed to an-
nounce publicly and to support a proxy campaign to raise the issues. 
Rather than merely seeking another candidate, the coordinators 
sought other ways to focus on the issues that Nader's candidacy 
would have represented. 
The two resolutions that eventually were presented to the annual 
meeting were the main vehicles for presenting the issues. The en-
largement of the board to include three directors of the type spon-
sored by Campaign GM dramatized what was claimed to be a too-
narrow decision-making base, and the absence from corporate boards 
of blacks, women, consumer advocates, community activists, and 
scientists whose interests were largely ecological rather than techno-
logical. The proposal to create the Shareholders Committe empha-
sized the claim that corporate decision-making overemphasized profit 
concerns and neglected the social impact of corporate activities. 
Hence, these proposals enabled Campaign GM to bring to public 
attention all of the areas in which it criticized General Motors and 
major corporations in general. 
Voting at a shareholders meeting is by proxy, of course, but 
Campaign GM could not solicit proxies from all of the General 
Motors shareholders. The cost was simply prohibitive; postage costs 
alone for a single first-class mailing to each shareholder would have 
been close to 100,000 dollars. The strategy, however, as Nader an-
nounced it, was to reach all of the corporation's shareholders. This 
goal could be accomplished only if the resolutions proposed to be 
offered at the annual meeting were included in the proxy statement 
that management mailed to the shareholders. It was thus necessary 
that the legal machinery for regulating proxy solicitations and 
conducting shareholder meetings recognize the proposals both as 
valid subjects for corporate concern and, specifically, as matters of 
shareholder concern. In this manner, Campaign GM would achieve 
a legitimacy of presence to force debate and consideration of the 
issues. 
29. 116 CONG. REc. E1266 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1970) {statement by Ralph Nader). 
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Rule 14a-830 of the proxy rules ~f the Securities Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) requires management, subject to certain important 
exceptions, to include in its proxy statement resolutions proposed to 
be offered at the annual meeting by shareholders, together with a 
supporting statement of one hundred words or less. This rule, then, 
was the instrument Campaign GM chose to present its issues to the 
shareholders. 
General Motors opposed the inclusion in the management proxy 
statement of any of the resolutions proposed by the Project, claiming 
that the proxy rules permitted their exclusion.31 This battle led to 
wide public interest in the campaign, for when the SEC declared 
that, in its opinion, the two resolutions dealing with the amendment 
of the bylaws and the creation of the shareholder committee on 
corporate responsibility were required to be included in the manage-
ment proxy statement under rule 14a-8, the news media widely re-
ported the event.32 Thus, Campaign GM was creating a stir well 
before the scheduled annual meeting. 
Because of the one-hundred-word limitation on the supporting 
statement, Campaign GM could not rely on management's proxy 
statement as its sole means of communication to shareholders. The 
coordinators regarded it as essential that they communicate with the 
public through the media, and with larger shareholders-particularly 
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969). The rule is reproduced in Appendix A to this 
Article. 
31. Wall St. J., March 6, 1970, at 14, col. 2. 
32. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 20, 1970, at I, col. 5; Wall St. J., March 20, 1970, 
at 5, col. I; NEWSWEEK, April 27, 1970, at 109; TIME, March 30, 1970, at 88. One reason 
why this story received more attention than the previous announcements is that the 
news of the decision of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) was revealed at 
a press conference called by General Motors, rather than at one called by Campaign 
GM. Editorial comment, which generally was favorable to the decision to require 
inclusion of the resolutions in the proxy statement, followed the release of the story. 
See, e.g., Christian Science Monitor, March 21-23, 1970, at 18, col. I; St. Louis Post 
Dispatch, March 29, 1970, § C, at 2, col. I; Washington Post, March 26, 1970, § A, 
at 16, col. I. 
Subsequent events relating to the campaign were also covered by the national 
press. A debate at Massachusetts Institute of Technology between Joseph Onek, one 
of the Campaign GM coordinators, and two representatives of General Motors, em-
phasized the significant role played by institutional investors. See Mintz, Colleges' 
Dilemma, 'Campaign GM' Raises Questions of Stock Investment Policies, Washington 
Post, April 13, 1970, § A, at I, col. I; N.Y. Times, April 14, 1970, at 23, col. I; 
Washington Post, April 14, 1970, § A, at 2, col. I. At Harvard University, an ex-
tensive debate within the university community occurred, as evidenced by the detailed 
articles in the Harvard Crimson. See, e.g., Jacobs, General Motors Proxy Challenge 
Catches Harvard in the Middle, Harvard Crimson, March 3, 1970, at I, col. I; Har-
vanl Crimson, April 24, 1970 (entire issue). Congressional support for Campaign GM 
was reported by the N.Y. Times, May I, 1970, at 13, col. I. When the New York City 
pension funds announced their support for Campaign GM (see text accompanying 
notes 436-38 supra), the story was back on page one of the New York Times. N.Y. 
Times, May 20, 1970, at I, col. 1. 
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' institutional shareholders, whom they regarded as the focal point 
in the campaign-through their own proxy statement. Consequently, 
they prepared a fifteen-page proxy statement, attached a form of 
proxy, and sent it to approximately 5,000 institutions and brokers. 
Meanwhile, national attention was much concerned with pollution, 
one of the major issues raised by Campaign GM. On April 22, 1970, 
a month before the General Motors annual meeting, there was the 
nationwide observance of Earth Day.88 At an early stage in the 
campaign, President Nixon submitted a legislative proposal dealing 
with environmental pollution.34 Scarcely a magazine or a newspaper 
in the country overlooked the problem of air pollution.311 Industry, 
including the automobile industry, announced new plans and pro-
grams to deal with air pollution.36 One result was that Campaign 
GM became identified in the press as a crusade against automobile 
air pollution. It was such a crusade, of course, but it was other 
things as well. The other issues in the campaign tended to become 
obscured by the attention to the air pollution issue. 
Management responded to Campaign GM in a vigorous fashion. 
Its proxy statement accused the Project of seeking to harass the 
management and of trying "to promote the particular economic 
and social views espoused by the proponent of the resolution."37 
Management took the unusual step of enclosing a twenty-one-page 
booklet entitled GM's Record of Progress with its proxy statement. 
This pamphlet defended management's record in all of the areas of 
social concern that were part of Campaign GM's program. It also 
contained an introduction by James Roche, the chairman of General 
Motors, in which he said, "The Project is using General Motors as 
a means through which it can challenge the entire system of cor-
porate management in the United States."38 In addition, on April 10 
General Motors published advertisements in about 150 newspapers 
throughout the country defending its record on air pollution. Man-
33. Bus. WEEK, April 18, 1970, at 22; N.Y. Times, April 23, 1970, at 1, col. 4. 
34. Washington Post, Feb. 11, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 6. 
35. E.g., Fortune's February 1970 issue was entirely devoted to the environment. 
36. See, e.g., Benedict, Campaign To Clean Up Gasoline May Cause Multibillion-
Dollar Headache over a Decade, Wall St. J., April 8, 1970, at 40, col. 1, describing 
efforts to reduce exhaust emissions. See also Hill, Nation Wants To Collect on Detroit's 
Clean-Air Vows, N.Y. Times, April 5, 1970, § 11, at 1, col. 2. The degree of the problem 
is also discussed in N.Y. Times, July 10, 1970, at 1, col, I. 
37. Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement of General Motors Corp., April 
6, 1970, at 19. 
38. General Motors Corp., GM's Record of Progress 1 (1970). This was a theme 
repeated often by Mr. Roche. He wrote to the regents of the University of California 
before they voted characterizing Campaign GM as an assault on our system, See Wash-
ington Post, April 22, 1970, § A, at 2, col. 7. 
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agement also telephoned larger shareholders and in other ways made 
clear that· it earnestly desired the support of larger shareholders.39 
The campaign culminated in Detroit as Campaign GM staged the 
"First Annual Convention on Corporate Responsibility."40 On May 
21, 1970, the eve of the annual meeting, a rally was held in Cobo 
Hall at which speakers, including Reverend Phillips, Miss Furness, 
Dr. George Wald of Harvard, an outspoken critic of the war, and 
this author, discussed various facets of corporate responsibility and 
shareholder democracy. The next morning, just prior to the annual 
meeting, another rally was held in Cobo Hall at which Robert Town-
send, former president of Avis and author of Up the Organization,41 
spoke on methods of dealing with the major corporations. 
The meeting on May 22 lasted a record 6½ hours and was at-
tended by an overflow audience of more than 3,000 shareholders-
more than twice the number that had attended the previous meet-
ing. 42 The meeting was largely devoted to Campaign GM's issues, 
and there were many sharp exchanges between the Campaign's speak-
ers and Mr. Roche, but unlike annual meetings at other companies 
there was no disruption. General Motors was obviously concerned 
about the challenge. The customary half-hour film did not discuss 
new products or profit activities, but rather was almost a point-by-
point rebuttal to the charges of irresponsible behavior. The meeting 
received unusual attention from newspapers, magazines, and tele-
39. Pearlstine, Activist Shareholders Provoke GM Offensive for Its Annual Meeting, 
Wall St. J., May 21, 1970, at 1, col. 4. Although management never doubted that it 
would easily defeat the proposals, shareholders were "wooed by management as though 
a major proxy fight were on. 'We're being treated to a classic example of corporate 
overkill,' says one bank trust officer who has had intimate exposure to the GM efforts." 
Id., col. 2. Earlier, the Wall Street Journal reported that "GM has been personally 
contacting many of its larger shareholders urging them to vote in favor of manage-
ment's recommendations. One Detroit banker, for example, says that GM 'has been 
putting tremendous pressure on banks' trust departments here to make sure they 
vote their shares for management.'" Id., April 20, 1970, at 12, col. I. See also Wargo, 
General Motors Defends Policies to Shareholders as Pro-Nader Group and Others Seek 
Changes, Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1970, at 12, col. 3. 
40. See Detroit Free Press, May 22, 1970, at 1, cols. 7-8. 
41. R. TOWNSEND, UP THE ORGANIZATION (1970). 
42. The meeting received considerably more press and television coverage than is 
customary for a shareholders' meeting. More than half of the meeting was spent on Cam-
paign GM's issues. See Detroit Free Press, May 23, 1970, at 1, col. 8; id., at 2, col. 2 
("The shareholders and the management of General Motors Corp., after an un-
precedented and broad discussion of its public responsibilities, overwhelmingly defeated 
Friday attempts which dissidents said would reform the company.'); Washington Post, 
May 23, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 5 ("But few would say that 'Campaign GM' had lost its 
war to persuade shareholders and the public to start perceiving giant corporations 
as subgovemments with vast, largely unchecked power over the environment and other 
great concerns.'). See also Carter, Commotion at GM, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 6, 
1970, at 8; Kahn, We Look Forward To Seeing You Next Year, THE NEW YORKER, June 
20, 1970, at 40. 
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vision.48 When it was over, each side complimented the other for the 
manner in which it behaved and this author, speaking on behalf 
of Campaign GM, informed management that ."[w]e look fonvard 
to seeing you next year."44 
The votes on the proposals were announced at the end of the 
meeting after most of the shareholders had long since departed. Man-
agement won ovenvhelmingly, of course. The proposal for the share-
holder committee received 6,361,299 votes, representing 2.73 per cent 
of the votes cast, from 61,794 shareholders, representing 7.19 per cent 
of the shareholders voting. The proposal to amend the bylaws was 
supported by 5,691,130 shares, or 2.44 per cent of the votes cast, and 
53,495, or 6.22 per cent of the shareholders voting.45 
Since the leaders of Campaign GM had, on a number of earlier 
occasions, announced that they had won the campaign because they 
had achieved what they wanted-the beginnings of a great national 
debate on the issues of corporate responsibility46-they regarded the 
meeting almost as an anticlimax. Nonetheless, few in Detroit denied 
that the meeting had been an important occasion, quite unlike any 
other shareholder meeting. The feeling prevailed that the campaign 
had made a significant contribution to corporate life, and that things 
would not be quite the same as before. 
II. ISSUES RAISED BY CAMPAIGN GM 
Campaign GM raised many significant securities law questions 
at various stages in its development. Paramount among these were 
the questions concerning the scope of issues that may properly be 
presented for consideration by the shareholders and the range of 
methods of solicitation that may be used. Both of these issues are 
subordinate to the larger legal problem of defining permissible areas 
of corporate conduct, corporate decision-making, and the conflict be-
tween benefits and burdens of corporate ownership. In addition, 
Campaign GM focused on the role of financial institutions in the 
public-interest proxy context. The legal issues, of course, are reflec-
43. See note 42 supra. 
44. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., SIX.TY·SECOND ANNUAL MElmNG OF STOCKHOLDERS 220 
(1970) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
45. Id. at 218-19. The other shareholder proposals advanced at the meeting, to limit 
executive compensation and to adopt cumulative voting, each received more votes than 
Campaign GM's proposals. Id. Under rule 14a•8(c)(4) of the SEC proxy rules, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4) (1969), Campaign GM's proposals cannot be submitted for three 
years, if management objects, since they received less than 3% of the total votes cast 
on the proposal. 
46. See, e.g., Washington Post, April 22, 1970, § A, at 2, col. 7: "Campaign GM 
••• asserted yesterday that it is winning on all fronts." 
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tions of larger questions of public policy. Certainly these policy 
questions are not new, nor have they escaped the concern of con-
temporary observers of the corporate scene, but it will be useful to 
examine them in the context of the use of the proxy machinery and 
of the annual-meeting forum as a means of effecting enlightened 
social policy. 
The primary inquiry must be whether it is viable to deal with 
questions of social policy through proxy appeals and shareholder 
meetings. Over the years the machinery of government has been 
used to deal with public-policy questions. Certainly it appears para-
doxical to ask shareholders, who are the beneficiaries of corporate 
profits, to force the corporation to remedy conditions that result 
from the quest for profits. The approach seems contrary to human 
nature. If so, is a public-interest proxy campaign merely a charade 
to demonstrate a failure in our corporate and economic system rather 
than an effort to achieve the specific results it ostensibly seeks? As-
suredly, some have raised this motive as the underlying issue. On 
the other hand, it should be observed that there was probably no 
single dominating motive that brought the various participants of 
Campaign GM together. The motives may, in truth, be undiscern-
ible. Nonetheless, the campaign may possess an independent validity 
requiring examination apart from the viewpoints of some or even 
all of its followers. 
A. The Issue of Includibility 
I. Provisions of Rule 14a-8 
All of Campaign GM's plans turned on being able to include its 
proposals in management's proxy statement and on the agenda of 
the annual meeting. The basis for accomplishing these objectives 
was rule 14a-8 of the SEC's proxy rules,47 which, as mentioned 
earlier,48 requires management to include a shareholder proposal 
in the management proxy statement49 with a one-hundred-word sup-
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969). See Appendix A to this Article for the text of the 
rule. Paragraphs (a) and (b) give the shareholder his right to include proposals in 
management's proxy materials. Paragraph (c) qualifies the right, and paragraph (d) 
describes certain procedures to be followed by the parties. 
48. See text accompanying note 30 supra. 
49. The document distributed to the shareholders is known as management's proxy 
statement, but this is an unfortunate term. In a contest over control it is perhaps ac-
curate to refer to one document as management's proxy statement and the other as the 
insurgent's proxy statement, but when control is not at stake, the document is really 
the "company's" proxy statement, which should not place nonmanagement shareholders 
in a humble position. It is, of course, paid for by the company, not by management 
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porting statement. The rule also permits management to exclude 
shareholder proposals in certain instances. 
The rule requires the shareholder to submit his proposal, to-
gether with the supporting statement, to management at least sixty 
days in advance of the day corresponding to the date on which man-
agement's proxy material was released in the prior year. 50 If manage-
ment opposes the inclusion of the resolution in its proxy statement, 
it must file a statement of its reasons for exclusion with the the SEC 
at least twenty days before it files its preliminary proxy material 
and must notify the security holder that it has taken this action. An 
opinion of counsel is required if management contends that the sub-
ject matter is not appropriate for shareholder consideration.51 The 
shareholder may respond to management's exclusionary filing with his 
own written argument. 52 
Although it holds no formal administrative proceedings, the 
SEC must consider whether the exclusion of the resolution would 
violate rule 14a-8, and, if so, what the Commission should do about 
it. 68 The Division of Corporation Finance administers the proxy 
rules, and it will generally advise both parties by letter that, in its 
judgment, the rule requires inclusion of the resolution, or that it 
will recommend that the Commission take no action if management 
omits the resolution. The letter generally does not set forth any rea-
sons for the conclusions stated therein. In appropriate cases, the Com-
mission reviews its staff's determination, and expresses its view of 
inclusion or no-action, again without opinion. A view that inclusion 
is required, however, is not a commitment of agency enforcement.54 
The argument over includibility concerns the exemptions in 
paragraph (c) of rule 14a-8. In Campaign GM, attention was focused 
personally. Bayne, Caplin, Emerson &: Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule-
Making Process: The 1951 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REv. 387, 399 (1954) (statement 
of M. Caplin). 
50. Rule 14a-8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1969). 
51. Rule 14a-8(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1969). 
52. Id. 
53. The possibilities available to the SEC are (1) commence an administrative 
proceeding to see if it should issue a declaratory order that exclusion would violate 
the proxy rules, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), (e) (Supp. V, 1965-1969); (2) determine under 1934 
Act § 19(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(2) (1964), whether a company's registration under § 12 
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969), be suspended 
or withdrawn because of violation of any provision of that statute; or (3) commence an 
enforcement proceeding in federal district court, probably seeking an injunction to 
compel inclusion of the resolution in the proxy statement, 1934 Act § 2I(e), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(e) (1964). The third alternative is the only practical approach, and it is the only 
one that the Commission ever employs or seriously considers. 
54. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.18(b)(3), 200.30-l(e)(4), 202.1-3, 202.5 (1969). 
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on three subparagraphs of paragraph (c) which provide that inclusion 
is not required: 
(I) If the proposal as submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's 
domicile, not a proper subject for action by security holders; or 
(2) If it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the 
security holder primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal 
claim or redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its 
management, or primarily for the purpose of promoting general 
economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes; or 
(5) If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that 
the management take action with respect to a matter relating to the 
conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.65 
2. The Function of the SEC 
Under rule 14a-8 the primary issue is whether the shareholder 
resolution may properly be included in management's proxy mate-
rials; the underlying issue is whether management's proxy statement 
complies with the law and the proxy rules if it fails to include the 
resolution. Clearly, a shareholder can privately enforce the proxy 
rules and sue the corporation to compel it to include the disputed 
resolution.66 But, if the SEC has taken a no-action position, the 
shareholder is likely to encounter an attitude in court that defers 
to the SEC's apparent determination that exclusion is permitted, al-
though technically neither the Commission nor the staff have made 
any such decision, but have instead made only an enforcement deter-
mination that they will not require management to include the reso-
lution.157 Formerly, the SEC contended that its no-action position 
was not reviewable agency action under the provisions of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).68 This view was rejected in 
a decision involving Dow Chemical Company, permitting an appeal 
55. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8(c)(l), (2), & (5) (1969). Subparagraphs (3) and (4), 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.14a-8(c)(3), (4) (1969), permit exclusion for reasons not relating to the sub-
stance of the resolution. 
56. Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); JJ. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U.S. 426 (1964). 
57. See, e.g., Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Curtin 
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Peele v. Greyhound Corp., 
97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
58. 1934 Act § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1964), provides, in pertinent part: 
Any person aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in a proceeding 
under this chapter to which such person is a party may obtain a review of such 
order • • • in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
[Circuit], by filing in such court, within sixty days after the entry of such order, 
a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set 
aside in whole or in part. 
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from a no-action determination.1m The availability of judicial review 
was limited in that case, however, since the court's jurisdiction was 
recognized to be dependent upon the SEC's initial determination 
to review the staff decision.60 
The SEC does recognize the necessity, of course, of making in• 
ternal decisions so that it can fulfill its function in advising the 
public about the law, and so that it knows whether and when to 
bring enforcement proceedings. For years this decision-making has 
been done by means of the no-action letter, which Professor Kenneth 
Davis considers to be a law-making function.61 Thus, paragraph (d) 
of rule l 4a-8, requiring that management file with the SEC a state-
ment of its reasons for omitting the resolution, 62 was inserted into 
the rule to allow the Commission sufficient time to consider the 
correctness of management's decision to exclude a resolution.68 The 
SEC has made it clear that the burden of proof is on management 
to show why the proposal should be omitted.64 
The Commission's decisions, in whatever form they appear, are 
generally obeyed by the parties. The SEC has brought only one en-
forcement proceeding in the twenty-eight-year history of rule 14a-8.61S 
Three cases have been brought against issuers,66 and two appeals have 
been taken against the SEC, out of perhaps 1,000 shareholder pro-
posals that have been rejected.67 
While "the law" of what resolutions must be included in man-
agement's proxy statement ultimately is a question of what a court 
59. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
60. 432 F.2d at 675. 
61. Symposium, Public Information Act and Interpretative and Advisory Rulings, 
20 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 29 (1967) (remarks of Professor Kenneth Davis). 
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1969). See text accompanying note 51 supra. 
63. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4979 (Jan. 6, 1954), 19 Fed. 
Reg. 246 (1954). 
64. Hearings on a Report from the SEC on Its Problems in Enforcing the Se:curities 
Laws Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. I, at 118 (1957) (statement of Chairman J. Sinclair Armstrong) [hereinafter 
1957 Hearings]. , 
65. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 
847 (1948). 
66. Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Curtin v. American 
Tel.&: Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 
679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
67. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970); 
Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). This estimate of 
the number of rejected proposals may even be conservative. According to the annual 
reports of the SEC from 1956 to 1969, the total was 826; from 1943 to 1955 the reports 
contained no statistics concerning rejected proposals. 
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will enforce,68 obviously "the law," from a practical standpoint, 
means something more rudimentary in this context. Counsel must 
advise their clients, whether they be shareholders or management, 
what is the likely position of the SEC.69 What further complicates 
matters is that the question of includibility is a mixed question of 
federal and state law. Subparagraph (c)(2) of rule 14a-8 seeks to as-
certain the proponent's purpose to see if it is one, as a matter of 
federal securities law, that precludes his access to management's 
proxy statement. But the larger questions are whether the resolution 
relates to a question that is not a proper subject for action by share-
holders (subparagraph (c)(l)), or whether it concerns a matter relating 
to the conduct of ordinary business (subparagraph (c)(5)). A finding 
that either one of these latter conditions exists would allow manage-
ment to exclude the resolution. And the question under both of 
these subparagraphs is one of state law.70 
The problem with the standards of subparagraphs (c)(I) and (c) 
(5), as Professor Loss notes, is "that there is simply not very much 
state law to use as a guide in these matters."71 Consequently, in 
the search for state law, the SEC has developed its own common 
law defining what is a proper subject for action by shareholders or 
what constitutes the ordinary business operations of the corpora-
tion. 72 This law-making procedure again emphasizes the significance 
of the SEC's findings concerning which resolutions may be excluded. 
Clearly the SEC's role in proxy contests has greater importance as 
a result of the Dow Chemical case, 73 and that case may likewise give 
the federal courts a larger role since some SEC rulings can be ap-
pealed.74 More judicial review should in turn stimulate the articula-
68. O. HOLMES, JR., The Path of the Law, in CoI.I.ECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 169 
(1920). See B. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE I.Aw 21-55 (1924). 
69. Judge Frank noted that "the practice of law has been aptly termed an art of 
prediction." J. FRANK, I.Aw AND THE MODERN MIND 51 (1963). 
70. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 514-15 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 
332 U.S. 847 (1948); 1957 Hearings, supra note 64, at 118 (statement of chairman 
J. Sinclair Armstrong). 
71. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 905 (2d ed. 1961). 
72. Id. at 906, 909 n.200; Crown Cork &: Seal Co., Inc., A Minute of a Meeting of 
the SEC, Feb. 28, 1964, reprinted in ·w. CARY, CASES AND 1fATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
327 (4th ed. 1969). 
73. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
74. The court in the l\ledical Committee case held not only that the petitioner in 
that case was a party "aggrieved" by an "order" of the SEC for purposes of § 25(a) of 
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1964) (see note 58 supra), despite the seeming in-
formality and lack of finality that characterized the SEC's no-action procedure with 
respect to the proposed resolutions (432 F.2d at 665-72), but also that judicial review 
was not barred by § IO of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(2) (1964), 
as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2) (Supp. V, 1965-1969), which prohibits judicial review 
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tion by the SEC of the reasons for particular decisions.75 
The determination that a resolution is a proper matter for in-
clusion in the proxy statement subsumes the question of what mat-
ters may properly be brought before the annual shareholder meeting. 
If the resolution is excluded, management can use its discretionary 
authority under the proxy rules to vote against the proposal if it is 
introduced, 76 and it can even keep the matter off the agenda and 
rule it out of order at the meeting.77 Therefore, the significant ques-
tion to consider in a public-interest proxy contest is what questions 
are proper matters for inclusion in the proxy statement within the 
meaning of rule l 4a-8. 
3. The Development of Rule 14a-8 
Resolution of the question whether issues involving the public 
interest can come before a shareholder meeting requires an assessment 
of the meaning of rule 14a-8 in light of some recent developments. 
The exercise is largely an effort to understand what subparagraph 
(c)(2) of the rule means when it allows management to omit a pro-
posal that "clearly appears" to be submitted "primarily for the pur-
pose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social 
of matters "committed to agency discretion" (432 F.2d at 673-76). The court stated that 
here, the full Commission has exercised its discretion to review this controversy, 
and . . • has ostensibly acted in accord with a very dubious legal theory. The 
Medical Committee asks us merely to examine this allegedly erroneous legal 
premise and return the controversy to the Commission so that it may properly 
exercise its further discretion regarding the propriety and desirability of enforce-
ment activity. 
Limited and partial review to examine the legal framework within which ad-
ministrative discretion must be exercised ••• has been repeatedly sustained •••• 
432 F.2d at 674-75. 
75. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 
76. Rule 14a-4(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c)(4) (1969), permits shareholders, by 
proxy, to confer discretionary authority upon management to vote with respect to 
"[a)ny proposal omitted from the proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to 
§ 240.14a-8 [rule 14a-8) or § 240.14a-9 [rule 14a-9]." Campaign GM argued to the SEC 
that a shareholder could consistently vote both management's proxy and its proxy and 
that in that event the discretionary authority given management should not prevail 
over a specific vote in favor of a resolution that was ultimately excluded under rule 
14a-8. The staff of the Division disagreed with this position and said rule 14a-4 allowed 
management to vote against the proposal. Communication to the author from Mr. Carl 
Bodolus, Branch Chief, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC. 
77. Chairman Fred Borch of General Electric Co. ruled out of order at an annual 
meeting resolutions dealing with the environment, defense business, and alleged strike• 
breaking, on the advice of counsel that these measures could not be voted on since 
the majority of shareholders did not have an opportunity to study them. N.Y. Times, 
April 23, 1970, at 63, col. 5. This dubious ruling shows how management can dominate 
the subject matter of the meeting unless the shareholder can succeed in getting his 
resolution included under rule 14a-8. 
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or similar causes." At the same time, it is necessary to determine 
which public-interest proposals are, "under the laws of the issuer's 
domicile, not a proper subject for action by security holders" within 
the meaning of subparagraph (c)(l) of the rule, or are matters 
relating to the conduct of "ordinary business operations" under sub-
paragraph (c)(5), since public-interest proposals face the possibility 
of being excluded under those provisions as well as under subpara-
graph (c)(2). 
Thoughts of shareholder proposals surely were distant from Con-
gress' mind when it adopted the 1934 Act.78 True, the congressional 
reports spoke of furthering "fair corporate suffrage"79 and of fa-
cilitating the consideration of "major questions of policy,"80 but 
nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended 
to provide a means by which shareholders could use the company 
proxy statement to present their proposals. Misuse of the proxy 
machinery by management was the real concern-Congress was well 
aware of the power wielded by managers and of the separation of 
ownership from control.81 But the 1934 Act does charge the SEC 
with responsibility for promulgating rules necessary or appropriate 
either "in the public interest"82 or "for the protection of investors,"83 
thus giving the Act enough breadth to encompass the regulation of 
shareholder proposals. 
The history of shareholder proposals in proxy statements pre-
dates the adoption of a formal rule. In 1938 under the antifraud84 
rule, the Commission staff maintained that if management had been 
notified by a shareholder that he intended to propose a resolution 
at the annual meeting, management's proxy statement could not 
omit the proposal and then add the usual recital that management 
was unaware of any other business to come before the meeting.85 
Similarly, management could not omit the proposal and at the same 
78. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a-hh-l (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
79. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). 
80. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). 
81. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 13-14 (1934); Hearings on H.R. 
8720 and 7852 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d 
Cong. 2d Sess. 140 (1934) (testimony of Mr. Thomas Corcoran, one of the draftsmen of 
the Act). 
82. 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964). 
83. 1934 Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964). 
84. Rule X-14A-5, SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 1823 (Aug. 11, 
1938). 
85. Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations-Effect on Ability of Corpora-
tion To Hold Yalid Meeting, 24 CoRNELL L.Q. 483, 499 (1939). 
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time obtain discretionary authority to vote against it, nor could it 
use its discretionary authority for the more limited purpose of ob-
taining a quorum and then relying on those present to vote down 
the proposal.86 
In late 1942, the SEC adopted rule X-14A-7,87 the predecessor of 
rule 14a-8, and the rule instantly encountered such hostility that 
bills were introduced in Congress to suspend its effectiveness. At the 
hearings before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee, Chairman Purcell explained an underlying reality that 
prompted the adoption of the rule: 
Once a shareholder could address the meeting, today he can only 
address the assembled proxies which are lying at the head of the 
table. The only opportunity that the stockholder has of expressing 
his judgment comes at the time when he considers the execution of 
the proxy form, and we believe, whether we are right or whether we 
are wrong-and I think we are right-that that is the time he should 
have the full information before him and the ability to take action 
as he sees fit. 
The proxy solicitation is now in fact the only means by which a 
stockholder can act and can perform the functions which are his as 
owner of a corporation. It, therefore, seems clear to us that only by 
making the proxy a real instrument for the exercise of those func-
tions can we obtain what the Congress and this committee called for 
in the form of "fair corporate suffrage."88 
86. Freeman, An Estimate of the Practical Consequences of the Stockholder's 
Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 550 (1957). The SEC emphasized the need to 
describe proposals that were to be presented at the meeting if the proxies were to be 
used in a way that could affect disposition of the proposal in SEC Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 Release No. 2376 Gan. 12, 1940). 
87. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3347 (Dec. 18, 1942), 7 Fed. 
Reg. 10,655-56 (1942). 
88. Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the House Comm, on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 174-75 (1943) [here-
inafter 1913 Hearings]. 
One scholar has recently commented that "the proxy system has developed to the 
point where it not merely leads up to but supplants the shareholders' meeting for 
most substantive purposes, and in some respects, for formal purposes as well." 
Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1489, 
1494 (1970). See Bernstein &: Fisher, The Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: 
Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. Cm. L. REv. 226, 227 (1940); Caplin, 
Shareholder Nominations of Directors: A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage, 39 VA. 
L. REv. 141, 159 (1953). 
Commissioner O'Brien explained to the Conference Board, in a speech in New 
York, on January 21, 1943, a month after the rule was adopted: 
It seems to me that the heart of the problem lies in the failure of corporate 
practice to reproduce through the proxy medium an annual meeting sub-
stantially equivalent to the old meeting in person. I know that the old-fashioned 
meeting cannot be revived. Admittedly, that is impossible. It is not impossible, 
however, to utilize the proxy machinery to approximate the conditions of the 
old-fashioned meeting. 
Address of Robert H. O'Brien, Commissioner, SEC, Before The Conference Board, New 
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The new rule permitted shareholders to propose resolutions only 
if they were "proper subject[s] for action by the security holders."89 
Some members of Congress were worried about the politicalization 
of the proxy statement. They expressed fears that radical proposals 
could be offered under the rule, and that the one-hundred-word state-
ment might be used as a propaganda vehicle.90 The SEC appeared 
untroubled by these doubts. Chairman Purcell said that the Com-
mission could not be concerned with the wisdom of the proposal 
offered.91 Baldwin Bane, who was the Director of the Division of 
Corporation Finance, acknowledged that the rule did not necessarily 
prohibit radical proposals, stating that such proposals could be a 
proper subject for shareholder action.92 
Clearly, it was necessary for the Commission to develop an under-
standing of what was a "proper subject" within the meaning of the 
rule. Two events were particularly significant in the rule's early 
development. In 1947 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, in the Transamerica case, 93 affirmed the view that the 
determination of a "proper subject" is to be made under state law. 
In that case, the shareholder had proposed resolutions for indepen-
dent auditors to be elected by shareholders, for amendment of the 
bylaws to eliminate a requirement that notice of a proposed amend-
ment of the bylaws be contained in the notice of meeting, and for 
a requirement that a report of the proceedings of the annual meet-
ing be sent to shareholders. The court found that each of these pro-
posals was a subject "in respect to which stockholders have the right 
to act under the General Corporation Law of Delaware."94 Under 
Transamerica's bylaws, the resolutions could not be voted upon be-
cause the proponents failed to comply with the provision requiring 
that notice of the proposals be contained in the notice of meeting, 
but the court said that this "minor provision" could not be used to 
frustrate "the intent of Congress to require fair opportunity for the 
operation of corporate suffrage."95 
York City, Jan. 21, 1943, at 3. A former Chairman of the SEC quoted this passage 
in a recent speech. Remarks of Hamer H. Budge, Chairman, SEC, Before the Am. 
Soc. of Corporate Secretaries, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., June 12, 1970, at 11. 
89. Rule X-14A-7, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,656 (1942). 
90. 1943 Hearings, supra note 88, at 161, 225. 
91. 1943 Hearings, supra note 88, at 180. 
92. Id. at 225. 
93. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 
847 (1948). 
94. 163 F.2d at 518. 
95. 163 F.2d at 518. See Analysis: An Examination of the Stockholder Proposal 
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Reference to state law, as noted earlier,96 presents problems be-
cause of the paucity both of state statutory provisions and of judicial 
decisions on point. As a result, federal common law has developed 
as a substitute. All state statutes are clear, however, that "the busi-
ness and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of 
directors."97 This provision enables management to argue in almost 
every case that the resolution invades the province of the board. 
While this argument clearly proves too much, as shown by the Trans-
america case, the SEC, in the development and administration of 
rules X-14A-7 and 14a-8, has been mindful of the necessity to avoid 
stripping the board of its basic governing function. 
An event of greater significance to the public-interest proxy con-
test was Mr. Bane's private interpretation of rule X-14A-7 which the 
SEC made public on January 3, 1945, in the oft-cited Release Num-
ber 3638.98 Resolutions had been submitted to a company asking 
first, that dividends paid to shareholders should be free of federal 
income tax; second, that the antitrust laws and their enforcement be 
revised; third, that all ensuing federal legislation providing for 
workers and farmers to be represented should be made to apply 
equally to investors. The SEC staff agreed with the company that 
all of the proposals could be omitted from the company's proxy 
statement as not "proper subjects" within the meaning of rule 
X-14A-7. The purpose of the rule, said Mr. Bane, was to 
place stockholders in a position to bring before their fellow share-
holders matters of concern to them as stockholders in such corpora-
tion; that is, such matters relating to the affairs of the company 
concerned as are proper subjects for stockholders' action under the 
laws of the state under which it is organized. It was not the intent of 
[the rule] to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of other 
stockholders with respect to matters which are of a general political, 
social or econoipic nature. Other forums exist for the presentation of 
such views. 99 
Provisions of the Proxy Rules, BNA SEC. REG. 8: L. REP. No. 41, at B-1, B-8 (March 11, 
1970). 
96. See text accompanying note 71 supra. 
97. ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr. § 33 (1966). The Delaware statute adds "except 
as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." 
DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (Supp. 1968). The principal draftsman of that statute, 
Professor Ernest L. Folk, has observed that in Delaware the corporation "enjoys the 
broadest grant of power in the English-speaking world to establish the most ap-
propriate internal organization and structure for the enterprise." E. Fout, AMENDMENTS 
TO THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 5 (1969), 
98. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3638 Gan. 3, 1945), 11 Fed, 
Reg. 10,995 (1946). 
99. Id. (Emphasis added). 
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The ruling draws a contrast between those questions over which 
the corporate body has power to act-and hence are of interest to it 
in its corporate capacity-and those questions over which the cor-
poration has no power to take any action-and hence belong in an-
other forum because they are of general interest to citizens. All of 
the resolutions described in the release fell into this latter category 
since their adoption by the shareholders could not affect the areas 
in question. 
In 1948, the SEC amended rule X-14A-7 to permit management 
to exclude a proposal if it was proposed primarily "for the purpose 
of enforcing a personal claim or of redressing a personal grievance 
against the issuer or management .... "100 This amendment was the 
first hint that "purpose" was relevant to the includibility of a resolu-
tion, and although it seems clear that the Commission intended to 
shield management from harassment,101 it was not explained how 
this objective related to the "purpose" of a proposal. 
Purportedly relying on Mr. Bane's 1945 interpretation, a federal 
district court in 1951 sustained a no-action determination by the 
SEC staff that permitted the Greyhound Corporation to exclude a 
shareholder proposal that had recommended the abolition of the 
"segregated seating system in the South."102 The shareholder sought 
to compel the inclusion of the proposal in management's proxy state-
ment by bringing suit in the federal district court, but the court 
found that the shareholder had not exhausted his administrative 
remedies.103 The court added that, on the proof before it, there was 
no basis to overrule the agency's interpretation of the rule. Clearly 
there was no de novo review of the question. 
Contemporaneous comment supported the Greyhound decision 
on fairly narrow grounds. One commentator pointed out that the 
decision was clearly correct because the proponents had asked the 
company to take action that was illegal under state law; thus the 
appropriate forum for such action was the state legislature.104 An-
100. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4185 Ouly 6, 1948), 13 Fed. 
Reg. 6678-79 (1948). 
IOI. Id.; Address of Edward McCormick, Commissioner, SEC, Before the Am. Soc. of 
Corporate Secretaries, May 13, 1950, cited in Ledes, A Review of Proper Subject Under 
the Proxy Rules, 34 U. DET. L.J. 520, 522 n.11 (1957). 
102. Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
103. 97 F. Supp. at 680. The Commission's determination was made by an assistant 
director of the Division of Corporation Finance. 97 F. Supp. at 680. 
104. Note, Rule X-14A-8 of the SEC: Stockholder Participation in Corporate Affairs, 
47 Nw. U. L. REv. 718, 719-20 (1952). The writer of this Note cautioned against reading 
the case to bar proposals that relate to company policy but also raise controversial 
political, social, or economic questions. 
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other comment noted that the resolution was excessive since it was 
not limited to the company's activities but sought to end segregation 
"in the South."105 Although the SEC gave no indication that it was 
seeking to enlarge the 1945 Bane interpretation in the Greyhound 
case, it appears to have done so. The resolutions excluded in 1945 
dealt with subjects with which the corporation was powerless to deal; 
they barely related to the corporation, and certainly did not relate 
to any practices of the corporation. The Greyhound Corporation 
shareholders, on the other hand, were asked to condemn a practice 
actually engaged in by their company, and although it may have 
been necessary to go to the state legislature or the state courts in 
order fully to effectuate that expression, nonetheless an act of will 
by the corporation was also required. In short, the Greyhound case 
presented a mixed question of corporate policy and social policy, 
but the SEC saw it only as a question of social policy. Rightly or 
wrongly, the Commission went beyond the 1945 Bane interpreta-
tion.106 
In 1952, the SEC adopted the present language of subparagraph 
(c)(2).107 Mr. Bane, still Director of the Division of Corporation 
Finance, explained that the purpose of the 1952 amendment was to 
codify Release Number 3638.108 However, he offered no explanation 
for the decision to express that limitation in a provision that made 
includibility tum on the purpose for which a proposal was submit-
ted. 
The SEC tightened rule 14a-8 in 1954,109 so that, according to 
105. Emerson &: Latcham, The SEC Proxy Proposal Rule: The Corporate Gadfly, 19 
U. Cm. L. REv. 807, 833 (1952). This interpretation was noted approvingly in Medical 
Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 677-78 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
106. A letter to the SEC from the American Jewish Congress, June 11, 1952, in SEC 
File No. S 7-35-6-1, pointed out this extension by the Peck case of Release No. 3638. 
The letter also asserted that the company would not rely on state law since the law 
did not require segregated seating on buses in interstate commerce, Morgan v. Virginia, 
328 U.S. 373 (1946), and that segregated seating had been abolished in some cases at 
that time. Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 941 
(1951). 
107. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4775 (Dec. 11, 1952), 17 Fed. 
Reg. 11,431, 11,433 (1952), codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1969). 
108. Letter from Baldwin Bane, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to John Mathis, 
Vice President, Am. Soc. of Corporate Secretaries, Feb. 4, 1952, in SEC Docket File 
No. S 7-35-6-2, in which he stated that the rule was designed to write into the ex-
clusion under rule 14a-8 "the substance of Exchange Act Release No. 3638 •••• " 
109. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4979 Gan. 6, 1954), 19 Fed. 
Reg. 246 (1954). Hearings were held on the amendments and some feared the "death 
knell" of shareholder proposals. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIE.S R.EGULAnoN 912 (2d ed. 1961); 
Bayne, Caplin, Emerson &: Latcham, Proxy Regulation and the Rule Making Process: 
The 1951 Amendments, 40 VA. L. REv. 387 (1954). The amendments specifically added 
the reference in subparagraph (c)(l) (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(l) (1969)) to state law 
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Chairman Ralph Demmler, it would "use a screen with a somewhat 
closer mesh."110 While some proposals had previously been included 
in managements' proxy statements because they were expressed as 
recommendations,111 and hence deferred to the boards' decision-
making power, the new amendment added subparagraph (c)(5) to 
preclude even recommendations or requests when they related to 
the conduct of ordinary business operations.112 The determination of 
what constituted "ordinary business operations" was a subject to be 
decided under state law just as was the question of what constituted 
a "proper subject" under subparagraph (c)(l).113 
Thus, by the 1952 and 1954 amendments the SEC made clear 
that it meant to deny shareholders access to the company's proxy 
statement either for a resolution constituting corporate action, when 
state law reserved the matter to the board, or for a resolution recom-
mending board action on ordinary business matters. On the other 
hand, shareholder recommendations on policy questions or action 
on matters not exclusively reserved for board action would pre-
sumably avoid the Scylla of (c)(l) and the Charybdis of (c)(5),114 al-
though the purpose test of (c)(2) could still prove to exclude the 
proposal. 
The SEC's interpretations are the common law of rule 14a-8, 
even though no compendium of rulings is published, and, at least 
in the past, no reasons were stated for the Commission's conclusion 
in any given case.115 Few decisions under the rule have specifically 
as the authority for determining "proper subject." The intent was to reinforce the 
Transamerica case. Memorandum from Byron D. Woodside, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., 
SEC, Dec. 8, 1953, in SEC Docket No. S 7-65-6. 
110. Demmler, Current Thinking at the SEC, 178 CoM. &: FIN. CHRON, 1227, 1267 
(1953). 
Ill. 2 L. Loss, supra note 109, at 908. 
112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5) (1969). 
113. 1957 Hearings, supra note 64, at 118 (statement of Chairman J. Sinclair Arm.-
strong). 
114. This is because state law would permit the shareholder to vote on such 
matters and to call a special meeting for such purpose. See, e.g., In re Auer v. Dressel, 
306, N.Y. 427, 432-33, US N.E.2d 590, 593 (1954). 
115. The Commission's rather informal administration of the rule has been sharply 
criticized by a former staff lawyer for its inconsistency, its development of weak law, 
and its failure to inform the public of the standards being applied. Clusserath, The 
Amended Stockholder Proposal Rule: A Decade Later, 40 NOTRE DAME LAw. 13, 40-42 
(1964). Others have criticized the SEC for ever having adopted the rule, as seen, for 
example, by the House hearings that were ignited by its adoption. See notes 87-90 supra 
and accompanying text. When hearings were held before the SEC in 1953, the first wit-
ness expressed a preference for repeal. In re Conference on Proxy Rules, Dec. 16; 1953, 
in SEC Docket No. S 7-65-1, at 29 (testimony of Mr. George Brownell, appearing on be-
half of American Telephone &: Telegraph Co.) This has also been the :eosition of the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries. See Emerson, Some Sociological and Legal 
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concerned public-interest questions. Most cases have dealt with such 
matters as cumulative voting, executive compensation, appointment 
of auditors, pre-emptive rights, post-meeting reports, and the place of 
the annual meeting.116 The most notable exclusions of political or 
social questions have been the Greyhound case117 and the Dow 
Chemical case.118 However, as the court of appeals observed in the 
Dow case, it is not clear whether the SEC agreed with Dow manage-
ment that they could exclude the proposal to amend the certificate 
of incorporation restricting the sale of napalm because the proposal 
was "too general" under subparagraph (c)(2) in dealing with a 
political or social question, or "too specific" under subparagraph 
(c)(5) in dealing with a matter of ordinary business operations.119 
The court thought that the possibility of omission under (c)(2) 
"appears somewhat more substantial,"120 but the case was remanded 
to the SEC so that the Commission could decide the issue with suffi-
cient reviewable detail.121 
Under subparagraph (c)(2), the SEC has permitted an investment 
company to exclude a proposal that it cease its investment in liquor 
stocks, and has permitted another company to exclude a proposal 
that women be extended the same pension benefits as men.122 The 
Commission has, on the other hand, indicated the nonincludibility of 
resolutions that would prohibit charitable contributions by com-
panies, 123 even when it was shown that the proposal was motivated 
by shareholder concern about giving support to the views of eco-
nomics professors whose universities were benefited by the charity.124 
The Commission has also permitted a resolution to allow shareholder 
nomination of directors.125 While this latter proposal may not appear 
Aspects of Institutional and Individual Participation Under the SEC's Shareholder 
Proposal Rule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 528, 530 (1957). See also Chilgren, A Plea for Relief 
from Proxy Rule 14a-8, 19 Bus. LAw. 303 (1963). 
116. 2 L. Loss, supra note 109, at 906-07; 35 SEC ANN. REP. 47 (1969). 
117. Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
118. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
119. 432 F .2d at 679. 
120. 432 F.2d at 680. 
121. 432 F .2d at 682. 
122. Heller, Corporate Democracy: Stockholder Proposals, 4 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA 
COMP. 72, 73-74 (1953). 
123. 35 SEC ANN. REP. 47 (1969) describes proposals seeking to limit charitable 
contributions as among those most commonly advanced. 
124. Monaghan, Annual Stockholders' Meetings: Some Legal and Practical Problems, 
16 BAYLOR L. REv. 129, 135 (1964). 
125. This issue related to the Illinois Central Railroad. Emerson &: Latcham, supra 
note 109, at 818-19. 
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to be a political or social question, social activity may focus on the 
corporation's decision-making process and such a resolution may be 
motivated by social or political concerns.126 
Subparagraph (c)(2) of the rule speaks of excluding proposals 
that are advanced "primarily for the purpose of promoting" certain 
causes. It is far from clear what is meant by "purpose" or "pri-
marily" in this context, or how this fact is to be determined, and 
the pre-General Motors cases have not proved particularly instructive. 
In general, the law seeks to avoid an exploration of mental state. 
While the law of contracts, for example, seeks to carry out the intent 
of the parties, "intent" in this sense means manifestation of intent, 
which can be very different from subjective desire or motive.127 
Similarly, an agent's authority is determined by the "principal's 
manifestations of consent to him,''128 not by the principal's motive. 
Often the meaning of a statute depends on the legislative "intent," 
but the inquiry does not pursue the reason why the legislature acted, 
but rather it seeks to plumb what effect the body sought.129 To be 
sure, the distinction between "intent," "motive," and "purpose" is 
subtle and difficult to grasp; unfortunately, the terms are often used 
interchangeably. 
There are times, however, when legal consequences depend on 
mental state. The criminal law is the best example. In other situ-
ations in which we speak of "motive"-which is apparently a mea-
sure of mental state-we may not in fact be examining mental state, 
but rather ascertaining objectively determinable effect, which we 
will construe to be the equivalent of motive. Thus, in deciding 
whether a taxpayer has the wrong "purpose" or "principal purpose," 
as used in various sections of the Internal Revenue Code, courts and 
commentators speak of "motive" and "purpose" as if they were the 
same thing, but proof is based upon objective behavioral facts-what 
was done and what was the tax effect.180 
126. Paragraph 3(E} of the proposal to create the General Motors Shareholders 
Committee for Corporate Responsibility called for a report on increasing the "diverse 
sectors of society in corporate decision-making," and "including nomination and 
election of directors" (emphasis added). See Appendix B infra, proposal 3. 
127. See generally O. Houms, JR., THE CoMMON I.Aw 334-35 (1881). 
128. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (1958). 
129. The classic case is Fletcher v. Peck, IO U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810), in which 
the Supreme Court disregarded the fact that the legislature was bribed as the 
probable motive for its action. The first Justice Harlan, dissenting in New York v. 
Roberts, 171 U.S. 658, 681 (1898), said, "In a legal sense the object or purpose of legis-
lation is to be determined by its natural and reasonable effect, whatever may have 
been the motives upon which legislators acted." 
130. Examples are !NT. R.Ev. ConE of 1954, §§ 269, 532, &: 1551, in which adverse 
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The syntax of rule 14a-8(c)(2) suggests that includibility of a pro-
posal is supposed to depend on the dominant motive of the pro-
ponent. One may be initially inclined to read "purpose" as the "effect" 
of a resolution, and hence confine his thinking to the language of 
the proposal. One would then determine whether the effect is to 
bring before the shareholders a question with which they are em-
powered to deal. But it is difficult to pursue this line of inquiry in 
the face of "primarily," which qualifies "purpose." In any given case, 
the resolution would either deal with a matter of shareholder con-
cern, or it would not. Objectively, if one were measuring only 
"effect," a proposal could not be "primarily" a question for the share-
holders and "secondarily" not, or vice versa. But there can be pri-
mary and secondary reasons for action. Thus, by inserting "primarily" 
in the sentence, it appears that the SEC intended to direct the 
inquiry into the reasons why a resolution was advanced-in other 
words, the proponent's motive is the test. Then, in order for the 
proposal to be excluded, it must "clearly" appear that the improper 
motive is the primary one. 
But syntax alone suggests this interpretation. Bane's 1945 ruling 
never examined or mentioned motive-it was addressed entirely to 
the effect of the proposal131-and he claimed in 1952 to be codifying 
the earlier release.132 More significantly, perhaps, there is no mech-
anism created or existing within the SEC procedures to ascertain 
motive. When the law does inquire into mental state, available 
machinery usually exists for it to do so.133 The Commission is fur-
nished only with documents and an opinion of counsel to make a 
decision whether the proposal must be included in the proxy state-
ment. The only thing it can rationally decide is whether the language 
of the proposal is proper for shareholders; motive, on the evidence 
before the Commission, is entirely speculative.184 True, this reading 
tax consequences can flow from conduct having been undertaken for the wrong 
"principal purpose" or "purpose." Motive and purpose seem to be used to mean the 
same thing. See B. BITl'KER &: J. EumCE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS 212-19, 638-40, 673-79 (2d ed. 1966). 
131. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra. 
132. See note 108 supra and accompanying text. 
133. Mental state, of course, is a fact, and it must be determined by a trier of facts. 
Perhaps the best example is a criminal trial, in which mental state may be a fact which 
determines guilt, or its degree. The issue is decided at trial when evidence is furnished 
in accordance with rules, and both direct examination and cross-examination are avail-
able to the parties. 
134. Not only would "motive" have to be divined without the mechanics of a 
hearing or evidence, but so would whether such motive was the primary one. Tax 
cases have long grappled with that question. See, e.g., United States v. Donruss Co., 
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of subparagraph (c)(2) may render it superfluous since such a reading 
does not appear to add much, if anything, to subparagraph (c)(l), 
but Bane's original ruling was made without the benefit of any 
special provision dealing with political or social questions. It was 
rather an interpretation of "proper subject." Thus, history and 
policy suggest the proper reading of "purpose" as the equivalent of 
"effect,'' rather than "motive." 
Furthermore, in other contexts, the SEC has understood the 
pains of making securities law consequences depend on motive. 
Section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "underwriter" to 
include "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view 
to ... distribution .... "1315 Thus, the statute seems to dictate that 
the status of underwriter depends on a person's state of mind when 
he purchases securities. And if a person is an underwriter with re-
spect to shares that he holds, sales by him would require the delivery 
of a prospectus,136 thereby impairing the free marketability of the 
stock. The consequences of the status of underwriter are sufficiently 
troublesome that thousands of persons each year write to the Com-
mission staff asking for a "no-action" position, fearing that if they 
sell their stock without delivering a prospectus they will be deemed 
to have been underwriters.137 These persons try to prove that they are 
not underwriters by showing objective facts, such as having held the 
stock for two or three years, or having suffered personal financial 
reverses, which confirm that they did not have the wrong state of 
mind when they purchased their stock. In other words, they show 
that they did not purchase stock "with a view to distribution" be-
cause if they had, they would have acted differently. 
The Commission has seen this type of person's problem and it 
hopes to clarify the law for persons affected by it. Although Con-
gress defined "underwriter" to indicate that consideration of motive 
is relevant, the Commission's Disclosure Policy Study recommended 
the adoption of an administrative rule to ignore such considerations. 
The study, best known as the Wheat Report, observed that "[i]t is 
this emphasis on state of mind which is at the heart of the problem. 
393 U.S. 297 (1969). How does one judge the primary motive of Campaign GM, when 
people may be moved for different reasons? Indeed, there may be no such thing as an 
institutional motive. 
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(ll) (1964). 
136. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1964). 
137. The author is advised by members of the SEC staff that this is the number of 
requests that the Division of Corporation Finance has been receiving for no-action 
letters over the past several years. 
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In lieu thereof, the Study recommends a specific set of objective 
rules-rules which would inform the purchaser how long he must 
hold and how he may sell, irrespective of his state of mind."188 Com-
menting on the operation of the rule proposed, the report states, 
"It will not be necessary to prove that a person lacked investment 
intent in order to find that he is an underwriter of securities if 
it can be shown that he has disposed of restricted securities in a dis-
tribution. Conversely, proof of the purity of one's intent will no 
longer be crucial to establishment of a claim for exemption."139 The 
solution proposed is a practical one, proposed because of the existing 
dilemma. The study questioned, "How can [ an investor's] true 'in-
tention' be accurately determined? It is obviously impossible to peer 
into his mind."140 
In spite of strong reasons not to do so-history, policy, and 
experience in related areas-the SEC has tended to interpret sub-
paragraph (c)(2) to require an examination of the proponent's mo-
tive. This policy has resulted in some public-interest questions being 
excluded from management's proxy statement although they dealt 
with subject matters that another shareholder might have been al-
lowed to raise.141 Thus, because the proponents bore toward manage-
ment a personal grievance, Radio Corporation of America was able 
to exclude a resolution prohibiting the hiring of any Communists, 
and Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was allowed to exclude 
a resolution prohibiting discrimination in hiring on the basis of race 
or religion.142 Similarly, the SEC permitted Link Belt Company to 
exclude a resolution that would have required full disclosure and a 
report to stockholders concerning the company's investment in and 
operation of a South African subsidiary.143 Probably the clearest 
example of how the improper-motive test has caused the exclusion of 
138. F. WHEAT, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS-THE WHEAT REPORT 152-54 (CCH. ed. 1969). 
139. Id. at 204. 
140. Id. at 163. 
141. Thus, the shareholder who wanted his investment company to stop owning 
liquor stocks (see text accompanying note 122 supra) might have been motivated by a 
conviction that the economic bottom was about to fall out of all such companies. 
Conceding that the proposal was germane to the company, "on the facts the Com-
mission determined that the primary motive of the stockholder was the advancement 
of a cause with which the stockholder had a close association, rather than the solution 
of a problem pertinent solely to the corporation itself." Heller, supra note 122, at 74. 
142. Bayne, The Basic Rationale of Proper Subject, 34 U. DET. L.J. 575, 602 (1957). 
143. DIV. OF CORP. FIN., STUDIES ON PROXY STATEMENTS (1958). At the General Motors 
meeting, Mr. Roche agreed that General Motors shareholders were entitled to similar 
information, See note 479 infra and accompanying text. 
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a proper proposal was the Commission's upholding of the exclusion 
of a resolution to provide cumulative voting proposed by Mr. Russell 
McPhail-who has engaged in a control fight with the management 
of L.S. Starrett Company144-even though a proposal for cumulative 
voting is the most common resolution offered.145 
Even if the motive of the proponent is unexceptionable, public-
interest proposals may involve allegedly "ordinary business matters," 
as was contended by management recently in both the Dow and 
General Motors cases. In 1958, shareholders of Ford Motor Company 
and General Motors proposed resolutions recommending that specific 
efforts be made by each company to improve the safety of its auto-
mobiles, but both proposals were excluded on grounds of subpara-
graph (c)(5).146 A court likewise sustained American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company's exclusion of a resolution dealing with pen-
sions, which the SEC agreed was an ordinary business matter.147 
On the other hand, dividends are not "ordinary business matters." 
But are dividends a "proper subject" under subparagraph (c)(I)? 
Clearly, the decision to pay a dividend is one for the board of direc-
tors, but courts acknowledge that shareholders may properly con-
sider some questions even though they cannot take binding corporate 
action.148 The SEC split evenly in 1964 on the question whether a 
proposal to recommend the payment of a dividend was required to 
be included on the proxy statement,149 but a close reading of the 
minutes describing the action indicates that one of the two Commis-
sion members who believed that the proposal could be omitted did 
so not on the grounds that it was not a "proper subject," but because 
it was not possible under the circumstances to make adequate dis-
closure in the one hundred words allowed under the rule.150 The 
other Commissioner who favored omission was unconvinced by the 
fact that the proposal was expressed as a recommendation. He be-
lieved that a resolution on a point that was not a "proper subject" 
144. McPhail v. L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958). 
145. 35 SEC ANN. REP. 47 (1969); 2 L. Loss, supra note 109, at 906 n,192. 
146, DIV. OF CORP. FIN,, STUDIES ON PROXY STATEMENTS (1958). 
147. Curtin v. American Tel. &: Tel. Co., 124 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). It has 
been suggested that this decision could give great sweep to the "ordinary business" 
exclusion. E. ARANow &: H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 293-94 
(2d ed. 1968). 
148. In re Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954). Cf. Campbell v. 
I:oews, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852 (Ch. 1957). 
149. Crown Cork&: Seal Co., Inc., A Minute of a Meeting of the SEC, Feb. 28, 1964, 
reprinted in w. CARY, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 327 (4th ed. 1969). 
150. Id. at 328. 
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for shareholders could be excluded under subparagraph (c)(l) even 
if it was expressed as a recommendation.151 
One of the two Commissioners who favored inclusion sharply dis-
agreed with the view just stated. He felt that a precatory resolution 
could be excluded only by reason of some specific provision in the 
rule, mainly subparagraph (c)(5), but presumably subparagragh (c)(2) 
as well. This view was based on a historical analysis of the rule.152 
The other Commissioner favoring inclusion stated that he would not 
go quite that far, but believed that shareholders could vote on policy 
questions. He felt that it was useful to allow open discussion of such 
questions, noting the healthy effect the rule has had on corporate 
management.153 
The issue of the includibility of policy proposals was joined 
again when the Division of Corporation Finance expressed "no 
action" on the exclusion by Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
of a resolution that the company continue its efforts to explore for 
oil in international waters. The proposal also directed the company 
to encourage the creation of a "stable international regime." The 
court deferred to the SEC judgment that this proposal was not a 
proper subject for shareholders under subparagraph (c)(l).m No 
opinion accompanied the SEC determination, but the court found 
that it was a correct interpretation of New Jersey law. The key to 
the proposal was the second part, dealing with the international 
regime, and, among other things, management questioned the extent 
to which a company could pursue such an objective.155 The share-
holder's observation was that his concern was policy, and that the 
objective could be pursued in a variety of ways, as determined by 
the board.156 The real problem with the resolution, however, ap-
peared to be the fact that it was not drawn in precatory language. 
Thus, the stage was set for Campaign GM's struggle with man-
agement. If Campaign GM could convince the SEC that its resolu-
tions were includible in management's proxy statement, a major 
battle would be won. But management's arsenal to combat the 
inclusion of the proposals was by no means insubstantial. If the 
prior SEC decisions provided any guide, they seemed to indicate that 
151. Id. at 330. 
152. Id. at 328-29. 
153. Id. at 331. 
154. Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
155. The argument was much the same as that made concerning the Greyhound 
case: that the company would violate local law if it adopted the policy of the resolu-
tion. See note 104 supra and accompanying text. 
156. 308 F. Supp. at 812-13. 
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management had a good chance of excluding most or all of the pro-
posals under rule 14a-8(c)(l), (c)(2), or (c)(5). 
4. The General Motors Decision 
The General Motors management notified the SEC and the 
Project that it intended to exclude all of Campaign GM's proposals 
from its proxy statement under rule 14a-8.157 It argued that it could 
exclude all of the proposals under subparagraph (c)(2) since it clearly 
appeared that they were submitted primarily for the purpose of pro-
moting a general economic, political, racial, religious, social, or simi-
lar cause.158 In this regard, management cited a letter from the Pro-
ject, describing itself as a "newly formed organization which will 
explore methods by which corporations can be made more responsive 
to public and social needs."1119 Management also relied largely on 
statements by Ralph Nader to show that General Motors was viewed 
as a target rather than as a subject of shareholder concern, and that 
the company was a symbol of the Project's activities. Campaign GM, 
it was charged, was interested in the public, not in the corporation. Its 
activities were directed mainly to citizens, not shareholders. Manage-
ment's counsel argued that the purpose of subparagraph (c)(2) "is 
to limit the use by shareholders of the management's proxy material 
to purposes which are germane to the corporation itself-that is, to 
matters which primarily concern the corporation or its shareholders 
as such rather than matters which concern them primarily as citizens 
or members of other groups."160 
Management also argued that all of the proposals, except the 
bylaw amendment, were not proper subjects for action by security 
holders under subparagraph (c)(l) since they either required action 
not permitted by state law, required action already required by 
state law, or involved action by shareholders that state law reserved 
to the board of directors.161 
Additionally, management argued that all of the proposals except 
157. Management's response was accompanied by opinions of its general counsel, 
Letter from Mr. Ross L. Malone to General Motors Corp., Feb. 27, 1970 [hereinafter 
Malone Letter), and a New York law firm, Letter from Davis, Polk & Wardwell to 
Mr. Ross L Malone, General Counsel, General Motors Corp., Feb. 27, 1970 [hereinafter 
Davis, Polk & Wardwell Letter), in addition to about one hundred pages of exhibits. 
158. Management also argued that the proxy rules had been violated by Campaign 
GM's solicitation activities and that the appropriate sanction was to exclude the 
proposals. See pt. II. C. infra. 
159. Letter from Mr. Geoffrey Cowan to Mr. Edward B. Wallace, Secretary, General 
Motors Corp., Feb. 6, 1970, reprinted in 116 CONG. R.Ec. El267 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1970). 
160. Davis, Polk & Wardwell Letter, supra note 157, at 9. 
161. Id. at 11. 
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the proposed amendment to the certificate of incorporation and the 
bylaws were excluclible under subparagraph (c)(5) since they con-
sisted of recommendations or requests that management take action 
with respect to matters relating to the conduct of ordinary opera-
tions of the company.162 Finally, management argued that the 
proposal to amend the bylaws related to an election to office and 
was excludible under paragraph (a) of rule 14a-8.163 
The Project's reply noted the significance of the includibility 
issue. It argued that 
[i]t must be recognized that Management's proxy statement is the 
only effective vehicle through which all of the shareholders can have 
an opportunity to express themselves, and even to hear any argu-
ments on the questions involved. It is too glib to say that the 
proponents of the resolutions can undertake their own proxy solici-
tations. As Management well knows, the cost is virtually prohibitive 
except to extremely well heeled shareholders .... This is no ordinary 
dispute with Management; it is not an effort by insurgent share-
holders to seize control of the corporation. If it were so, one could 
justify large expenditures because the individual rewards are great 
and because, if successful, the insurgents could obtain reimbursement 
of their expenses from the company. The issues here lack that 
personal pecuniary bias. Denial of access to the shareholders through 
Management's proxy solicitation, practically is total denial.164 
The Project noted that the proposed resolutions dealt with mat-
ters of great importance to General Motors, as was indicated by 
management's formidable submission to the Commission of docu-
ments showing the company's great involvement in safety, pollu-
tion, and other public-interest fields. The Project then argued that 
management could not contend that the resolutions were exclud-
ible both for the reason that they were concerned with a matter 
of general social or political questions and at the same time that 
they were ordinary business matters.165 In truth, said the Project, 
the proposals were neither, but were rather matters of company 
policy. The social orientation of the resolutions was not disputed, 
but it was argued that modem notions of the corporation rendered 
social concerns legitimate areas for corporate activity and for share-
holder consideration. Moreover, the Project urged that it was good 
162. Malone Letter, supra note 157, at 20-27. 
163. Davis, Polk&: Wardwell Letter, supra note 157, at 15-16. 
164. Letter from the author to the SEC, March 10, 1970, reprinted in 116 CoNc. 
REc. E2147-51 (daily ed. March 17, 1970). 
165. This same inconsistency was noted by the court in Medical Comm. for Human 
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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business for the corporation to weigh social factors in business deci-
sions. 
Attention at the SEC focused on the proposal to create the share-
holder committee. The Commission was advised, both by its General 
Counsel and by the Division of Corporation Finance, that the pro-
posal to amend the certificate of incorporation and the six proposals 
to require specific action in various problem areas could be excluded 
from management's proxy statement. Both also agreed that the 
proposal to enlarge the board of directors by amendment of the 
bylaws required inclusion in the proxy statement. However, the 
General Counsel advised the Commission that the shareholder com-
mittee proposal should be included in the proxy statement, while 
the Division of Corporation Finance agreed with management that 
the proposal could be excluded, apparently on the basis of sub-
paragraph (c)(2).166 The Commission resolved, by a two-to-one 
vote,167 to advise management that the shareholder committee pro-
posal should be included if the proposal "were revised promptly (1) 
to restrict the funds to be allocated to the Committee to reasonable 
amounts as determined by the Board of Directors and (2) to restrict 
the information to be made available to the Committee to areas 
which the Board of Directors did not deem privileged for business 
or competitive reasons."168 
The Commission's decision posed a dilemma for Campaign GM. 
Access to corporate information was central to the shareholder com-
mittee proposal. The one-hundred-word supporting statement em-
phasized this point by declaring that "[p ]ast efforts by men such 
as Ralph Nader to raise these issues have been frustrated by the 
refusal of management to make its files and records available either 
to the shareholders or to the public. Only a committee representing 
a broad segment of the public with adequate resources and access 
to information can prepare a report which will accomplish these 
objectives."169 Consequently, the last sentence of the proposal as 
originally submitted read, "The committee shall have the power to 
166. Minutes of a Meeting of the SEC, March 18, 1970, at 2 (April 14, 1970). 
167. Chairman Budge and Commissioner Needham were absent. 
168. Minutes of a Meeting of the SEC, March 18, 1970, at 3 (April 14, 1970). Com-
missioner Richard B. Smith, who proposed the motion, would have gone further. He 
favored hearing oral argument on the proposals because of "his belief that the proposals 
presented serious issues raised by the movements in the nation toward increased con-
sumer protection and greater corporate social responsibility. It was [his] feeling that 
these developing concerns should be given new attention in the Commission's con-
sideration with respect to the proposals •••• " Id. 
169. Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement of General Motors Corp., 
April 6, 1970, at 18. 
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obtain any information from the corporation and its employees as 
deemed relevant by the Committee." After the Commission's de-
cision, the Project proposed to meet the Commission's objection by 
adding to that sentence, "Provided, however, that the committee 
shall not release to the public any information which the board of 
directors deems privileged for business or competitive reasons."170 
The Division of Corporation Finance responded that this proviso 
did not comply with the Coin.mission's decision of March 18, which, 
it noted, directed that the change be made "promptly."171 At this 
point, Campaign GM seriously contemplated standing its ground 
and asking a court to compel management to include the proposal 
as originally written. It finally concluded, however, that the specific 
language of the proposal was not so important as the general prin-
ciples embodied in the proposal, and that the principles should be 
allowed to come to a vote. A lawsuit threatened that possibility. 
Consequently, Campaign GM decided to accept the Commission's 
language, modified, however, to limit the board's right to restrict 
information only if it "reasonably" determined that such restricted 
information is privileged.172 The SEC staff accepted this change,173 
and agreed that the proposal be included. 
5. Rule 14a-8 Revisited: The Meaning of the 
General Motors Decision 
In the early development of rule 14a-8, the only test of includi-
bility of a resolution was whether a proposal was a proper subject 
for action by shareholders. What was scrutinized was the proposal-
not the proponent. Bane's test, which the Commission purported 
to adopt, was whether the shareholder meeting was a "proper 
forum"; in other words, could shareholders properly deal with the 
subject matter.174 This test was consistent with the Commission's 
purpose of having the proxy machinery simulate a meeting that 
all could attend.175 Certainly at a meeting, the appropriateness of a 
170. Campaign To Make General Motors Responsible, Preliminary Proxy Statement, 
filed March 23, 1970. 
171. Telephone communication to the author from Carl Bodolus, Branch Chief, 
Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, March 24, 1970. 
172. See Appendix B infra, proposal 3. 
173. The change was proposed in the belief that a court would liberally allow 
shareholders access to pertinent corporate information. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 
163 F.2d 511, 517 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948). 
174. SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3638 Gan. 3, 1945), 11 Fed. 
Reg. 10,995 (1946). See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra. 
175. See 1943 Hearings, supra note 88, at 174-75 (testimony of Chairman Ganson 
Purcell); Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's 
Role, 37 VA. L. R.Ev. 653, 686-97 (1951). 
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resolution would be judged only by its words, and not by the reason 
for uttering them. 
But the Commission lost sight of this objective, for reasons never 
stated, but perhaps out of an understandable reaction to much of 
the abuse it received in respectable quarters for ever having adopted 
the rule. Consequently, it inserted a test of "primary purpose" in a 
rule supposedly codifying Bane's release,176 first with respect to a 
personal grievance, and later with respect to social and political 
objectives. Bane never spoke of purposes; the rule does. This dis-
crepancy has resulted in some unfortunate policy under the rule. As 
Professor Loss notes, resolutions barring an investment company 
from investing in liquor stocks, or requiring a company to treat 
women employees equally are germane to the company, but the 
"purpose" test, which was used to mean "motive," excluded the 
proposals.177 The proposals could have been offered at the meeting; 
why not through the proxy machinery? The murkiness created by 
the inquiry into "motive" was expressed by Father Bayne: 
If the Commission meant merely to exclude the airing of political 
views, or the use of a proxy statement as a forum for the spread of a 
religion, or the like, it did not say so. If it meant to prohibit share-
holders from formulating corporate policies in regard to basic moral 
issues, important social questions, broad economic programs or 
similar causes, it was flatly out of order.178 
SEC policy after the General Motors decision and the Dow case 
may be different. The Commission necessarily determined in the 
General Motors decision that the resolutions were not offered "pri-
marily for the purpose" of dealing with social or political questions. 
The "motives" of the proponents were not concealed; the alleged 
disability created by those motives was effectively argued by manage-
ment. Certainly there was a social purpose behind the resolutions.179 
The purpose of the proposed Shareholders Committee on Corporate 
Responsibility was to "enable shareholders to assess the public im-
176. See Letter from Baldwin Bane, Director, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to John 
Mathis, Vice President, Am. Soc. of Corporate Secretaries, Feb. 4, 1952, in SEC 
Docket File No. S 7-115-6•2, Cf. Remarks of Hamer H. Budge, Chairman, SEC, Before 
the Am. Soc. of Corporate Secretaries, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., June 12, 1970, 
at Ill. See text accompanying notes 100-08 supra. 
177. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REcuunoN 902 n.179 (2d ed. 1961). See text accompanying 
note 122 supra. 
178. Bayne, supra note 142, at 602. 
179. This point was not missed at the Commission table. Commissioner Smith asked 
for oral argument because "the proposals presented serious issues raised by the move-
ments in the action toward increased consumer protection and greater corporate social 
responsibility .••• [T]hese developing concerns should be given new attention in the 
Commission's consideration with respect to the proposals ••• ," Minutes of a Meeting 
of the SEC, March 18, 1970, at 11 (April 14, 1970). 
456 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:419 
pact of the Corporation's decisions, and to determine the proper role 
of the Corporation in society."180 The bylaw amendment was offered 
to achieve broader representation on the board in order to assess 
the social impact of the corporation's decisions. These concerns were 
not with the profitability of the corporation, but were nonetheless 
with the activities of the corporation. In finding that the proxy rules 
required any of the proposals to be included, the Commission was 
finding that a proponent's concern more for the impact of the cor" 
poration on society than with the corporation itself does not render 
his proposal one which is ipso facto "primarily for the purpose of 
promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or 
similar causes .... "181 Rather, the proposals are raised in a proper 
forum when shareholders consider them because they are within the 
corporation's scope of action. 
The crucial word, under this reading of subparagraph (c)(2), 
is "general." This word focuses on the resolution, rather than on the 
reasons for proposing it. Thus, Commissioner Smith, explaining 
why the proposed amendment to the bylaws was clearly proper, said, 
"That sort of shareholder proposal has always been considered 
includible ..• ,"182 
Commissioner Smith's reasoning and his decision are right; his 
history is wrong. The Commission has permitted exclusion of pro-
posals that would clearly have been includible except for the impro-
priety of the proponent's motive. Thus, a proposal for cumulative 
voting offered by Lewis Gilbert had to be included; one offered by 
Russell McPhail to L.S. Starrett Company could be excluded.188 
Perhaps Commissioner Smith, in ignoring the motive for the bylaw 
change, is suggesting that personal motive is not the meaning of 
"primarily for the purpose," at least when assessing the propriety of 
a resolution dealing with political or social questions. In the same 
speech, Commissioner Smith said that "state law does not in any 
case enable shareholders to use the corporate machinery to advance 
solely personal interests, solely general community interests or mat-
ters of ordinary business-type corporate interest."184 Why does 
Smith refer to state law when subparagraph (c)(2) itself makes no 
180. Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement of General Motors Corp., 
April 6, 1970, at 18. 
181. SEC proxy rule 14a•8(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1969) (emphasis added). 
182. Remarks of Richard B. Smith, Commissioner, SEC, Before the ALI-ABA Con-
ference on Securities Regulation, ·washington, D.C., June 6, 1970, at 1. 
183. DIV. OF CORP. FIN., STUDY ON PROXY STATEMENTS (1958). 
184. Remarks of Richard B. Smith, Commissioner, SEC, Before the ALI-ABA Con-
ference on Securities Regulation, Washington, D.C., June 6, 1970, at 9 (emphasis added), 
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reference to state law? Commissioner Smith seems to be judging the 
question of excludibility as essentially a determination of "proper 
subject," which the Commission has held is a question of state 
law.1811 State law, of course, does not afford a guide in determining 
motive; thus, the reference to state law indicates that the Commis-
sioners may be looking only at the subject matter of a proposal, not 
at the motive of the proponent. And the Dow case makes the same 
point. In that case, Judge Tamm said that "it seems fair to infer 
that Congress desired to make proxy solicitations a vehicle for 
corporate democracy rather than an all-purpose forum for malcon-
tented shareholders to vent their spleen about irrelevant matters 
• • • .''186 But what about the malcontented shareholder who wants 
to vent his spleen about relevant matters? 
The General Motors decision, then, may have wide implications. 
There are doubtless many ways that a corporation could approach 
problems of social responsibility. In his argument against including 
the proposal for a shareholder committee, General Motors' general 
counsel, Ross L. Malone, argued that "[t]he proposed Committee, 
its composition, appointment, purpose and functions, is no more 
than a concept, without precedent, that I know of, in corporate 
law."187 He also argued that the proposal "is replete with vague, 
indefinite and theoretical phrases and concepts and may be properly 
excluded from the proxy soliciting material for that reason alone.''188 
These so-called infirmities, however, which Mr. Malone thought 
made the proposal excludible under subparagraphs (c)(I) or (c)(5), 
were not sufficient to bar the proposal. Thus, in the wake of the 
General Motors decision, shareholder proposals may seek approval 
for new forms of corporate action that lack precedent under tradi-
tional notions of corporate law.189 
The General Motors decision, however, recognized certain limits 
on the scope of public-interest questions that could be included in 
management's proxy statement. These limits result from the applica-
tion of state law to the questions what is a "proper subject" or what 
185, See notes 70, 96-99, 113 supra and accompanying text. 
186. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
187. Malone Letter, supra note 157, at 27. 
188. Id. 
189. Chairman Budge commented before the Corporate Secretaries that "[i]t is 
probably safe to assume, however, that Rule 14a-8 will be increasingly focused upon 
as a means of raising questions which companies have assumed to be outside the 
perimeter of proper shareholder interest," Remarks of Hamer H. Budge, Chairman, SEC, 
Before the Am. Soc. of Corporate Secretaries, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., Jun~ 12, 
1970, at 16. 
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is "ordinary business." The Commission's decision to restrict the 
amount of information available to the Shareholders Committee for 
Corporate Responsibility to that which the board would permit 
recognized that state law assigns to the board of directors the primary 
responsibility for protecting the shareholder interest.190 A proposal 
that prevents the board from performing its basic function is not, 
in the Commission's opinion, a proper subject for action by security 
holders. Shareholders are protected both by access to corporate in-
formation and by the denial to others of access to that information. 
The board cannot be stripped of its protective role in this regard; 
to do so would flaunt the governing structure of corporations as 
defined by state law. At the same time, the staff's acceptance of the 
insertion of a reasonableness standard191 suggested by Campaign GM 
indicated that the Commission recognized that the board could 
encounter questions concerning the extent of corporate privilege 
of information that requires criteria for resolution, and, further, 
that the resolution of such questions might require a judicial deter-
mination. 
No reasons were advanced by the Commission for permitting 
exclusion of the seven other proposals, but management had argued 
that they were excludible under either subparagraph (c)(l) or (c)(5).192 
No single rationale will support the exclusion of the proposals, 
however, since they represent three different types of proposals. 
One of the excluded proposals would have amended the certifi-
cate of incorporation to prohibit the company from implementing 
certain of its corporate purposes by unlawful means, or by means 
that endangered the public health, safety, or welfare.198 The pro-
posal was undoubtedly defective in form as the Commission noted 
-Delaware law requires the board of directors to initiate changes 
in the certificate of incorporation194-but this defect could have 
been overcome by redrafting the resolution in precatory terms.lOIS 
190. See notes 166-71 supra and accompanying text. The minutes reflect the belief 
held by all present at the meeting that without modification of the provision allowing 
for complete access to information the proposal would be barred under subparagraph 
(c)(l). Minutes of a Meeting of the SEC, March 18, 1970, at 3 (April 14, 1970). 
191. See text accompanying notes 172-73 supra. 
192. See text accompanying notes 161-62 supra. 
193. See Appendix B infra, proposal 1. 
194. DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(d)(l) (Supp. 1968). 
195. See notes 114 &: 148-56 supra and accompanying text. In 1967 and 1968, 
Mrs. Evelyn Y. Davis proposed to amend the General Motors certificate of incorporation 
to limit charitable contributions, and the proposal was cast in the same mandatory 
form as the Campaign GM proposal. Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement 
of General Motors Corp., April 19, 1968, at 26; id., April 13, 1967, at 25. But, if the 
form is defective, the Commission may suggest changes. In re Union Electric Co., 38 
S.E.C. 921, 927 (1959). 
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Thus the Commission must have concluded that the proposal was 
not a "proper subject" because of its substance. 
This decision is puzzling. General Motors' argument that the 
proposal merely stated the law196 overlooked the restriction against 
implementing its purposes "in a manner which is detrimental to the 
public health, safety or welfare .... " One suspects that the Commis-
sion did not fully understand the implications of the proposal and 
in that respect they can hardly be blamed since the proposal is a 
broad statement of policy. But much of the language contained in 
the purpose clause of a certificate of incorporation is similarly broad 
and vague. A more appropriate disposition by the Commission on 
this proposal would have been a suggestion for clarification rather 
than a bare ruling of exclusion. 
Another excluded proposal would have required the company 
to announce and act upon a commitment to a greatly increased role 
for public mass transportation.197 Management objected to this 
proposal under subparagraphs (c)(l) and (c)(5).198 The opinion of 
General Motors' outside counsel distinguished this proposal from 
the remaining five that were excluded, but said that it dealt with "a 
matter of business policy"199 and that, on the authority of Brooks v. 
Standard Oil Company,200 such matters were not a proper subject 
for action by security holders. In addition, Mr. Malone's opinion 
contended that questions of business policy are matters for the 
directors. 201 
It should be noted, however, that this proposal was worded as a 
recommendation to management rather than as a mandate. This 
fact distinguishes the proposal from those excluded in the Standard 
Oil case. But even recommendations to the board are properly ex-
cluded under subparagraph (c)(5) when they deal with "the conduct 
of ordinary business operations." The resolution was directed at 
General Motors' pro-highway lobbying activities, which obviously 
relate to selling more cars.202 The proponents' view was that a 
policy favorable to selling more cars is not necessarily good policy, 
even if it does make more money for the company. When viewed in 
this context, the proposal clearly goes beyond everyday operations. 
196. Malone Letter, supra note 157, at 16-19. 
197. See Appendix B infra, proposal 4. 
198. Malone Letter, supra note 157, at 20, 26-28. 
199. Davis, Polle &: Wardwell Letter, supra note 157, at 13. 
200. 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See text accompanying notes 154-56 supra. 
201. Malone Letter, supra note 157, at 21-26, 28. 
202. See Statement of Project on Corporate Responsibility in Support of Proposal 
No. 4, reprinted in 116 CoNG. REc. El974 (daily ed. March 12, 1970). 
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To say that the board is empowered to deal with this policy matter 
does not provide an answer, unless the board's interest at the same 
time preempts shareholder action or interest. Subparagraph (c)(5) spe-
cifically bans shareholder proposals on "ordinary business" matters. 
Policy questions, on the other hand-at least when cast in precatory 
terms-seem to be "proper subjects."203 This distinction was noted 
by Commissioner Smith when he remarked that "pride of ownership 
may extend to corporate policies as well as profits."204 He added, 
"The Commission's proxy rules, while not explicit on the point, 
appear to recognize this distinction between expressions of basic 
corporate policy by shareholders-as to which properly framed 
proposals under l 4a-8 may be includible-and attempts by share-
holders to diffuse managerial obligations which state law clearly 
places upon the board of directors."205 
It seems likely that the Commission did not clearly distinguish 
this precatory resolution from the five other properly excluded 
resolutions that proposed specific measures in particular problem 
areas.206 These proposals were objected to as improper-even if 
worded as recommendations-because they dealt with ordinary 
business matters. In one sense the proposals were far from ordinary 
since their implementation would have involved substantial expendi-
tures and they were not calculated to improve the company's profit-
ability. But while the general policy of expending large sums on 
safety and pollution may be proper for shareholders to consider,207 
anything more specific than that would seem to be a question wholly 
within the province of the board. The proponents may in fact possess 
as much expertise as the board in such matters, but the body of share-
holders who are asked to decide the question do not, nor can they 
be expected to be interested in dealing with detailed programs.208 
Consequently, the Commission's decision to allow exclusion of the 
five specific proposals was the correct disposition under either sub-
paragraph (c)(l) or (c)(5). 
203. See the conflicting views expressed by the Commissioners in the Crown Cork 
8: Seal Co. controversy, in text accompanying notes 149.53 supra. 
204. Remarks of Richard B. Smith, Commissioner, SEC, Before the ALI-ABA Con-
ference on Securities Regulation, Washington, D.C., June 6, 1970, at 10. 
205. Id. at 11, 
206. See Appendix B infra, proposals 5-9. 
207. Analysis: An Examination of the Stockholder Proposal Provisions of the Proxy 
Rules, BNA SEC. REc. & L. REP. No. 41, at B-1, B-16 (March 11, 1970). 
208. According to Commissioner Smith, "The system has started with the factual 
assumption that shareholders today are neither interested in nor capable of making 
ordinary managerial decisions." Remarks of Richard B. Smith, Commissioner, SEC, 
Before the ALI-ABA Conference on Securities Regulation, Washington, D.C., June 6, 
1970, at 10. 
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Even after the General Motors decision the question whether rule 
14a-8 permits the raising of a public-interest issue in management's 
proxy statement remains a confusing one because of the inquiry into 
purpose. Happily, the recent interpretations seem to revive the early 
applications of the rule. The issue of purpose, therefore, requires an 
exploration first, into whether the proposal is concerned with a ques-
tion that is within the corporation's power to act, and, second, into 
whether it is a matter on which the body of shareholders can address 
themselves in their capacity as shareholders. If both of these ques-
tions are answered in the affirmative (and assuming the proposal is 
not motivated by a personal grudge), the purpose of the resolution 
cannot be construed to be primarily that of promoting a "general" 
social or political cause. The personal social or political philosophy 
that may have motivated the resolution is irrelevant under this test. 
This interpretation of purpose under subparagraph (c)(2) was not 
followed by the SEC during the period between the Greyhound and 
Dow decisions,209 but it was the original meaning of the rule,210 and 
was revived in the General Motors decision consistent with the Dow 
case. 
This revived formulation of the purpose test necessitates a deter-
mination of what questions are within the corporation's ambit of 
action and are of common concern to the shareholder body. If cor-
poration law demands that corporation decision makers consider 
only questions of profitability and that they ignore social and moral 
implications of corporate conduct, then such questions are not of 
common interest to shareholders as shareholders. So the ultimate 
question must be what is the role of the modem corporation in 
society; that is, do corporations have a social responsibility. If ques-
tions of social and political significance are germane to a corporation, 
the shareholders' role would seem legitimately to embrace questions 
of policy. As Judge Tamm, speaking in the Dow case, said: 
We think that there is a clear and compelling distinction between 
management's legitimate need for freedom to apply its expertise in 
matters of day-to-day business judgment, and management's patently 
illegitimate claim of power to treat modem corporations with their 
vast resources as personal satrapies implementing personal political 
or moral predilections. It could scarcely be argued that management 
is more qualified or more entitled to make these kinds of decisions 
than the shareholders who are the true beneficial owners of the 
corporation; and it seems equally implausible that an application of _ 
209. See note, 102-08, 122·26, 141-45 supra. and accompanying text. 
210. See notes 89-95, 98-99, 131-32 supra and accompanying text. 
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the proxy rules which permitted such a result could be harmonized 
with the philosophy of corporate democracy which Congress em-
bodied in section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.211 
B. Corporate Social Responsibility 
If the key to the includibility of a public-interest question in 
management's proxy statement is whether the corporate forum is the 
right one in which to raise the issue, obviously it is necessary to 
determine the jurisdiction of the corporation. What can an ap-
propriate decision maker do with the aggregation of assets and 
powers combined in corporate form? The question is a legal one-
not a political one. It relates only to power-not social imperatives-
although the existence of social imperatives may shape the scope of 
the power. 
The traditional theory of the corporation is that the corporate 
manager pursues maximum profits for the benefit of the share-
holders.212 The common thread that binds investors to the corpora-
tion is the expectation that the managers will make every effort to 
derive the largest possible profit, consistent with the safety of the 
invested principal. The devotion to profit is explained not only in 
terms of investor expectation, but also by the need to adopt criteria 
to limit the power and judge the performance of management. Adolf 
Berle wrote in 1932 "that you cannot abandon emphasis 'on the view 
that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making prof-
its for their stockholders' until such time as you are prepared to 
offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities 
to someone else."213 
Pursuit of private gain is relied upon to protect the ownership 
interest in the private corporation; the protection of the community 
211. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
Judge Tamm seemed upset by management's inconsistent defense of exclusion. While 
urging that the shareholder was moved by moral concerns, and not by corporate in-
terests, management did not try to defend its sale of napalm on grounds of profitability, 
but admitted that it had adverse profit impact. 432 F.2d at 681. So it was a moral fight 
on both sides, with management insisting that the shareholders had no right to urge 
action for moral reasons. This argument seemed too one-sided for Judge Tamm. 
212. Ruder, Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. Rm-. 209, 
213-14 (1965). 
213. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. Rm-. 
1365, 1367 (1932). That expression finds wide support from contemporary scholars. 
See, e.g., Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers and Corporate 
Sodal Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. R.Ev. 248 (1969); Katz, Responsibility and the Afodem 
Corporation, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 75, 77 (1960); Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends 
Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CoRFORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 
61-62 (E. Mason ed. 1959). 
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interests affected by corporate activity, however, is a function as-
signed to the free market. The traditional model operates on the 
assumption that the economic forces of competition and the price 
mechanism will afford the public a reasonably free choice and will, 
in turn, provide optimal allocation of resources.214 Adam Smith 
envisioned an enlightened self-interest emerging in an economy free 
from monopolistic domination to serve society's economic needs.215 
Thus, the logic of the traditional theory demands that managers 
operate a business with a view only to profit-seeking, and that they 
leave it to the market place to develop moral or social judgments.216 
The strict logic of this view also limits corporate charitable contri-
butions to those situations in which there is clear corporate bene-
fit.211 
An efficiently operating securities market is supposed to assist 
in the economic functions. If the securities market operates fairly, 
displeased investors can sell their stock for the right price. Supposedly, 
the combined shareholder dissatisfaction with company policies will 
result in collective sales that will put pressure on the stock of the 
company, driving it downward and making it possible for outsiders 
to seize control. To avoid this result, managers will tailor their 
policies to prevent shareholder dissatisfaction. 218 
American corporation law has been fashioned as the constitu-
tional law of our economic state based upon the traditional 
economic model.219 This constitutional law has developed a structure 
for decision-making220 and a mode of acceptable behavior for man-
214. The traditional theory is well expressed in P. HEYNE, PRIVATE KEEPERS OF THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 7-13 (1968). See also A. .ALCHIAN &: w. At.LEN, ExCHANGE AND PRODUCTION 
-THEORY IN USE chs. 2, 3 (1969). 
215. A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 14 (Modem Library ed. 1937). 
216. Professor Milton Friedman asserts: 
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society 
as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make 
as much money for their stockholders as possible • • • • rilf businessmen do have 
a social responsibility other than making maximum prolifs for stockholders, how 
are they to know what it is? Can self-elected private individuals decide what the 
social interest is? 
M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
217. Manne, Book Review, 24 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 194, 196 (1956). 
218. Manne, Good for General Motors?, BARRON'S, May 18, 1970, at 1. The free 
operation of the securities markets causes Dr. Manne to worry less about the separa-
tion of ownership from control. See Manne, The "Higher Critidsm" of the Modern 
Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 399 (1962). 
219. See A. BERLE&: G. MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
!157 (1932); Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern 
Corporate Dedsionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1, 4 (1969). 
220. See id. 
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agers.2:11 The decision-making norm places the responsibility for 
management activities on the board of directors, but recognizes that 
owners have a voice in some decisions, most notably the choice of 
managers. Shareholder democracy becomes expressed as an ideal, but 
the fact is lamented that control of the corporation has become 
separated from ownership of the stock.222 
With respect to conduct of managers, the classical corporate 
norm demands behavior consistent with the objectives of maxi-
mizing profits. Managers must manage the corporation with due 
care and avoid conflicts of interest. The duty of due care requires 
diligence and at the same time affords managers protection from 
liability for errors of judgment if they observe it. This is the well 
known "business judgment" rule that eliminates judicial scrutiny of 
everyday business decisions.223 
It is, however, fair to question an economic system-the frame-
work within which corporate norms are formulated-because as 
Berle notes, "An economic system is not an end in itself. It exists 
to serve men. When it ceases to do that, it ceases to be acceptable-
or, at all events, has demonstrated effects which require curing."22~ 
The same is true for the free market. While such a system may be 
abstractly preferable, "we cannot overlook how the market in ques-
tion actually operates, and we cannot forget that our aim should be 
not merely the free market as such, but the improved products and 
services and lower prices which are presumed to flow from free-
market competition."225 
It is increasingly common for corporate leaders to verbalize 
business goals other than profits. The growing magnitude of society's 
problems has commanded the attention of business leaders as well 
as citizens in other callings. Indeed, since business activity has shaped 
our national landscape and our goals for so long,226 one cannot think 
about social problems without thinking about business responsi-
bility for them. 
The crises in the environment, in urban affairs, and in race rela-
tions seem to have spurred businessmen to express larger roles for 
221. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. R.Ev. 259 
(1967). 
222. See A. BERLE &: G. MEANS, supra note 219, 
223. See Manne, supra note 221, at 270-72. 
224. A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUPLIC 80 (1963). 
225. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the 
Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REY. 1425, 1468 (1967). 
226. Chandler, The Role of Business in the Vnited States: A Historical Survey, 98 
DAEDALUS 23, 39 (1969). 
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business that depart from the traditional profit maximization goal. 
And government, too, has emphasized the need for private-sector 
involvement in the nation's problems. Shortly before he left the 
SEC, former Chairman Manuel F. Cohen emphasized the need for 
business to broaden its horizons. After analyzing the increasing 
power of the larger corporation and its pervasive influence in society, 
Mr. Cohen asked: "Doesn't such power carry with it the responsi-
bility . . . to act in full recognition of the responsibility of these 
corporations to all of society-to their suppliers, their employees, 
to the communities within which they operate, to the ta.."\:payers and 
to the needs of the nation as a whole?"227 Mr. Cohen added: 
We have ample evidence that such abuses create smoldering resent-
ments which explode into violence, affecting the whole community. 
If further evidence of the responsibility of the business community 
is required, the past several years, a period of incomparable pros-
perity, have nevertheless spa·wned tragedy and violence on a scale 
that boggles the minds of those who believe that our civilization is an 
advanced one and that we share a common ethical and religious 
heritage. Apart from this, it is a clear acknowledgement of the polit-
ical nature of the power of the business community.228 
Similar expressions have come from the business community.229 
On Earth Day, Dan W. Lufkin, a prominent investment banker, told 
an audience at Harvard Business School that President Coolidge's 
aphorism, "the business of America is business" was no longer true. 
Instead, he said "the business of business is America."230 He called 
for a "reordering of business priorities" and a "redefinition, not an 
abolition, of the concept of profit--one that will assess corporate 
gains and losses not only in terms of dollars but also in terms of 
social benefits realized or not realized. "281 
None of these expressions of the social role of corporations in the 
rea! world-not in an economic model-is completely new, since 
businessmen have purported to express concerns for the public 
constituency for a long time.232 After World War II business leaders 
227. Address of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC, Before the Economic Club of 
Detroit, Jan. 27, 1969, at 10. 
228. Id, at 10-11. 
229. See generally Monson, The American Business View, 98 DAEDALUS 159, 163-64 
(1969). 
2!10. Remarks of Dan W. Lufkin at Harvard Business School, April 22, 1970. See 
Cohn, Wall Street Banker Scolds Firms on "Quality of Life", Washington Post, April 
2!1, 1970, § A, at 15, col. 1. 
2!11. Remarks of Dan W. Lufkin at Harvard Business School, April 22, 1970, at 8. 
2!12. See the statement of Owen D. Young, president of General Electric Co., in 
1929, in which he said that he owed obligations to employees and the general public as 
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encouraged support for education as a responsibility of business.283 
What has occurred in recent times, however, is a much deeper 
involvement in community problems, often when the benefit to the 
company is remote. Surveys indicate that a large number of com-
panies have acted in response to the plea for business involvement 
in urban and ghetto problems.234 Business as well as general-circula-
tion publications write extensively about the need for business 
involvement, and describe the large number of activities that are 
being supported by business.235 These activities include corporate 
interest in housing, job-training, minority-hiring, environmental 
problems, and assisting minority enterprises. Some aspects of busi-
ness involvement extend beyond any apparent relationship to the 
goal of profit-seeking, let alone profit maximization. For example, 
Mattel, Incorporated, a Los Angeles toy manufacturer, helped form 
a company to manufacture toys that was owned and operated by 
blacks in Watts.236 
While businessmen have spoken of the great pleasure that their 
social activity has provided them, they do not justify or explain their 
acts in altruistic terms. Invariably they find some link to the welfare 
of the company, if only to say that their company requires a healthy 
environment in which to exist.237 
well as to stockholders, quoted in W. CARY, CAsES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 
239-40 (4th ed. 1969). 
233. See C. WALTON, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSraILITIES 48-52 (1967). 
234. See Cohn, Is Business Meeting the Challenge of Urban Affairs?, 48 HARV. 
Bus. REv., March-April 1970, at 68 (Passim). 
235. A small sampling would include Spedal Report: Business and the Urban 
Crisis, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 3, 1968, at C-1; Spedal Report: Dealing the Negro In, Br~. 
WEEK, May 4, 1968, at 64; Special Report: The War That Business Must Win, Bus. 
WEEK, Nov. I, 1969, at 63; Perspectives on Business, 98 DAEDALUS 1-207 (1969) (entire 
issue); Special Issue on Business and the Urban Crisis, FORTUNE, Jan. 1968 (entire 
issue); SATURDAY REVIEW, Jan. 13, 1968 (entire issue); Wall St, J., June 11, 1968, at I, 
col. 8; id., June 14, 1968, at 1, col. 8; Hunt, Gamblers in the Ghettoes, id., Oct. 14, 
1968, at 36, col. 1. The Chase Manhattan Bank publishes a digest of corporate ap-
proaches to public problems called Action Report, which it announces with full-
page ads in the Wall Street Journal. A company known as Urban Directions, Inc., was 
formed as a management consultant to help corporations deal with racial, urban, and 
social problems. Sloan, Business Aided on Social Goals, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1970, at 
47, col. 7. 
236. Demaree, Business Picks Up the Urban Challenge, FORTUNE, April 1969, at 103, 
180, 184. Significantly, the new company was called Shindana Toys, "shindana" being 
the Swahili word for "competitor." 
237. Moral exhortation and mild social pressures will get a few small contribu-
tions and some attendance at meetings from businessmen, particularly if no major 
capital commitment or significant diversion of executive attention is ultimately 
expected. Public approval may be gained, relations with federal agencies cemented, 
and some sense of participation provided-all with no diminution in potential 
earnings per share. Many firms tlxat have responded to tlxe program of private 
Job Corps management or "hardcore" unemployment contracts have been moved 
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Have either the economic standard or the legal rules that govern 
corporate conduct changed in the light of all these recent develop-
ments? Professors Berle and Dodd perhaps started our systematic 
thinking about the law that limits corporate goals in their debates 
in the 1930's.288 Dodd contended that the business corporation as an 
economic institution had a social-service as well as a profit-making 
function. He contended that ethical standards appeared to be 
developing in the direction of increased social responsibilities. Berle; 
on the other hand, asked what could be the reasonably enforceable 
standard to replace profit maximization as a means of limiting and 
judging the actions of corporate managers. After the New Jersey 
supreme court decided A.P. Smith Manufacturing Company v. 
Barlow,289 which upheld a 1,500-dollar contribution to Princeton 
University as being within the scope of legitimate corporate action, 
Professor Berle wrote that the debate had been settled squarely in 
favor of Professor Dodd's position.240 The court could have sustained 
the contribution on narrow grounds, but chose instead to expound 
a theory on the social role of corporations: "It seems to us that just 
as the conditions prevailing when corporations were originally 
created required that they serve public as well as private interests, 
modern conditions require that corporations acknowledge and dis-
charge social as well as private responsibilities as members of the 
communities in which they operate."241 The court concluded that 
shareholders could not "thwart the long-visioned corporate action in 
recognizing and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a 
constituent of our modern social structure."242 
Recent decisions have followed the A.P. Smith decision in up-
holding various corporate expenditures. In Theodora Holding Com-
pany v. Henderson,243 a Delaware chancellor denied a shareholder's 
by such reasons. There is also the incentive of fear-the realistic recognition that 
our cities, and with them our urbanized society, might simply fall apart. But 
these reasons do not suffice to attract the commitment of substantial capital or top 
executive manpower. One must, therefore, turn to the basic profit motivation of 
business and its increasingly public scoreboard. Not an oral moral whip, but an 
enticing economic carrot will make the stubborn business animal get started. 
Goldston, New Prospects for American Business, 98 DAEDALUS 78, 89 (1969). 
238. Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 
lll65 (1932); Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1931); 
Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practi-
cable, 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 194 (1935); Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932). 
239. Ill N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953). 
240. A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REvOLUTION 169 (1954). 
241. Ill N.J. at 154, 98 A.2d at 586. 
242, Ill N.J. at 161, 98 A.2d at 590. 
243. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
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challenge to a charitable contribution, commenting that "contempo-
rary courts recognized that unless corporations carry an increasing 
share of the burden of supporting charitable and educational causes 
that the business advantages now reposed on corporation by law may 
well prove to be unacceptable to the representatives of an aroused 
public."244 The same court also upheld a payment by U.S. Steel Com-
pany in lieu of taxes-clearly a business-motivated expenditure-as 
made "with a recognition of Steel's responsibilities to the communi-
ties in which it was established .••. "245 
Lest these developments persuade us that a new era has dawned 
in which profit maximization ceases to govern and limit corporate 
conduct, however, we should reflect on whether profit maximiza-
tion ever was the applicable legal standard. Professor Hetherington, 
arguing a Holmesian view that "the law" means what a court would 
enforce,246 feels that "there is no legal obligation of management 
to maximize profits."247 Both Hetherington and Professor Blumberg 
observe the virtual impossibility of defining "profit maximiza-
tion."248 
The power to use massive corporate assets is so imposing that 
the law must devise some means to circumscribe its exercise. And 
one is drawn to the conclusion that confining power within the 
profit-seeking goal is safe, if not imaginative, Professor Blumberg, 
in his recent study of corporate responsibility, concluded that "single 
minded pursuit of shareholder interest remains the legal standard 
for corporate conduct,"249 and that "the validity of corporate activity 
is believed to rest on the business orientation of the program and the 
existence of a reasonable relation between the program and the 
long-term objectives of the business, or, simply put, whether the 
activity is being reasonably undertaken as good business in the cli-
mate of the times."250 He then noted that 
the solution of ghetto, minority group and other social problems has 
been generally accorded such a high priority as a national political 
244. 257 A.2d at 404. The dissenting judge in Union Pacific R.R. Co, v, Trustees, 
8 Utah 2d 101, 109, 329 P.2d 398, 403 (1958), ijustice Worthen, dissenting), commented 
that "only among the inhabitants of Sherwood Forest has need been accepted as 
justifying the end." 
245. Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 74 (Del. Ch. 1969), affd., 266 A.2d 879 (Del. Sup. Ct. 
1970). 
246. See note 68 supra and accompanying text, 
247. Hetherington, supra note 213, at 258, 
248. See id.; Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B,U. L. 
REv. 157, 163 (1970). 
249. Id. at 205. 
250. Id. at 206. 
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and social objective as to provide the necessary foundation for 
recognition of the existence of corporate power in the area. The 
depth of social needs molds both public opinion and the opinion of 
corporate managers on what constitutes "good business," and thereby 
in a sense may be said to create the basis for corporate power to deal 
with these needs.251 
Therefore, he concluded, "the current ways in which American busi-
ness is attempting to respond to social problems through greater 
corporate involvement seem well supported by existing authority as 
valid corporate measures."21>2 
The danger with such a flexible standard is that it may not con-
stitute any standard at all. To speak of the corporate goal as a search 
for long-term profits is fine, but ''long-term profits" is as difficult to 
define as "profit maximization." Even if long-term gain could be 
defined, that goal sacrifices the interests of some shareholders for 
the benefit of others, since at least some investors are interested in 
short-term profits to be realized in higher stock prices. Deferral of 
immediate profits for the long-term gain and the eventual reward 
is not to them a postponement-it is an outright loss.253 More appro-
priately, corporate conduct should be judged by whether it confers 
a benefit on the corporation. 
While this flexibly stated standard tolerates a possible abuse of 
power, it does permit an imaginative exercise of power. In large 
corporations managers have, in fact, guided themselves by consid-
erations other than profit.254 But, as Professor Neil Chamberlain has 
251. Id. at 207-08. 
252, Id. at 208. 
253. See Shonfield, Business in the Twenty-First Century, 98 DAEDALUS 191, 201 
(1969). 
254. Some commentators contend that the management of the large corporation 
has not sought to maximize profits, but has pursued other goals. See, e.g., R. GORDON, 
Business Leadership in the Large Corporation 311-16 (1961). Professor John Kenneth 
Galbraith describes the aim of the technostructure of the large corporation as maximiz-
ing growth-which he carefully notes is not the same as profit-in order to stay in 
power and enable managers to pursue their individual goals, pecuniary and otherwise. 
J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 168-72, 309 (1967). The creation of corporate 
policy based on nonprofit motives is shown in the decision of Dow Chemical Co. to 
produce napalm for the military despite the adverse economic effects on the company. 
Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
An interesting exchange occurred at the General Motors meeting when Mr. A. R. 
Appleby asked Mr. Roche if the directors would recommend donating profits fr,;im 
weapons sales to rehabilitate civilian war victims. Roche said that this could not be 
done without shareholders' approval, and, when asked if he would be willing to poll 
the shareholders on the question, he answered: "No, I think what we should do instead 
-I firmly believe that President Nixon is doing his best to bring the war to an end. 
He has made commitments. Let's give him a chance and let's not give Hanoi and 
Peking a massive victory through a lack of unity here at home," Transcript, supra 
note 44, at 210-11. 
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written, while social activity by corporations would de-emphasize 
the role of profits, "to de-emphasize ... is not to abandon. As long 
as private enterprise prevails, some profit is essential to survival."255 
Chamberlain also believes that such a standard will invigorate cor-
porate management and attract better managers.256 And a business 
leader, writing in the same issue of Daedalus as Chamberlain, praised 
an urban-housing program in which his company had been involved. 
He felt is was 
somewhat less profitable, but somewhat more exciting and satisfying 
than a good many others to which our executives might have directed 
their attention. The important lesson, however, is that a reasonable 
enough opportunity for profit was presented. Our firm was able to 
consider the project as a major task rather than as a secondary civic 
assignment or a hobby for a couple of executives. There was not 
enough profit to compensate fully for top executives attention to 
complex social controversies, but there was at least enough profit to 
bolster executive concern about the social problem with a sense of 
.business purpose.2111 
However, even this "marginal-profit" explanation might not pro-
vide a sufficient rationale for socially desirable activities that curtail 
short-term profits, or incur expenses, without promising larger profits 
in the long run. The business benefit from such conduct is found, as 
Gardner Means noted, in the effort by corporations "toward assuring 
their own long-run status and survival."258 Thus, Berle implores 
corporations to act for the social weal before the government inter-
venes to make them act.259 If privately owned corporations fail to 
take such actions on their own initiative the ultimate threat to them 
is that the society which sustains them will no longer tolerate them.26U 
With the "benefit to the corporation" test as a beacon, corporate 
managers can refrain from seeking the highest profit available and 
255. Chamberlain, The Life of the Mind in the Firm, 98 DAEDALUS 134, 144 (1969). 
256. Id. at 143-44. 
257. Goldston, supra note 237, at 98. 
258. Means, Collective Capitalism and Economic Theory, in THE CORPORATION 
TAKE·OVER 67, 83 (A. Hacker ed. 1964). 
259. Berle, Corporate Decision Making and Social Control, 24 Bus. I.Aw. 149, 157 
(1968). 
For example, on July 14, 1970, the federal government announced a program that 
would give the automobile manufacturers until 1975 to develop a pollution-free 
vehicle, or face possible elimination of the internal-combustion engine. Wall St. J., 
July 15, 1970, at 2, col. 3. This resulted in the passage of the Clean Air Amendments 
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 6(a) (Dec. 31, 1970), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857£-l(b) 
(Supp. V, 1965-1969), which require that by 1975 the automobile manufacturers re 
duce by 90% of the presently allowable levels carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon 
emissions. 
260. See Theodora Holding Co. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch, 1969). See 
also THE DIRECOOR LooKS AT HIS JOB 15 (C. Brown &: E. Smith ed. 1957). 
January 1971] Public-Interest Proxy Contest 471 
still be reasonably within a standard of being faithful to their share-
holders. They can ask their shareholders to make a sacrifice, but they 
cannot sacrifice their shareholders.261 In fact, corporation law has 
always recognized this wide and flexible mandate of power to cor-
porate managers. The proposition is simply that the "business judg-
ment" rule, which is the classic way of expressing managerial latitude, 
would permit the corporation to engage in socially useful work, 
entailing costs or a sacrifice in profits, if a decision maker in good 
conscience could claim a business benefit from it.262 
There are few examples of courts actually curbing the authority 
of managers who have acted out of regard for the community in-
terest. The most notable case is Dodge v. Ford Motor Company,263 
in which management abruptly terminated "special" dividends in 
favor of using the money normally paid out to the shareholders for 
other purposes. A ten-per-cent shareholder sought to compel the pay-
ment of these dividends and to enjoin certain other conduct by the 
corporation, which he alleged was motivated by Mr. Ford's personal 
feelings. The court found that the refusal to pay dividends was arbi-
trary, and that the board's plans were not intended to produce a 
more profitable business, but rather a less profitable one. Mr. Ford's 
actions were aimed at a larger constituency, but the court observed 
that "a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily 
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are 
to be employed for that end."264 Payment of a dividend was ordered, 
but the court refused to enjoin any of the other activities under 
attack. Ford's proffered justification did not relate his activities to 
shareholder benefit, but it must have been clear to the court that a 
261. A particularly thoughtful expression of the dilemma and the standard to guide 
business activity is in Carr, Can an Executive Afford a Conscience?, 48 HARV. Bus. REv., 
July-Aug. 1970, a~ 58, 62-64: 
Proposals that fail to promise an early payoff for the company and that involve 
substantial expense are accepted only if they represent a means of escaping drastic 
penalties, such as might be inflicted by a government suit, a labor strike, or a 
consumer boycott. To invest heavily in anti-pollution equipment or in programs 
for hirin~ and training workers on the fringe of employability, or to accept higher 
taxation m the interest of better education for the children of a community-for 
some distant, intangible return in a cloudy future-normally goes against the grain 
of every profit minded management. 
It could hardly be otherwise • . .. . 
Before responsibility to the public can properly be brought into the frame-
work of a top-management decision, it must have an economic justification. 
It may be that the future of an enterprise system will depend on the emergence 
of a sufficient number of men ••• who believe that in order to save itself, business 
will be impelled to help save society. 
262. Cf. Ruder, Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 
209, 223 (1965): "The only limitation is that corporate policy must be reasonably 
related to long-term corporate benefit." 
263. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). 
264. 204 Mich. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684. 
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corporation could explain its proposed plans for vertical integration 
in shareholder-benefit terms. Therefore, the court must have re-
garded Mr. Ford's altruistic motives as picturesquely irrelevant, and 
the plans were not enjoined.265 
The congruence of business-benefit and social reasons for corpo-
rate action, and the relative ease with which managers can justify 
their acts, is illustrated in Shlensky v. Wrigley.266 In that case a 
minority shareholder of the Chicago Cubs baseball team was denied 
relief in a derivative suit challenging management's refusal to in-
stall lights at Wrigley Field and schedule night games (presumably 
to draw larger attendance). The shareholder charged that the refusal 
to install lights was based upon Mr. Wrigley's personal conviction 
"that baseball is a daytime sport and that the installation of lights 
and night baseball games will have a deteriorating effect upon the 
surrounding neighborhood."267 The plaintiff alleged that the prin-
ciples of the Dodge case controlled. The court, however, sustained 
a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of 
action. It found that the directors' decision to install lights could 
have been based on a concern that deterioration of the neighborhood 
would reduce patronage and not be in the long-run interest of the 
corporation. 
The effect of the business judgment rule in practice, as one com-
mentator has observed,288 is that courts will take management's word 
that it intended to benefit the corporation by its actions, and, more, 
that management is the best judge of what is good for the corpora-
tion. Thus, management is put to the task of devising business-sound-
ing reasons for its conduct but, as is indicated in Wrigley, the courts 
are not particularly interested in deciding the merits of a challenge. 
Professor Rostow, who finds the implications of corporate social 
responsibility confusing,269 asks whether, apart from the areas of self-
interest, management is doing anything that it could not justify in 
classical profit-seeking terms.270 
265. Two English cases have imposed liability on conduct that conferred community 
benefit but did not benefit the corporation or reasonably relate to its activities. The 
older case, Hutton v. West Cork Ry. Co., 23 Ch. D. 654 (C.A. 1883), was long thought 
to be a bar against charitable gifts. The later case, Parke v. Daily News, Ltd,, [1962] 
l Ch. 927, has been described as "myopic." Pennington, Terminal Compensation for 
Employees of Companies in Liquidation, 25 MODERN L. REv, 715, 719 (1962). 
266. 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968). 
267. 95 Ill. App. 2d at 176, 237 N.E.2d at 778. 
268. Beuthian, The Range of Company's Interests, 11 CORP. PRAc. CoMMENTATOR 
331 (1970), in 86 S. Arn. L.J. 155 (1969). 
269. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible1, 
in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 63 (E. Mason ed. 1959). 
270. Id. at 70. 
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What is different from the traditional approach, perhaps, is that 
managers more openly embrace society's goals as business objectives, 
all in the name of good business.271 Today, business has wider hori-
zons, and self-interest is more commonly linked with enlightenment. 
As always, the power of managers is sufficiently broad to permit them 
to engage in new activities that can reasonably be defended as bene-
ficial to the business, and such power also permits them to conduct 
avowedly profit-seeking activities with a view to social impact. 
Thus, corporation law reposes great power in management to 
deal with social problems. But what the General Motors nranagement 
sought to deny and what is at issue in a public-interest proxy contest 
is the power of the shareholders to take an active interest in those 
areas.272 General Motors argued that the particular shareholders 
proposing the resolutions-members of Campaign GM-were not 
interested in the welfare of the corporation, but rather with the 
impact of the corporation's activities on society.278 Some commenta-
tors have seen significance in this distinction. Professor Hetherington 
observes that 
[t]he principal pressures for reform and change both in the structure 
of the business community and in its role in society come from 
outside forces that are primarily concerned, not with business itself, 
but with social goals and values. Any realistic analysis of the legal 
duties and responsibilities of corporate management and of the 
enterprises that comprise the industrial and financial community 
cannot ignore this important fact.27~ 
And Professor Blumberg maintains that the ultimate question of 
legitimate corporate conduct is affected by the motivation of the 
proponents of that conduct.275 Similarly, the motive of the share-
271. Thus at the conclusion of the General Motors meeting, Mr. Roche stated that 
"we leave this meeting more determined than ever to continue to fulfill our social 
responsibilities •••• " Transcript, supra note 44, at 221. 
272. Senator Muskie noted this point, and in his speech to the Advanced Man-
agement Institute the day before he introduced the Corporate Participation Bill 
(S. 400l!, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)) he said that "General Motors admitted to a social 
responsibility, but it felt that social questions were out of place on the stockholders' 
ballots." Remarks of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie at the Advanced Management Institute, 
New York City, June 22, 1970, at 14. See notes 488-92 infra and accompanying text. 
27ll. See General Motors Corp., GM's Record of Progress 1 (1970), in which 
Mr. Roche claims that "[t]he Project is using General Motors as a means through 
which it can challenge the entire system of corporate management in the United 
States," In Letter from James M, Roche, Chairman, General Motors Corp., to the 
Chairman of the Board of Regents of the University of California, April 15, 1970, he 
makes the same point. 
274. Hetherington, supra note 213, at 292. 
275. Blumberg, supra note 248, at 202 n.269A. 
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holder was determinative of the question whether he could obtain 
a shareholders list in Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Incorporated.276 
It is not clear, however, why the reformers' motives have any 
legal significance on the questions of the corporation's sphere of 
action or of the shareholder's role therein. Perhaps the supposed in-
difference by reformers to the corporation's welfare is thought to 
create a danger to the market place because such a one-sided concern 
might cause economic distortions. 
A capital market, when properly functioning, is an effective 
allocater of a scarce resource among those who can best use it.277 
While the capital markets may be less significant now than they 
once were in furnishing capital to business,278 they continue to play 
an important role, particularly in a time of inflation and increased 
cost of borrowed funds. Moreover, they are significant to the 100 
million or more persons who have an interest in the performance of 
the market, either as direct investors or as beneficiaries in some form 
of pooled investment, such as a variable annuity or a union pension 
fund.279 To tamper with the capital markets might be a reckless dis-
regard of the future of millions of people. 
The issue of capital market impairment is indeed complex. In 
part, it depends on the accounting conventions that determine the 
amount of earnings reported by a company, which in turn dictates 
the market price. Existing conventions are biased in favor of social 
irresponsibility, since external diseconomies, such as river pollution, 
are not borne by the polluter, but rather by society.280 Accounting 
innovations might be devised so that earnings could reflect, up or 
down, a quantitative evaluation of social conduct.281 
Then, too, it is not clear that the engagement in social activity 
by corporations would seriously reduce profits or stock prices. Cali-
fornia Assemblyman Willie L. Brown, Jr., speaking to a group of 
276. No. 663,410 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn. April 8, 1970) appeal filed, No. 
42,541, Minn. Sup. Ct., May 6, 1970. See text accompanying note 373 infra. 
277. W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ch. 1 (1965). 
278. A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 38-41 (1959). 
279. This was the number used by President Nixon in his famous letter to 
representatives of the security industry during the 1968 presidential campaign. See 
Washington Post, Oct. 3, 1968, § K, at 9, col. 2. 
280. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw &: ECON. 1 (1960); Holton, Busi-
ness and Government, 98 DAEDALUS 41, 52-53 (1969); Rose, The Economics of Environ-
mental Quality, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970, at 120. 
281. Lufkin claims that social gains can be quantified. For a discussion of the 
quantification problem, see Beyer, The Modern Management Approach to a Program 
of Social Improvement, J. ACCOUNTANCY, March 1969, at 37, 38-39. See also SoCIAL 
INDICATORS (R. Bauer ed. 1966). _ I 
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International Telephone & Telegraph Company executives, hypoth-
esized a ten-cent reduction from 1969 earnings per share of $2.90, 
which, on the basis of existing price-earning ratios, would have 
lowered the stock price by no more than $1.40 from its thirty-to-sixty-
dollar price range. He declared this to be an insignificant shareholder 
sacrifice compared to the social values that could have been purchased 
for the 12 million dollars of diverted cash flow.282 The facts hardly 
suggest impairment or distortion of the market place from corporate 
engagement in social activity. 
It is possible, of course, that social activity might sharply reduce 
earnings, so that equity capital would be diverted away from some 
companies. Our capital markets have placed a heavy premium on 
rapid growth in recent years; to the extent that growth would taper 
off, capital might seek other outlets. If, on the other hand, this 
reallocation of capital would enable municipalities and other in-
frastructure capital users to compete more effectively for capital, can 
it fairly be said that the market place is distorted? Perhaps there al-
ready is a real distortion in the market place that considers the best 
user of capital to be the one who can produce the fastest growth, 
regardless of what social result is achieved or what financial trickery 
is used.283 
It has also been suggested by some commentators that the proper 
way for shareholders to register their displeasure with management 
is to sell their stock, not to try to reform the corporation from within. 
If enough disgruntled shareholders sell, the market pressure would 
reduce the price of the stock and make management vulnerable to 
a take-over. Seeking to avoid this catastrophic result, management 
will change its policies. This, some maintain, is the classic operation 
of the free market.284 
This alternative sounds fairly ludicrous when spoken in the con-
text of General Motors. It bears no relationship to the shareholder 
of any company whose disagreement with management concerns 
social responsibility. It is unrealistic to expect a selling wave in a 
profitable company because of a disagreement over social policy. 
Management need not adjust its policies to avoid a raid prompted 
by a desire to convert the company into a socially responsible one-
282. Address of Willie L. Brown, Member, Calif. Assembly, Before the Intl. Tel. &: 
Tel. Co. Public Affairs Seminar, Washington, D.C., June 18, 1970, at 6. 
283. See Hearings on Investment Policies of Pension Funds Before the Subcomm. 
on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess. HS (1970) (testimony 
of Roy A. Schotland). 
284. Manne, Good for General Motors1, BARRON'S, May 18, 1970, at 1. 
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social irresponsibility may well have caused higher profits and stock 
prices, hardly an atmosphere conducive to a raid. The take-over 
threat, as a response to social inactivity, is a myth, or worse, a decoy. 
Moreover, under this alternative shareholders unhappy with social 
policies are told to pursue a strategy unrelated to their objective. 
Their objective is to convince managers and shareholders to adopt 
certain policies. They are not seeking the personal catharsis that 
might accompany disassociation from distasteful policies. Thus, sell~ 
ing stock in a company that discriminates against blacks might be 
good for the spirit, but it does not directly affect the company; 
rather it would place the stock in the hands of persons who either 
favor the policy, or at least are indifferent to it. So the objectionable 
policy would be strengthened by selling. 
How different the attack on corporate social policy is from an 
attack on policies that depress profits or dividends. In the latter 
case, the shareholder views the stock as a piece of paper representing 
a dollar value and nothing else. He can accomplish his objectives 
by selling the stock and acquiring a new symbol of dollar value. 
But, to the shareholder who is concerned about social questions, his 
stock ownership is not entirely a dollar symbol. His piece of paper is 
not freely exchangeable with another piece of paper. The only way 
he can redress the source of his displeasure is by remaining a share-
holder. Indeed, his strategy should call for gaining influence by buy-
ing stock, rather than abandoning influence by selling it. 
The process of decision-making as it affects corporate social policy 
remains the fundamental issue in this analysis of corporate power 
because reformers believe that they can affect policy only by active 
participation. They are not convinced that, having demonstrated the 
existence of broad managerial power on social questions, they could 
really accomplish very much if that power is exclusive and pre-empts 
all shareholder power on those issues. In earlier times, it might 
have been thought highly significant to demonstrate that managers 
could use their discretion for the benefit of society; in fact, that 
was the topic of the Berle-Dodd debate.285 The belief was that the 
shareholder interest would dictate a narrower focus for corporate 
policy and that a more sophisticated and enlightened management 
would better serve society.286 Thus, the managerial school believed 
285. See references cited in note 238 supra and accompanying text. 
286. See A. BERLE 8: G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
356 (1932); Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analyses 
and Particular Reservations, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 38, 41 (1960). 
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itself more progressive than the school of shareholder democracy, 
which urged more power to the owners of the corporation.287 
Today's reformers believe that as the argument was framed be-
tween those two schools, it missed the point. Shareholder democracy, 
if it meant only a concern for pecuniary shareholder interests, was 
entirely too narrow since the appropriate constituency of the cor-
poration includes all those affected by corporate activity, not just 
shareholders.288 Managers, on the other hand, are no more expert 
than shareholders on questions of social policy,289 and they may be 
even less representative of many of the interests affected by corporate 
action. And representation of as many interests as possible is impor-
tant. The large corporation has emerged as a demistate.290 Unbridled 
power, in fact if not in form, in the hands of managers raises the 
likelihood that arbitrary policies will emerge.291 Political experience 
teaches us that the restraint of power through principles of law and 
republican government best serves the collective interest.292 
Campaign GM was deeply concerned with attempting to demon-
strate the inadequacy of the existing corporate decision-making struc-
ture, which it believed instinctively resists change because of its 
unrepresentative composition. For example, the board of directors 
of General Motors included several persons with close ties to the oil 
industry-a liaison which the Justice Department ordered termi-
nated.298 General Motors also had close ties with universities294 and 
287. Lewis Gilbert is the best symbol of the shareholder democrat. Cf. F. EMERSON 
&: F. I.ATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 113-14 (1954). 
288. See Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE CoRPOkATlON 
IN MODERN SOCIETY 72 (E. Mason ed. 1959). 
289. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1489, 
1511 (1970). 
290. See A. BERLE, TltE THRES FACES OF POWER ch. 2 (1967); Address of Manuel F. 
Cohen, Chairman, SEC, Before the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Mich,, Jan. 27, 
1969, at 7. 
291. Manning, supra note 286, at 46. 
292. Our democratic ideals require that political power be limited; that counter-
vailing power be maintained; that power be responsive to the community's needs 
and aspirations; and that legitimate power be non-authoritarian. Adolph Berle 
concluded that corporate power was legitimate because it was generally accepted 
in the community. I suggest that the exercise of political power (whether by 
Government or business) cannot be legitimate unless it is non-authoritarian-
that is, unless it is subject to free and systematic analysis and criticism-what 
I have termed "institutional criticism." 
Address of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC, Before the Economic Club of Detroit, 
Detroit, Mich., Jan. 27, 1969, at 7. Professor Chayes argues that the rule of law must be 
applied to the corporation so that "significant power will be exercised not arbitrarily, 
but in a manner that can be rationally related to the legitimate purposes of the 
society." Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CoRPOkATION 
IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 31 (E. Mason ed. 1959). 
293. See Transcript, supra note 44, at 24-27. 
294. See id, at 33-35, 54, 144-45, 154-55. 
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banks.295 And the board selection process of General Motors main-
tained this exclusivity. To replace Richard Mellon, one of the 
directors linked to the oil industry, management selected John A. 
Mayer, chairman of the Mellon National Bank and Trust Company, 
"to provide a highly qualified Board member from the Pittsburgh 
area."296 But why was the Pittsburgh area deserving of special con-
cern?297 And why not a steelworker rather than a banker? When the 
two new nominees were chosen by the board, no other persons were 
considered for the position-the nominees were chosen "by common 
consent."298 Nor did the board as constituted consider some of the 
questions that were of greatest concern to Campaign GM. At the 
annual meeting, it was revealed that the board did not take up the 
question of the number of black dealerships, or the alleged inade-
quacy of consumer warranties; it merely "heard reports" on safety 
and pollution.299 
Some board members did not take kindly to the criticism that 
they were an unrepresentative body.30° Former chairman Frederick 
Donner referred to the Campaign GM representatives as "pip-
squeaks."301 More untenable was the reaction of former Secretary 
of Commerce John T. Conner, who said, "I think it is essential for 
a board to have free and frank discussions .... I was quite upset by 
the nature of the questions and the tone of the questions-as if the 
board was a public body whose deliberations were a matter of public 
record. "302 
It is not surprising, therefore, that reformers view corporate 
decision makers as endemically lacking the ability or the will to 
make necessary changes. Even management efforts to deal with some 
problems such as pollution, safety, and minority opportunity will 
not assuage them because these actions and the accompanying rhetoric 
295. See id. at 165. 
296. Letter from Mr. Ross L. Malone, General Counsel, General Motors Corp., to 
Philip W. Moore, Executive Secretary of Campaign GM, April 22, 1970, quoted in 
Transcript, supra note 44, at 175-76. 
297. See id. at 175-77. 
298. Id. at 181. Stewart Mott, whose father has been a General Motors director since 
1917, said he had been told "on good authority" that there was no occasion in the 
recent past when there was a split vote on any issue. Id. at 190. 
299. See id. at 184-86. 
300. Not so Mr. Roche, however. He commented on the "sincerity and honesty and 
purpose" of the speakers at the meeting. Id. at 220. At his press conference after the 
meeting, he said, "I think that Campaign GM conducted itself in a very fine fashion 
today." General Motors Corp. Sixty-Second Annual Meeting of Stoc.1<holders, News 
Conference, Detroit, Michigan, May 22, 1970, at 4. 
301. Detroit New11, May 23, 1970, § A, at 8, col. 4. 
302. Bus. WEEK, May 30, 1970, at 84. 
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are viewed as minimum steps necessary to still an aroused commu-
nity.sos 
At the press conference announcing Campaign GM, Ralph Nader 
spoke of a "new reality . • . that will tame the corporate tiger.''30' 
As others have seen it, that "new reality" would necessarily refine 
the decision-making process to take into consideration of all the effects 
of corporate decisions, including the social implications. For exam-
ple, Assemblyman Brown told the International Telephone & Tele-
graph gathering, "[t]hese considerations should become a natural, 
and integral part of the process. We have had enough of after-
thoughts, of public relations gestures, of corporate band aids. A new 
medicine is what we are after."305 Under the "new reality" the public 
would be represented on the board "selected from a broad cross-sec-
tion of the people who will most directly be affected by the opera-
tions of the concern," and finally, "we should require that they be 
not exclusively male, not exclusively white and not exclusively Prot-
estant.''306 In short, the "new reality" envisions the creation of a 
countervailing force within the corporation to keep its power in 
check and constructively channeled, rather than relying solely on 
outside countervailing forces, such as government, labor unions, and 
free markets to do so. The new force is especially needed in the 
197O's since the effectiveness of those outside forces seems to have 
been weakened over the years.307 
But how to achieve the internal countervailing force-how to 
introduce public considerations as part of the corporate decision-
making process-is a large question. Nader's "new reality" did not 
emerge clearly during Campaign GM. Over the years suggestions 
have been made for introducing a public voice on the board: Justice 
303, Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers and Corporate 
Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L R.Ev. 248, 289-91 (1969). Those on the New Left 
suspiciously eye the social activities of business because they view satisfying social needs 
and making money as distinct and hostile goals. M. HAruuNGTON, TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC 
LEFr 87 (1968). In this view, they share common ground with their more traditional 
brethren. 
An example of the limitations of social activity undertaken without compulsion of 
some sort is the recent report of curtailed use of DDT. While voluntary action has 
cut its use, DDT is still as widely used as ever by cotton growers, who account for two 
thirds of the national consumption. Indications are that they will continue to use 
DDT until the Department of Agriculture prevents its further use. N.Y. Times, July 
20, 1970, at I, cols. 7-8. 
304. See text accompanying note 27 supra. 
305. Address of Willie L. Brown, Member, Calif. Assembly, Before the Intl. Tel. 
&: Tel. Co. Public Affairs Seminar, Washington, D.C., June 18, 1970, at 5. 
306. Id. at 3. 
307. Hacker, Introduction: Corporate America, in THE CORPORATION TAKE-OVER 1, 
10 (A. Hacker ed. 1965). 
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Douglas' proposal for professional directors;808 Beardsley Ruml's sug-
gestion that the board designate each one of its members as a 
"trustee" for one other interest group, such as employees or the 
public;309 Reverend John Maxwell's proposal for government-desig-
nated representatives on the boards of major corporations;310 and 
Detlev Vagt's proposed emulation of German corporation law which 
seeks codetermination for employees and the public interest.811 Con-
ceivably there is merit in some of these suggestions, but only if they 
are effectively implemented with regard to the selection of directors 
and provisions for salary and staff. 
Perhaps the "new reality" as demonstrated, if not articulated, by 
Campaign GM was no new form, but merely new wine in old bottles. 
What is fictitious about shareholder democracy, of course, is its 
existence.312 But in a free-enterprise system, particularly one that 
has striven so hard to create a broad public capital market, are we 
not bound by those forms that listen to the voice of the owners of 
the business? Is the new reality, then, a new role for shareholder 
democracy? Of course, merely posing the question reveals the para-
doxical nature of the public-interest proxy contest. The shareholder 
did not become a shareholder in order to become a social reformer. 
The purpose of his investment was to make money. As such, his 
interest as a shareholder is antithetical to the public interest insofar 
as activity in the public interest involves any sacrifice on his part. 
But are those interests really antithetical? The great majority of 
shareholders are affected by corporate decisions more as citizens than 
as shareholders, With their mounting numbers, the shareholders 
increasingly represent a cross-section of our society, and if they view 
their interest as aligned with the general public, then they might 
serve as a surrogate for the community as a whole. Some of the finan-
cial institutions at least should perceive such an identity.818 
308. W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 52-53 (1940). 
309. Ruml, Corporate Management as a Locus of Power, in N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAw, 
SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS, No. 3: THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF CORPORATE 
MANAGEMENT 219, 235-37 (E. Cahn ed. 1950). First Pennsylvania Banking 8: Trust Co. 
is reportedly considering turning over as many as a third of its board seats to consumer 
representatives, young people, employees, blacks, poor people, and militant feminists. 
Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1970, at 12, cols. 4-6. 
310. See Latham, Equality a_nd Power in the Maxwell Memorandum, 40 U. DET. L.J. 
457, 464 (1963). 
311. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 
80 HARv. L. REv. 23, 85 (1966). 
312. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1958). 
313. See pt. II. D. infra. 
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Does this "new reality" presage any success in achieving the goal 
of more socially responsible corporations? It probably does not 
through the electoral process, since most shareholders are unlikely 
to vote for any proposal opposed by management. Nevertheless, it 
does make the electoral process significant. Some shareholders will 
seek social action from the corporation, and, if they are permitted 
to do so, will raise policy questions with their fellow shareholders, 
Management could probably defeat any such proposal for social 
action merely by arguing that it would be bad for business. But it 
dare not do so, and that is the rub. While management might argue 
privately that the proposal would hurt the corporation financially, it 
will not do so in a public-interest proxy contest since what is said 
to the shareholders will be overheard by nonshareholders. Therefore, 
management must justify its opposition to the proposal in public-
interest terms lest the nonshareholder public react adversely to the 
corporation. Management's strongest argument is that it is already 
dealing with the problem.314 If the same questions are asked peri-
odically, however, management cannot reply merely with rhetoric, 
but must show positive results that justify renewed confidence in its 
stewardship. The repeated process also serves to educate the public 
about the effects of the corporation's activities, and about the way 
corporate decisions are made. 
Hence, under the "new reality" shareholders and the public are 
brought within the process of corporate decision-making through 
the debate of issues in a public forum. Naturally, this process is not 
so effective as institutionalizing a public role in corporate decisions 
through board representation or participation on committees. One 
can expect future efforts to achieve such direct representation for 
proposals for reforming the director nomination process, for further-
ing cumulative voting,315 for permanent committees on corporate 
responsibility to monitor corporate decisions, and the like.316 In the 
814, This is the argument that General Motors management made, At the stockholder 
meeting it ran a lengthy film to show the company's efforts in pollution, safety, and 
race relations. Mr. Roche said that management intended to get much use from the 
film. Transcript, supra note 44, at 197. It has since been shown on national television. 
Bus, WEEK, July 11, 1970, at 72. 
815, There were suggestions at the General Motors meeting that shareholders 
should be able to nominate candidates (Transcript, supra note 44, at 59) or that 
cumulative voting could achieve a public voice on the board (id. at 105-06). 
!116. See Schwartz, Corporate Responsibility in the Age of Aquarius, 26 Bus. LAw. 
513 (1970) (Address Before the ABA Convention, St. Louis, Mo., Aug. 11, 1970), 
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meantime, however, the public-interest proxy contest as a vehicle for 
the public airing of social-responsibility issues may be the only fea-
sible "new reality" within the framework of the free-enterprise 
system. 
This analysis of the social responsibility of corporations allows 
for three interim conclusions. First, the corporation is not confined 
to operating within the framework of profit maximization. It can 
engage in those activities which the appropriate decision maker be-
lieves serve to benefit the company. This norm permits the corpora-
tion to invest its resources to improve the welfare of the community 
in which it operates. Thus a corporation can undertake an expense 
incident to its profit activities, even if that expense is costly or does 
not increase profits. An example would be an expenditure to improve 
the safety of a car, or to make it less polluting. And a corporation 
can undertake activities reasonably related to the welfare of the free-
enterprise system in general, such as charitable contributions. 
The second conclusion is that the shareholder role in the exercise 
of corporate social responsibility is important, and may serve to bring 
a public awareness to the process. At present, the decision makers 
may not think grandly enough about the implications of their con-
duct. But policy alone is the concern of the shareholder, not detail. 
These first two conclusions are merged in the third in tangible 
form as we relate corporate social responsibility to the specifics of 
a proxy contest. The question then is what issues are proper for 
inclusion in management's proxy statement. Resolutions that deal 
with some aspect of an activity now carried on by the corporation, 
or that ask the corporation to undertake some new activity that is 
within its permissible scope, cannot be dismissed as primarily for the 
purpose of serving a general social, political, or similar cause and 
must therefore be included. If the resolution relates to an activity 
outside the corporation's realm, on the other hand, such as one re-
questing a government body to take action, or proposes something 
that the corporation is not empowered to do, such a resolution's pur-
pose relates to a general social, political, or similar cause, and is 
improper. If the resolution is confined to a proposal of policy, then 
it is a proper subject for shareholders and must be included in the 
proxy statement. If, however, it seeks to compel, or even to recom-
mend, the detailed implementation of policy, it may be excluded by 
management as not a proper subject matter for shareholder interest, 
or as one that deals with ordinary business. 
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C. The Solicitation of Support 
I. The Strategy of a Public-Interest Proxy Contest 
Campaign GM was different from the normal proxy contest be-
cause it did not actively pursue the votes of most of the voters while 
it did seek the support of many nonvoters. Understanding why, in a 
public-interest proxy contest, this may not be so strange, requires 
a close look at the methods of solicitation and the rules that govern 
them. 
The proxy rules317 require a proxy to be accompanied or pre-
ceded by a proxy statement,318 which in tum must contain the infor-
mation detailed in Schedule 14A.319 The proxy statement must be 
filed with the SEC at least ten days prior to its use.320 If a shareholder 
has been furnished with a proxy statement, supplementary soliciting 
material may then be distributed to him, but it must also be filed 
with the Commission.321 False or misleading solicitations are ille-
ga1.s22 
A special rule is applicable to an election contest, which is defined 
as a solicitation "for the purpose of opposing a solicitation subject 
to [this regulation] by any other person or group of persons with 
respect to the election or removal of directors at any annual or 
special meeting of security holders."323 Thus, if Campaign GM had 
opposed the election of any of management's nominees by seeking 
votes for its nominees without first seeking to enlarge the board of 
directors, then its solicitation would have been in opposition to 
management's solicitation. Campaign GM emphasized in the proxy 
material that Miss Furness, Dr. Dubas, and Reverend Phillips would 
be nominated only if the bylaws were amended to enlarge the board 
of directors by three seats. Since a contest over a bylaw to enlarge the 
board is not an election contest, the special rule did not apply to 
Campaign GM.324 
317. SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1969), promulgated pursuant to 1934 Act 
§ 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7Sn(a) (1964). 
318. Rule 14a-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1969). 
319. 17 C.F.R. § 240.Ha-101 (1969). 
320. Rule 14a-6(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (1969). 
321. Rule 14a-6(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(b) (1969), requires advance filing by two 
days, but speeches, press releases, and radio or television scripts may be filed when used 
or published. Rule 14a-6(g), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g) (1969). 
322. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969). 
323. Rule 14a-ll(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-ll(a) (1969). 
324. Rule 14a-ll(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-ll(c) (1969), requires all "participants" to 
file a Form 14B (containing the information specified in Schedule 14B, 17 C.F.R. 
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In a proxy contest involving control, both sides saturate the share-
holders' mailboxes with solicitation material. Proxy statements and 
supplementary material, each accompanied by proxy cards, are sent 
to shareholders. Larger shareholders may receive telephone calls from 
the contestants or from professional proxy solicitors. Personal visits 
are sometimes made.325 Occasionally, advertisements supporting one 
faction or the other appear in the newspapers. Contestants pay par-
ticular attention to brokers in soliciting since customers may ask 
their brokers how to vote. Institutions, of course, often represent the 
balance of power and they receive the most attention.326 Proxy con-
tests, consequently, are expensive; in some cases the cost may exceed 
I million dollars.327 Management ordinarily expects its expenses to 
be paid out of the company treasury, while only successful insurgents 
can obtain reimbursement for their expenses.828 
Campaign GM's strategy differed from that employed by most 
groups that oppose management because its resources were limited 
and its objectives were substantially different. The Campaign 
adopted three basic tactics. 
First, Campaign GM would have to get its proposals on manage• 
ment's proxy statement. Its efforts in this regard have been described 
above.329 For each proposal that was so included, each shareholder 
would have an opportunity to vote for Campaign GM on manage-
ment's proxy. 
Second, Campaign GM would file a proxy statement of its own 
§ 240.14a-102 (1969)) before a "solicitation" is made; this requirement can prove 
cumbersome and cause delays. See Bayne &: Emerson, The Virginia-Carolina Chemical 
Corporation Proxy Contest: A Case Study of the SEC's New Rule 210, Ua-11 and 
Schedule B, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 801 (1957). The SEC staff was uncertain whether to 
apply the rule to Campaign GM, and finally decided not to do so. A contrary decision 
could have been troublesome for Campaign GM. Nader insisted that he was not a 
"participant,'' but the staff thought that the broad language of the definition in rules 
14a-ll(b)(3) or (6), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-ll(b)(3), (6) (1969), extended to him. Some 
persons who contributed money to Campaign GM might not have wanted to do so if 
they had been required to identify themselves as participants. 
325. See Robards, The Proxy War Is Escalating, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1969, § 8, at I, 
col. I; Klein, Proxy War Pros, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1967, at 1, col. 6. 
326. See Louis, The Mutual Funds Have the Votes, FORTUNE, May 1967, at 150; 
Maseritz, The Investment Company: A Study of Influence and Control in the Major 
Industrial Corporations, 11 B.C. IND.&: CoM. L. REv. 1 (1969); Special Report: Why the 
Big Traders Worry Industry, Bus. WEEK, July 25, 1970, at 53. 
327. E. ARANOW &: H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 543 (2d 
ed. 1968). 
328. Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild 
Engine &: Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955); E. ARANOW &: H. EIN· 
HORN, supra note 327, at 572. 
329. See pt. II. A supra. 
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and with it contact directly some of the larger investors, particularly 
the institutional investors.830 In this proxy statement, Campaign GM 
could elaborate on its proposals and advance reasons why it should 
be supported. Moreover, investors who received the proxy statement 
would also be sent follow-up soliciting material. 
Third, Campaign GM would communicate with the public 
through Campaign literature oriented toward the public rather 
than shareholders. It expected to make frequent use of the mass 
media and to develop newsworthy stories that would create added 
publicity. This tactic began with Ralph Nader's announcement of 
the campaign.331 
Why did the strategy encompass communication with the public? 
This question has considerable legal significance because in some in-
stances communication with the public might conflict with proxy 
regulations limiting solicitations. There are basically three reasons 
why a public-interest proxy campaign, such as Campaign GM, needs 
to reach the public. First, since the contest involved a program of 
action that affected the public, it was hoped that the public response 
to Campaign GM would be heard, and heeded. Thus, Campaign 
GM believed that favorable newspaper accounts and editorials were 
important. And, as discussed earlier,332 it was deemed essential to 
engage in public debate with management so that the issues would 
be discussed in broad terms. This was not just a tactic; it was one 
of the main objects of the campaign. Second, Campaign GM con-
tended that the political structure of the corporation was too narrow, 
and that the public should be part of the decision-making process. It 
was thus deemed necessary to try to convince the nonshareholder pub-
lic of its potential role in the public-interest proxy contest. Finally, 
Campaign GM felt it necessary to reach the constituencies of financial 
and other institutions who were shareholders of General Motors to 
influence their votes. These constituencies included students, alumni 
and faculty of universities, beneficiaries of pension funds, and policy 
holders of insurance companies.333 
330. The delivery of management's proxy statement, containing the shareholder 
proposals, did not constitute the furnishing of a proxy statement by Campaign GM to 
the shareholders within the meaning of rule 14a•3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1969), since 
the supporting statement could not disclose the detailed information about Campaign 
GM required in schedule A. See notes 318-19 supra and accompanying text. Thus, to 
solicit its own proxies, Campaign GM was required by the rules to use its own proxy 
statement. SEC v. Dyer, 180 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Mo. 1959), revd. on other grounds, 291 
F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1961). See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 901 (2d ed. 1961). 
331. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra. 
332. See text following note 32 supra. 
333. Campaign GM was not the first proxy contestant to go past the institution to 
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2. What Is a Solicitation? 
General Motors argued that Campaign GM violated the proxy 
rules with Ralph Nader's initial press conference, a second press 
conference announcing the six additional proposals, and a television 
interview of Nader on Face the Nation since none of these "solicita-
tions" was preceded or accompanied by a proxy statement. It also 
argued that Campaign GM's contemplated activities foreshadowed 
future violations of the rules. Management argued that if a share-
holder wanted to communicate with shareholders via rule 14a-8 he 
could not engage in other soliciting activity without furnishing a 
proxy statement. The appropriate remedy suggested by management 
for these violations was to bar Campaign GM from including the 
proposals in management's proxy statement.334 
Although the SEC did not adopt management's suggestion re-
garding the proper remedy for improper solicitations, the staff was 
troubled by the question whether the early public announcements 
constituted "solicitations" within the meaning of the rule defining 
that term.335 In Studebaker Corporation v. Gittlin336 and Securities 
those who influence it. In 1966 and 1967, both sides in the Metro-Goldywn-Mayer 
proxy contest sought the support of influential members of Congress to try to gain the 
votes of certain mutual friends. These private conversations, of course, involved no 
violation of the proxy rules. See Louis, The Senators, the Funds, and the Law, FORTUNE, 
May 1967, at 152. 
This strategy raises a problem under the proxy rules. The contention of the 
public-interest proponent is that the beneficiaries of an institution should be en-
couraged to take part in the decision-making process. Thus, they are addrescd not 
just as interested members of the public, but as persons who can affect the vote. There-
fore, it might be argued that it is necessary to send a proxy statement to such bene-
ficiaries before communicating with them. Some SEC staff members were known to be 
troubled by this problem. But the only practical solution would be to prohibit com-
munication with such constituencies; and this measure would be of highly dubious 
constitutionality. In effect, the SEC's fears of bias are not well founded since the other 
side is always free to answer any incorrect or excessive assertions that might be made. 
334. Davis, Polk & Wardwell Letter, supra note 157, at 2-6; Malone Letter, supra 
note 157, at 11-12. One response by Campaign GM to management's objections was to 
hold a third press conference revealing its plans. See Wall St. J., March 6, 1970, at 14, 
col. 2. The SEC then voiced its objection to the press conferences and asked that they 
be stopped. Campaign GM agreed to do so "until there is available a definitive proxy 
statement." Letter from the author to Theodore I. Sonde, Special Counsel, Office of 
General Counsel, SEC, March 9, 1970. 
335. Rule 14a-l(f)(l)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(f)(l)(iii) (1969), defines "solicitation" 
to include any "communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably 
calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy." At the 
first meeting with Campaign GM representatives, the Commission staff expressed its 
view that Nader's first press conference (see text accom:;ianying notes 24-27 supra) may 
well have constituted a technical violation of rule 14a-3 since it was not accompanied 
or preceded by a proxy statement. The staff followed the long-standing Commission 
practice of warning counsel of a possible violation at this stage. 
336. 360 F .2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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Exchange Commission v. Okin,331 two Second Circuit cases, the court 
held that in order to constitute a solicitation a communication need 
not specifically request a proxy from the shareholder if it is part of a 
"continuous plan" intended to end in the solicitation of a vote, and 
is used to prepare the way for a successful proxy fight. 
In context these Second Circuit decisions appear sound; in the 
context of a public-interest proxy contest, however, they encounter 
a policy clash that has long plagued the administration of the 
securities laws. If a communication is solely an attempt to influence 
a shareholder decision on voting or an investor decision to purchase, 
and is of no other interest or serves no other purpose, there is little 
difficulty in finding that the communication should comply with proxy 
or prospectus rules.338 But if that same communication serves to in-
form others about facts or an event in which they have a legitimate 
interest, or is relevant to some other interest besides voting or pur-
chasing, then the effect of forcing it to comply with such rules would 
be to shut off necessary or useful disclosure rather than to promote 
it. This latter problem arises when shareholders vote on a matter 
of general community interest, as they do in a public-interest proxy 
contest. 
In Brown v. Chicago, Rock Island b Pacific Railroad Company,339 
the board of directors of the Rock Island Railroad had agreed with 
the board of directors of Union Pacific Railroad to merge the two 
companies, but the Chicago & North Western Railway Company 
opposed the plan. The latter made a tender offer to the Rock Island 
shareholders in an attempt to defeat the merger. Of course, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had to give its approval 
to any combination involving railroads.340 In an attempt to sway the 
ICC decision and public opinion against North Western, the Union 
Pacific published advertisements opposing North Western's bid and 
supporting the proposed merger. A shareholder vote on the merger 
was three months away, but of course the control of the railroad was 
of community interest. North Western, supported by the SEC,341 
337. 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943). 
338. Under the Securities Act of 1933, the problem presented here is one of "gun 
jumping." Section 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964), prohibits any "offer" of securities 
until a registration statement has been filed. 
339. 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964). 
340. Interstate Commerce Act § 5(2), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1964). 
341. The Commission's amicus brief regarded any communication linked to an 
eventual shareholder vote as a solicitation. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 4-8, 
Brown v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., No. 63-C-1361 (E.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 1963), 
affd,, 328 F.2d 122 (7th Cir, 1964). This view is consistent with an earlier proposal 
made by the staff to amend the definition of "solicitation" in rule 14a-l(f), 17 C.F.R. 
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argued that the advertisements were proxy solicitations and hence 
illegal since they were not accompanied by a proxy statement. The 
court balanced the interests involved. Considering the fact that the 
advertisements were published three months before the shareholder 
vote, the fact that no votes were sought at that time, nor were in-
tended to be sought, the fact that the communication was directed 
to the public, and the fact that there was a substantial public interest 
in the outcome of the struggle, the court found that there was no 
solicitation within the meaning of rule 14a-l.342 
Thus the Brown case shows that it is too easy, and not correct, to 
assume that all communications connected with a plan for vote-
seeking fall within the rigors of the proxy requirements. Arguably, 
all information about a company planning to issue securities is an 
"offer" of securities within the meaning of the Securities Act of 
1933343 and, therefore, cannot be uttered until a registration state-
ment has been filed. But the SEC realizes that a strict prophylactic 
rule cannot work since the need to publish information about com-
panies may sometimes outweigh an investor's interest in obtaining 
a prospectus.344 The line is difficult to draw, and results may appear 
arbitrary in some cases.345 The guides furnished by the Brown court, 
however, are helpful. By analogy to that case, at least the first Nader 
press conference should not be considered to be within the definition 
of "solicitation," although the later publicity may come within its 
scope. 
More serious problems arose from the activities contemplated by 
Campaign GM that admittedly fell within the interpretation of "so-
licitation." Since the mass media were to be used to reach the public, 
clearly some General Motors shareholders who did not receive a 
§ 240.14a-l(f) (1969), to include "any statement made or used by or on behalf of any 
participant in a solicitation (i) in support of or in opposition to any matter to be 
acted upon by security holders •.• , whether addressed directly to security holders, or 
to a group of persons or the general public or (ii) which may facilitate, influence, aid 
or obstruct the giving or revoking of proxies by security holders." SEC Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 5212 (Aug. 23, 1955) (emphasis added). This proposal 
was not adopted by the Commission, however. 
342. 328 F .2d at 124-26. 
343. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964). See note 338 supra. 
344. See rule 135, 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1969), promulgated under Securities Act of 
1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964). SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 3844 
(Oct. 4, 1957) illustrated public communications that were not "offered." See F. WHEAT, 
DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER 
THE '33 AND '34 Acrs-THE WHEAT REPORT ch. 5 (CCH ed. 1969), acknowledging the 
need to balance interests. 
345. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d 
Cir. 1970). 
January 1971] Public-Interest Proxy Contest 489 
proxy statement from Campaign GM would still be solicited by it, 
and, further, they would be given a chance to vote for Campaign GM 
on management's proxy statement. Campaign GM pointed out this 
problem to the SEC in its letter urging the includibility of its 
proposals.346 
The SEC staff responded to Campaign GM on this point in a 
letter explaining that while advanced filing under the proxy rules 
was not required with respect to speeches, press releases, and radio 
or television scripts, 
the use of this form of material is dependent upon compliance with 
Rule I 4a-3(a) .... Thus, unless a proxy statement is sent to each 
shareholder entitled to vote at the meeting or is included in the ad-
vertisement or other forms of communication to the public, the 
requirements of Rule 14a-3(a) would not be met. Moreover, the fact 
that the communication may be addressed to the public generally 
as well as to stockholders does not of itself remove the solicitation 
from the requirements of the proxy rules.347 
Campaign GM pointed out to the SEC that such an interpretation 
of the proxy rules would bar all public communication by Campaign 
GM because it would require sending a proxy statement to each 
shareholder-at a cost of about 100,000 dollars. Campaign GM then 
urged the staff to interpret "solicitation" to exclude a communication 
that does not seek votes, that occurs in a noncontrol contest, and in 
which there is a substantial interest by the nonvoting public. This 
interpretation was sought only for purposes of rule I 4a-3 so that a 
communication would not have to be preceded or accompanied by 
a proxy statement; such a communication would still be subject to the 
antifraud provisions of rule l 4a-9 and the filing requirements of 
rule 14a-6.348 Campaign GM argued that a contrary interpretation 
would violate its first amendment right to communicate with the 
public.349 
First amendment concerns about the proxy rules are not new to 
the SEC.350 Internal memoranda from the Commission's staff have 
justified the rules as legitimate qualifications on communication both 
because they are reasonable and because they serve an important 
!146. Letter from the author to the SEC, March 10, 1970, reprinted in 116 CONG. 
R.Ec. E2147-51 (daily ed. March 17, 1970). 
!147. Letter to the author from Charles E. Shreve, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, 
March 25, 1970. 
!148. See notes !118-22 supra and accompanying text. 
!149. Letter from the author to Charles E. Shreve, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, 
April 9, 1970. 
!150. See Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Respon-
sible1, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46, 304 n.l!l (E. Mason ed. 1959). 
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policy of protecting investors by providing full and fair disclosure. 
Because most proxy contests offer commercial incentive to the con-
testants to deviate from the truth, the restraints embodied in the 
proxy rules have been upheld as serving a necessary regulatory ob-
jective.351 
In general, regulation that narrows a fundamental constitutional 
right, such as free speech, will be examined by the courts to see if it 
serves a "compelling governmental interest."352 The Government's 
interest in requiring a proxy statement to precede or accompany 
solicitations, presumably, is to protect the integrity of the regulation 
that seeks to make the proxy statement the basic soliciting document. 
If shareholders do not have to be shown the proxy statement before 
other communications constituting "solicitations" are made, they 
will not receive adequate information on which to base their vote 
because they will probably ignore the proxy statement itself-or at 
least form their opinions of its merit before they have seen it. In the 
context of the General Motors case many shareholders would not 
see the required proxy statement at all since Campaign GM could 
only afford to send out proxy statements selectively, but they would 
nonetheless receive a proxy from management on which they could 
vote for Campaign GM.353 Thus, the SEC's interest in requiring a 
proxy statement with or before each solicitation was not insub-
stantial, but it had to be measured against its effect. If the SEC's 
view of its rules as communicated to Campaign GM did not impinge 
on any protected rights, it seemed fair to accept the view since it was 
that of the agency charged with devising rules for the implementation 
of congressional objectives. 
Campaign GM argued that the effect of the SEC view would be 
to prevent any communication to the public.354 That conclusion 
seems inescapable because one must accept the fact that Campaign 
GM did not have the funds available to send a proxy statement to 
all shareholders. At the same time, Campaign GM pointed out that 
none of its proxies would be distributed apart from its proxy state-
ment.355 Of course, a shareholder could vote on management's proxy 
351. See SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956); Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660 
(D.C. Cir. 1950). Cf. Curtis Pub. Co. v. :Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), 
352. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 
(1968); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 7, 120 (1969). 
353. Management's proxy statement does not comprise the proxy statement neces-
sary for Campaign GM to furnish. See note 330 supra. 
354. See text following note 347 supra. 
355. Letter from the author to Charles E. Shreve, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, 
April 9, 1970, at 2-3. 
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and thus never see Campaign GM's proxy statement, or even if he 
did receive such a proxy statement he might not read it, or feel the 
need to read it. In either case, however, the shareholder would get 
his ballot either with the document he is supposed to get-Campaign 
GM's proxy statement--or, if he votes on management's proxy, with 
a document containing the other side's arguments. 
The SEC's interest in requiring a proxy statement from a pro-
ponent in a public-interest proxy contest before media communica-
tions can be made to the shareholders seems far from compelling. 
It is seeking to protect too narrow an aspect of the proxy procedure. 
Considering that both the filing requirements and antifraud pro-
visions remain applicable to the communication sought to be pre-
vented, too little is gained to justify sanitizing the process. This view 
is limited to a contest that does not involve a pecuniary interest of the 
speaker but rather is related to a policy question that has social and 
political ramifications of interest to the general public.356 While there 
was sufficient commercial interest in Campaign GM to sustain the 
requirement of furnishing a proxy statement to each shareholder 
if and when he was given a Campaign GM proxy, the noncommercial 
interests were present to such a greater degree that the added re-
straint proposed by the SEC seemed excessive.357 
It is not clear whether the SEC agrees with this position. Follow-
ing the exchange of correspondence between the Commission staff 
and the author on this question, Campaign GM held several press 
conferences and distributed press releases, which were filed with the 
Commission under the proxy rules. However, there was no response 
from the Commission concerning any of these activities. While this 
fact does not mean that the Commission or its staff agreed with Cam-
paign GM in its interpretation of the proxy rules, it may indicate 
that they had some doubts about their earlier position. On the other 
hand, the Commission and its staff may have been unshaken in its 
views, but may not have viewed any "violation" as sufficiently serious 
to warrant enforcement. 
3. Shareholder List 
Proxy contests often begin with a request by the antimanagement 
forces for a shareholder list. Notwithstanding the opportunity a£-
356. Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
357. See Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commerdal Contest, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
1191 (1965). Cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-03 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
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forded by the proxy rules358 to have management mail their material, 
most contestants prefer to mail it themselves and insist upon receiv-
ing the list. The availability of the shareholder list is a question of 
state rather than federal Iaw.359 
Generally, the law allows liberal access to the shareholder list. 
Under common-law principles, the right may be denied only if man-
agement can show that the contestant does not desire the list for a 
proper purpose.360 Statutes often implement the right providing 
penalties for its wrongful denial,361 but many such statutes limit 
access to the list to persons who own a specified percentage of shares, 
or those who have been shareholders for a specified period of time.362 
However, the statutory right does not preclude the older common-
law right to inspect the list. 363 
"Proper purpose" is usually the focus of inquiry in any dispute 
over the right to obtain the shareholder list. It has been held proper 
to obtain the list for the purpose of communicating with share-
holders about a proxy contest364 or a tender offer,365 for inquiry into 
the affairs of the company,366 or for use in a derivative suit.367 On 
the other hand, inspections that are meant to harass manage-
ment, 368 to procure a list for resale,369 or to assist a competitor370 
have been held not to be for a proper purpose. The weight of au-
thority leans to the side of permissiveness on this issue; this fact 
would seem to indicate that ready access to the list can be had in a 
358. Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1969), provides that management must 
either furnish a shareholder list or mail a security holder's soliciting material, at the 
latter's expense. 
359. 2 L. Loss, supra note 330, at 890. But, enforcement of an order to provide a 
list may be obtained in federal court. Stem v. South Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606 
(1968). 
360. H, HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 396 (2~ ed. 1970). 
361. E.g., ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1967); ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr 
§ 46 (1966). 
362. E.g., ABA-AU MODEL Bus. CORP, Acr § 46 (1966); N.Y. Bus. CORP, LAW 
§ 624(b) (McKinney 1963). 
363. E.g., ABA-AU MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 46 (1966). The statutes commonly 
preserve the "proper purpose" test. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1953). 
364. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d '155 
(Sup. Ct. 1968). 
365 Hanrahan v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 
(1955). 
366. Durr v. Paragon Trading Corp., 270 N.Y. 464, 1 N.E.2d 967 (1936). 
367. State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co., 41 Del. 172, 18 A.2d 235 (1941). See 
Note, Proper Purpose for Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 1970 DUKE L.J. 393, 398. 
368. Ochs v. Washington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 17 N.Y.2d 82, 215 N.E.2d 
485, 268 N.Y.S.2d 294 (1966). 
369. Hagy v. Premier Mfg. Corp., 404 Pa. 330, 172 A.2d 283 (1961). 
370. Slay v. Polonia Publishing Co., 249 Mich. 609, 229 N.W. 434 (1930). 
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public-interest proxy contest. One court has ruled that a shareholder 
may obtain the list if his purpose is stated to relate to the solicitation 
of votes on a matter "which may properly come before a stockholder 
for deliberation or vote.''871 No real test of the availabil_ity of the 
shareholder list to public-interest contestants was achieved in the 
General Motors contest since a request for the list was not made 
until April 28, 1970-less than a month before the annual meeting. 
Management proceeded to deposit the 133 large volumes comprising 
the General Motors shareholder list in Cobo Hall, Detroit, by May 
12, as it was required to do under Delaware Iaw.372 
However, some doubt was cast on the issue whether the courts 
will afford public-interest advocates ready access to the shareholder 
list by the decision in Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Incorporated.813 In 
that case a Minnesota court denied a shareholder's request for a writ 
of mandamus to permit inspection of the list based on his intention 
to communicate with his fellow shareholders concerning the corpora-
tion's policies and practices in the sale of war items. No proxy contest 
was in progress when the request for the list was made, and it was 
unclear what use the shareholder proposed to make of the list. Aside 
from these factors, however, the court stated that the purpose for 
which the shareholder wanted the list was improper under the Dela-
ware statute because he was motivated by an interest in his social 
and political views, and, further, that the shareholders' meeting was 
the wrong forum in which to raise these questions. 
Doubt was also cast on the issue by the Delaware supreme court 
in Northwest Industries, Incorporated v. B.F. Goodrich Company.814 
In that case, the court affirmed a refusal to produce a shareholder list 
when the shareholder declared that his purpose was to "communi-
cate" with other shareholders, but the grounds for the court's deci-
sion were not made clear. The court did observe that the shareholder 
had owned his stock for only a short time, that it was not acquired 
for investment, and that it would be difficult to relate the purpose 
of the demand to an interest "as a stockholder," which is the statu-
tory requirement.875 But it is clear from both earlier376 and later377 
371. NVF Co. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (W.D. Pa. 1969). 
372. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (1953). The more significant problem in a public-
interest proxy contest may be one of expense. To be of most value, the list must be 
copied, or a copy obtained, and this process is costly. 
373. No. 663,410 (Dist. Ct. Hennepin County, Minn. April 8, 1970) appeal filed, No. 
42,541, Minn. Sup. Ct., May 6, 1970. 
374. 260 A.2d 428 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1969). 
375. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (1953). 
376. E.g., General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 
755 (Sup. Ct. 1968). 
377. Kerkorian v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 253 A.2d 221 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
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Delaware cases that a demand for a shareholder list is proper if it 
relates to the solicitation of proxies. Further, if the demand relates 
to an issue with which shareholders are properly concerned under 
state law, such as company policy, then the reason for shareholder 
concern is not important.378 The General Motors and Dow decisions 
point to the error in the Honeywell case, in which the court looked 
to motive rather than effect. If the solicitation relates to a matter 
that will properly come before the meeting, the shareholder should 
be able to obtain a shareholder list. 
D. The Institutional Response 
Campaign GM designed its proxy solicitations to gamer ma.xi-
mum votes and attention at minimum cost. Therefore, it directed 
its appeal mainly to the financial institutions879-the largest group 
of General Motors shareholders, and the largest holders of common 
stock in general.88° For some time institutions have been recognized 
as a powerful factor in corporate politics, and they have more re-
cently come under public and scholarly scrutiny for activities 
378. "If a plaintiff establishes a proper purpose then all others are irrelevant • • •• 
It follows then, that if a plaintiff tenders a purpose which is proper the corporation 
cannot defeat his claim to the list by showing that he has another purpose, or that 
he is really more interested in the list for other reasons" (emphasis in original). Mite 
Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855, 858 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
379. As used here, the term "financial institutions" includes those institutions con-
trolling large amounts of money that they manage either for themselves (uni• 
versities, foundations) or for others (pension and welfare plans, trust companies, in-
vestment companies). Insurance companies are not included although the general 
principles regarding institutional investing also apply to them. 
380. As of 1968, according to the NEW YORK STOCK ExcHANGE, PERSPECTIVES ON 
PLANNING No. 5, at 2 (1970), institutional common stockholding, in billions of dollars, 
was as follows: Noninsured pension funds, 64.5; investment companies, 54.8; life 
insurance companies, 14.3; property and casualty insurance companies, 20.5; state 
and local trust funds, 3.7. As of 1966, in billions: personal trust funds, 56; foundations, 
8.8. Hearings on H.R. 9510 and H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and 
Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess., pt. 2, at 554-55 (1968). Universities, as of June l!O, 1969, held $7.7 billion. 
Glenn, Degree of Difference, BARRON'S, May 11, 1970, at 9 (survey of seventy-one 
colleges and universities). 
General Motors presents an atypical example of institutional power. It has 287,000,000 
shares outstanding, and all institutions combined own only a small percentage of the 
stock. For example, all mutual funds as of 1969 held only 1.5% of General Motors 
stock and the largest single fund holder held .3%. See Maseritz, The Investment 
Company: A Study of Influence and Control in the Major Industrial Corporations, 11 
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 1, 24 (1969). None of the forty-nine banks covered in the House 
report on commercial banking have sole or partial voting rights over even 5% of Gen-
eral Motors stock. I STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FIN., HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING 
8e CURRENCY, 90th CONG,, 1st SESS., COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES: 
EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 93 table 16 (Subcomm. print 1968) 
[hereinafter Patman Report]. Universities own 1,560,000 shares. Glenn, supra at 9. 
Figures for foundations are unavailable, but a list of some of the largest foundation 
holders in the N.Y. Times, May 3, 1970, at l!l, col. 1, shows holdings of approximately 
5,200,000 shares. 
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affecting corporate control.881 In general, however, institutions have 
been loath to use their influence in this area, observing instead the 
"Wall Street Rule": to invest in a company is to invest in manage-
ment and if one does not like what management is doing, one sells 
the stock.882 While large-scale institutional selling could affect man-
agement policy,883 this "love it or leave it" approach will rarely 
exert a positive influence. The "Wall Street Rule," however, may not 
be wholly feasible for institutions holding large blocks of stock that 
cannot be freely sold; such institutions may thus be compelled to 
take an interest in managerial conduct.884 
What few deviations there have been from this pattern have 
usually occurred in proxy contests for control or in express opinions 
(usually directed to management rather than through voting) on 
dividend policies or prospective merger activity.885 Campaign GM 
asked the financial institutions to violate the "Wall Street Rule" by 
supporting its admonitions to management. Only a handful of insti-
tutional holders of General Motors stock actually gave their proxies 
to Campaign GM, but the debate generated within their community 
led at least one observer, Jay Rockefeller, himself an institutional 
trustee, to predict that "next time around it may be different."886 
381. See generally Patman Report, supra note 380; WHARTON SCHOOL OF FIN. &: 
COMM., A STUDY OF MurUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) 
[hereinafter Wharton Report]; D. BAUM &: N. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS (1965); 
Enstam &: Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LA.w. 289 (1968). 
382. See Sobieski, In Support of Cumulative Voting, 15 Bus. LA.w. 316, 321 (1960). 
There were many references to this rule, if not all by name, in replies from institutions 
contacted in this study. A full expression of the rule is as follows: 
The basic reason for this policy is that the corporation is engaged in investing 
and not in the management of companies or the reorganization or revamping of 
business or corporate managements. One obvious investment criterion is how well 
managed is a candidate for investment, a qualification which is carefully scrutinized 
and weighed. Without reasonable confidence in a management, no investment 
will be made. Action in supporting that management at annual meetings is a 
normal and natural expression of that confidence. Only a marked departure from 
proper corporate practice warrants a deviation from this policy. When con-
fidence in a management has been shaken or lost the investment involved is 
reduced or liquidated. 
Wharton Report, supra note 381, at 418-19. 
383. See Brown, Institutional Investors as Shareholders, in DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL 
OF LA.w, CONFERENCE ON SECURITll"S REGULATION 207, 228 (R. Mundheim ed. 1965), de-
scribing how large-scale selling of stock by institutions affected the wage-dividend poli-
cies of Eastman Kodak Company. 
384. Landau, Do Institutional Investors Have a Social Responsibility?, INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESIOR, July 1970, at 25, 26-27. 
385. See Clarence A. Galston, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors, 
A Paper Presented to the Association of Life Insurance Counsel, Dec. 10, 1968, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF AssN. OF LIFE INSURANCE COUNSEL 835, 853 (1968) (describing Metro-
Goldwyn•Mayer proxy fight). See also Louis, The Mutual Funds Have the Votes, 
FORTUNE, May, 1967, at 150; Sobieski, supra note 382. 
386. Mintz, Campaign GM Likely To Stir New Conflict on Campus, Washington 
Post, May 24, 1970, § A, at 3, coL 2. 
496 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:419 
With Earth Day as a backdrop, the greatest controversy centered 
around the universities, collectively holding only I½ million shares 
of General Motors stock.387 The issues raised by Campaign GM, 
publicly debated on the university campuses and then privately 
decided in board rooms, also reached the less "open" institutions.388 
& a fundamental question, institutions were forced to examine 
their role as stockholders and to decide whether the lack of social 
responsibility in a corporation could be justified by higher profits. 
The directors and trustees of financial institutions had to consider 
whether their social duty permitted or dictated to them that they 
vote the stock of portfolio companies in accordance with social con-
siderations. 389 These questions involve legal and economic problems 
that are at the core of the viability of the public-interest proxy con-
test. 
I. The Legal Position of the Institutions 
The major legal obstacle to institutional participation in Cam-
paign GM was raised at the General Motors annual meeting in a 
shareholder's objection to the New York City Pension Funds' voting 
their shares for the shareholder proposals. Mrs. Wilma Soss, a well 
known advocate of shareholder democracy, citing the Campaign Givf 
proxy statement which read: "It is possible that adoption of these 
proposals could cause a reduction in the Corporation's profits,"300 
challenged the vote on the grounds that the "sole responsibility or 
the primary responsibility facing the fiduciaries is the responsibility 
to act for the benefit exclusively of the pensioners."891 Since :rvfrs. 
Soss was not a beneficiary of the fund, however, she lacked standing 
to raise the issue.892 But suppose beneficiaries of a pension fund, 
387. See note 380 supra. 
388. One of the problems facing Campaign GM and any other low-budget public-
interest proxy contest is finding out which institutions hold stock in the target com-
pany. The only holdings readily available to the public for inspection are those of 
mutual funds. See notes 396-97 infra and accompanying text. Since General Motors is 
so large, however, it was a reasonable assumption that nearly every large institution 
held at least some shares. 
389. This question was repeatedly raised in editorial comment throughout 
Campaign GM. See, e.g., Washington Post, April I, 1970, § A, at I, col. 3; Smith, 
Will General Motors Believe in Harmony? Will General Electric Believe in Beauty?, 
NEW YORK MAGAZINE, June 15, 1970, at 36, 37. 
390. Campaign To Make General Motors Responsible, Proxy Statement, March 25, 
1970, at 2. 
391. Transcript, supra note 44, at 115. 
·392. Market Street Ry. Co. v. Hellman, 109 Cal. 571, 590-91, 42 P. 225, 231 (1895). 
See A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 193.1, at 1598 (3d ed. 1967). The vote of the 
trustee cannot be rejected by the corporation on the ground that he is guilty of a 
violation to his duty to the beneficiaries since they alone can object. See notes 406-10 
infra and accompanying text. 
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prior to the meeting, had asked a court to enjoin the trustees from 
voting for Campaign GM, claiming that the threatened vote was a 
breach of trust, or failing that argument, suppose that they threatened 
to sue for damages if as a result of a Campaign GM victory the stock 
price declined.893 To deal with this objection, we must first examine 
the voting procedures of the financial institutions and the fiduciary 
responsibilities of the institutional trustees to their beneficiaries and 
shareholders with respect to voting the stock owned by institutions. 
2. The Financial Institutions 
Universities and foundations are similar in that they manage 
money for themselves. The trustees of these institutions have ulti-
mate responsibility for investment decisions-usually made by an 
investment committee-and, as do all trustees, they owe a fiduciary 
duty to their institutions.894 Neither universities nor foundations are 
required to report publicly their holdings. 
Investment companies include face amount certificate companies, 
unit investment trusts, and open- and closed-end management com-
panies. The major holders of common stocks in the United States 
are the open-end companies (mutual funds).895 Mutual funds are 
required to report publicly their holdings,396 and this information 
is easily obtainable.897 Mutual-fund directors are essentially like any 
other corporate directors, and in the same manner they are responsi-
ble to their shareholders as fi.duciaries.398 Often the investment 
decisions of mutual funds are made by investment advisors to whom 
management functions have been delegated, but these decisions are 
reviewable by the directors of the fund. 
39!1. A variation of this theme occurred in California where a group of con-
cerned citizens consisting of the Southern California Chapter of The American Insti-
tute of Architects, S.O.S. (Stamp Out Smog), GASP (Group Against Smog Pollution), 
and several individuals filed suit for injunctive relief to prevent the regents of the 
University of California from voting for General Motors management. Southern Calif. 
Chapter, Am. Institute of Architects v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. No. 400,270, Super. 
Ct. Alameda County, Calif., filed May 6, 1970. 
394. A. ScolT, supra note !192, § 2.5; R.EsrATEMENT {SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 (1959). 
!195. Open-end investment company securities are redeemable--that is, upon pre-
sentation to the issuer the holder is entitled to his share of the net asset value of the 
issuing company. The total of common stockholdings for open-ended funds in 1968 
was $54.8 billion compared to $7.1 billion for closed-end investment companies. NEW 
YORK STOCK ExcHANGE, PERSPECTIVES ON PLANNING No. 5, at 2 (1970). 
396. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § !I0(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29{b) (1964). 
397. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30bl-l, 274.106 (1969), which prescribe the forms required 
to be filed with the SEC pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 80-29(b) (1964). 
!198. See Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 
1961). 
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Banks and trust companies, when investing as fiduciaries, are 
subject to state and federal laws enacted for the protection of in-
vestors.399 Basically there are two types of trust accounts-personal-
trust accounts and pension plans. Since there are no reporting 
requirements for personal-trust accounts, and since banks have 
varying degrees of voting discretion depending on the trust agree-
ment, which they regard as confidential, little can be said about their 
voting procedures.400 Banks, however, also act as corporate trustees 
for most of the employee pension funds401-the largest institutional 
common stockholders, and the most complex from the standpoint of 
fiduciary responsibilities. 
Most pension plans are administered by management-appointed 
committees; few of these committees have union representation.402 
However, the committees usually handle only the administrative 
matters of the fund, such as determining who is entitled to receive 
benefits. Investment decisions are delegated by the committee to cor-
porate trustees, usually commercial banks. These trustees generally 
have authority to make investment decisions and to vote the shares 
held by the pension fund, unless that power is expressly limited in 
the trust indenture. Information regarding the powers of the trustee 
and the extent of his discretion is publicly reported,403 but holdings 
by pension funds in listed stocks do not have to be reported.404 
There is a double management orientation to the pension funds 
399. Galston, supra note 385, at 839. 
400. One estimate, that the bank had to consult with other individuals on voting 
in 52% of its personal-trust accounts, came from the president of the United States 
Trust Company of New York. Buck, Trust Companies and Banks as Institutional 
Investors, in DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, CONFERENCE ON SECURITlES REGULATION 
147, 155 (R. Mundheim ed. 1965). 
401. Some 80% to 90% of all pension plans of this type (welfare and pension plans) 
use a bank as corporate trustee to hold and invest the funds in accordance with the 
trust agreement. S, REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1956), cited in P. HAR-
BRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 64 (1959). 
402. According to the New York State Insurance Department report, M. HousE, 
PRIVATE EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS, A PUBUC TRUST 92-93 table 5 (1956), only 5% of 
271 single-employer plans studied provided for union representation in their manage• 
ment. Single-employer plans represent 86% of all employees covered by pension plans. 
S. REP. No. 1734, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1956), cited in P. HARBRECHT, supra note 
401, at 43, 45. 
403. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1964). According 
to the New York State Banking Department, seven out of ten pension funds managed 
in the state gave full investment authority to the trustee. Patman Report, supra note 
380, at 23, citing P. HARBRECHT, supra note 401, at 64. "One of the largest invest-
ment banks in this field enjoys full investment control in 88.6% of its accounts •••• " 
Id. at 103. 
404. 29 U.S.C. § 306(f)(l)(C) (1964). There is no reporting requirement for the 
securities of any corporation other than those who are parties of interest. 
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structure-first in using employer-dominated administrators, and 
second in designating commercial banks as trustees, with power re-
served by the administrators to remove them. The situation is 
slightly different for state and municipal retirement funds. There, 
investment decisions rest ultimately with public officials, although 
investment advisors may handle money management.405 
There is considerable confusion on the question to whom the 
corporate trustees of pension funds owe fiduciary duties.406 Repre-
sentative trust indentures usually contain the following clause: "No 
person other than the company or the committee may require an 
accounting or bring any action against the trustee with respect to the 
trust or its actions as trustee. ••4o7 In light of this clause, can the em-
ployee beneficiaries bring any action against the trustee? Courts 
have held union-operated pension trusts to be trusts with the benefi-
ciaries having an individual right to sue,408 but courts are less clear 
on this question with regard to employer funds. The leading case, 
Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone Company,409 has indicated by dictum 
that trust principles will apply, and it is reasonable to assume that 
a beneficiary who has already completed the age and service require-
ments-and has a vested interest in the pension fund-would have 
standing to sue the corporate trustee for misconduct or abuse of 
discretion in the voting of the shares held by the pension trust.410 
Therefore, with the exception of mutual-fund directors, who are 
held to the slightly lower standard of corporate directors, the powers 
and responsibilities of most financial institutions in the voting of 
their stock are found in the law of trusts. 
405. Galston, supra note 385, at 843. In the three New York City pension systems, 
the Teachers' Retirement Board, the NYC Employees Retirement System, and the Police 
Pension Fund, authority to vote the stock held is vested in a board of directors for 
each system. All pension boards have representatives from the city and from those labor 
organizations that engage in collective bargaining between the city and a specific 
employees group (e.g., teachers are represented by the United Federation of Teachers). 
Letter to the author from Michael J. Dontzin, Counsel to the Mayor of New York City, 
July 22, 1970. 
406. For a thorough discussion of all the implications of the trust status of pension 
funds see P. HARBRECHT, supra note 401, at 163-90. 
407. Specimen Form of Trust Agreement, Chase Manhattan Bank, in id., app. B., 
at 318. 
408. See Booth v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 755 (D.N.J. 1957); 
P. HARBRECHT, supra note 401, at 173-77. 
409, Il!6 F. Supp. 125, 134-35 (N.D. Ill. 1955), affd., 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956). 
410, The right is probably even broader, and one would expect employees who are 
contributing to a plan, but whose rights have not yet vested, to be able to sue for 
mismanagement of a pension trust. See Employing Plasterers' Assn. v. Journeyman 
Plasterers' Local 5, 279 F.2d 92, 97 (7th Cir. 1960). 
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3. Voting Powers and Duties of Trustees 
In choosing and managing investments, trustees are required to 
preserve the best interests of the beneficiaries. It is fundamental that 
"[i]f there is one word which summarizes a trustee's duty regarding 
investments, that word is prudence";411 it is the recognized standard 
of care, skill, and caution in the making and managing of invest-
ments.412 The Model Prudent Man Investment Statute states the 
rule in the following manner: 
In acquiring, investing, reinvesting, exchanging, retaining, selling, 
and managing property for the benefit of another, a fiduciary shall 
exercise the judgment and care under the circumstances then pre-
vailing, which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise 
in the management of their own affairs, not in regard to speculation 
but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds, consid-
ering the probable income as well as probable safety of their 
capital.413 
Loyalty, good faith, openness and disclosure, and abstention from 
self-dealing are demanded from all types of fiduciaries, and these 
duties extend to the voting of stock.414 Thus, the trustee's duty, in 
voting stock over which he has control, is to promote the best 
interests of the beneficiaries.415 Except in clear cases of abuse of 
discretion, the courts will not interfere with the trustee's judg-
ment, 416 although the court's power to restrain the trustee417 or to 
impose damages for breach of fiduciary duty is well recognized.418 
There are no reported instances of beneficiaries challenging a 
trustee's right to vote in favor of continued charitable contributions 
by corporations. Traditionally, this issue has presented the only 
opportunity trustees have had to vote for social activity that might 
be construed to be inconsistent with the shareholder's interest. Cer-
tainly such conduct can be justified as related to the interests of the 
corporation and therefore consistent with trustees' duties. Presum-
411. Subcomm. on Trust Administration and Accounting, Report: Trustee's Duties 
Regarding Investments, 4 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE &: TRusr J. 604, 622 (1969). 
412. A. Sco1T, supra note 392, § 227, at 1806. 
413. Subcomm. on Trust Administration and Accounting, supra note 411, at 608. 
See McSwain, The Prudent Man Rule, 106 Trusts &: Estates 742, 74!1 (1967). 
414. See Spotts, Duty of Fiduciary To Vote Stock, 79 TRusrs &: EsrATES 289, 291 
(1944). 
415. A. Sco1T, supra note 392, § 193.1, at 1594-95. 
416. Id. § 193, citing Myers v. Pink, 42 Ill. App. 2d 230, 191 N.E.2d 659 (1963), and 
In re Connor's Estate, 153 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1956). 
417. A. Sco1T, supra note 392, § 193.1, at 1595. 
418. Id. § 193.3, at 1602-03, citing UNIFORM TRusrs Acr § 8. 
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ably, a vote by a trustee for the resolutions supported by Campaign 
GM could be defended by the same reasoning, but the problem be-
comes more complex if the trustee believes that the socially useful 
project, of which he approves, entails a long-term reduction of 
corporate profitability. Would he then be precluded from voting 
in favor of such a proposal? 
The trustee's obligation remains that of advancing the best 
interests of his beneficiaries, but that is not to say that the law re-
quires that profits be maximized. The law makes no such require-
ment of corporate directors, as has been discussed earlier,419 because 
it is impossible to calculate "maximum profits." In determining the 
best interests for the beneficiary, it is probably necessary for the 
trustee to limit his consideration to the pecuniary aspect of "best 
interest" and not to take into account aesthetic or other nonmone-
tary values. The trustee, after all, is not given dominion over all 
aspects of the beneficiary's life, but only those that relate to his 
pecuniary interest. 
But, just as the corporation cannot realistically ignore social 
implications in determining what are its best economic interests, 
neither can a shareholder, nor a trustee acting on his behalf.420 The 
trustee, in many cases, is as concerned with generating long-term 
value as he is with current profits. Further, society restricts the 
trustee with respect to the zeal with which he can pursue the pecuni-
ary interest of his beneficiaries. For instance, a fiduciary cannot take 
advantage of inside information about a company to make greater 
stock market profits for his beneficiary.421 The possible conflict of 
duties is settled in society's favor. 
419. See text accompanying notes 223-71 supra. 
420. A shareholder, as well as the corporation, should heed the reasoning of 
Theodora Holding Co. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969) (see text accompany-
ing notes 243-44 supra), or the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), as warnings that 
corporations best protect their position by social involvements. One college trustee 
wrote to Mr. Roche: "From an investment point of view the Committee is concerned 
that if General Motors does not move to discharge its full public responsibility as 
rapidly as possible, the public will begin to withdraw the premier acceptance which it 
has accorded the company's products in the past." Letter from a college investment 
committee to James M. Roche, Chairman, General Motors Corp., May 1, 1970. 
In its proxy statement, immediately after the warning Mrs. Soss read (see text ac-
companying note 390 supra), Campaign GM stated its belief "that in the long run 
only those companies which conduct their business in a manner more responsible to 
the large community needs will be able to profitably survive." Campaign To Make 
General Motors Responsible, Proxy Statement, March 25, 1970, at 2. 
421. In re Cady, Roberts &: Co. 40 S.E.C. 907, 916 (1961); DISCLOSURE REQUIRE-
MENTS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES AND INSIDERS 172-73 a. Flom, J. Freund&: B. Garfinkel ed. 
1967) (remarks of D. Schwartz). But see Black v. Shearson, Hammill &: Co., 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968). 
502 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:419 
A clash between society's interests and the beneficiary's interests 
could ensue if the trustee were required by law to vote against a 
proposal simply because it might reduce profits. Clearly, an individ-
ual shareholder could vote for such a proposal, despite the adverse 
effect on profits. If the existence of a trust arrangement somehow 
prevented trustees from voting their beneficiaries' stock in favor of 
the pursuit of a social goal, then it would be that device, rather than 
an uncoerced shareholder decision, which would be frustrating the 
corporate use of resources for social purposes. If such were the legal 
duties of trustees, the courts might, in tum, find that ownership of 
corporate stock by trustees is against public policy. A more likely 
result-and a better one from the social standpoint-is to find that 
the trustee has greater freedom in considering how to vote the stock 
he manages. 
The law seems to point toward this view that enables institutions 
to favor public-interest proposals; certainly there is scant evidence 
that they do not enjoy this freedom. But this conclusion is only the 
beginning of the inquiry, for the law does not compel institutions 
to act in any prescribed manner. The pressure on institutions to 
derive necessary income from their portfolio, the competition for 
capital-sometimes on the basis of performance-and the "Wall 
Street Rule" are all strong factors militating in favor of votes for 
management. The reaction of the institutions to Campaign GM's 
solicitation may be indicative of the response future public-interest 
proxy contests may encounter.422 
4. The Universities 
Campaign GM won few votes from universities, but it probably 
achieved its most significant victory on the campuses by virtue of 
the attention students gave to the problems it raised. From most 
university trustees, Campaign GM had to contend with the attitude 
expressed in Harvard President Nathan Pusey's 1967 statement that 
"[o]ur purpose is just to invest in places that are selfishly good for 
Harvard. We do not use our money for social purposes."423 It was 
422. Because proxies are not available for inspection unless contested-the actual 
number of votes was not crucial for this study-institutional responses other than 
those reported in the press had to be privately solicited. Questionnaires were sent to 
twenty representative mutual funds and to twelve of the largest commercial banks. 
Five questions were asked: How were the General Motors shares held by the institution 
voted? What were the reasons for the decision? Were beneficial owners' opinions 
solicited? Was splitting of votes or abstention considered? What was the voting 
procedure? Many of the more revealing replies were either confidential or not for at-
tribution and in those cases the identity of the source has been withheld. 
423. Quoted in J. RIDGEWAY, THE CLOSED CORPORATION 41 (1968). This statement was 
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also evident that universities did not use their votes for social pur-
poses either.424 The final tally found only Amherst, Antioch, Boston 
University, Iowa State, and Tufts announcing support for any of 
the three Campaign GM proposals. Yale, Stanford, Rockefeller, 
Swarthmore, and Williams abstained. The major stockholders, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (290,342 shares), Harvard (287,-
000 shares), Princeton, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Columbia all 
rejected the counsel of advisory groups and voted for manage-
ment.4211 
The pattern of solicitation was similar at almost all of the univer-
sities. After campus leaders were contacted by member of Campaign 
GM or through the news media, ad hoc committees, composed 
mostly of students, were formed on campuses. These committees 
gave recommendations-generally favorable to Campaign GM-to 
the trustee committee in charge of voting the shares, and then after 
much ballyhoo and support for Campaign GM in the campus presses, 
the trustees voted with management. 
The largest and most publicized debate took place at M.I.T. 
Representatives from General Motors and Campaign GM debated 
and answered questions for more than three hours before the M.I.T. 
Corporation Joint Advisory Committee, which later overwhelmingly 
endorsed Campaign GM's proposals. Although the trustees of M.I.T. 
eventually voted the school's shares with management, the informa-
tion brought out in the debates was used by other, more sympa-
thetic institutions. 
made in response to student protest over holdings in southern companies that allegedly 
were managed by racists. Dr. Pusey answered by saying, "if there are discriminatory 
practices, then the companies should be prosecuted under federal law." Id. He then 
added the statement quoted in the text. 
424. Harvard's treasurer, George F. Bennett, was quoted in Jacobs, General Motors 
Proxy Challenge Catches Harvard in the Middle, Harvard Crimson, March 3, 1970, at 
8, col. l, as stating that "I only do as treasurer what is in the best interest of Harvard 
-and that means the students, alumni, and faculty." Later, in Rowan, 'Project GM' 
Seen as Business Challenge, Washington Post, May 6, 1970, § D, at 8, col. 6, he was re-
ported as saying that he rejected the notion that a school's investments should be man-
aged for any purpose other than growth and income. 
425. Mintz, 'Campaign GM' Likely To Stir New Conflict on Campus, Washington 
Post, May 24, 1970, § A, at 3, col. l. The most complete list of supporters for Campaign 
GM, although itself incomplete, is the Campaign GM Scorecard printed by the Campaign 
To Make General Motors Responsible and presented at the meeting. This scorecard 
includes all institutions voting on the Campaign GM proxy and those voting on the 
management proxy who informed Campaign GM of their vote. The other colleges 
listed as supporting one or more of the proposals are Park College, Kansas City, 
Missouri (1,770 shares); University of Oregon (139 shares); Pepperdine College, Los 
Angeles (130 shares); Andover Newton Theological Seminary (1,549 shares); and 
Southern Education Foundation (6,930 shares). GM Scorecard, supra at 3. 
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Several observations can be made from the responses and behav-
ior of universities. 
First, nearly all of the universities were in sympathy with the 
concept of greater corporate social responsibility and the proposition 
that all institutions should take into account their impact on the 
health, safety, and welfare of the country. 
Second, the public debates-and as far as one can tell, the private 
discussions-were on the merits of the proposals. However, the 
trustees who actually cast the votes did not seem to recognize the 
symbolic nature of the specific proposals. Harvard's reasons for 
voting with management, stated in a press release, were perhaps 
representative. The Harvard trustees felt that too much manage-
ment time would be expended educating the Committee for Cor-
porate Responsibility on the operations of General Motors, and that 
there was no satisfactory procedure for resolving differences between 
the committee and the directors. Even conceding that a stockholders 
committee might be desirable, the Harvard Corporation objected 
to the procedure for selecting members of the committee and the 
fact that stockholders would have no way of knowing who would be 
on it.426 
Third, the decision-making bodies were not influenced by the 
members of the university communities. Campaign GM, thinking 
in political terms, expected to influence trustees by gaining student 
support. In all cases student opinion was sympathetic to Campaign 
GM, and wherever polls or referendums were held students sup-
ported the proposals.427 At Harvard, for example, the decision on 
how to vote the university's General Motors shares was delayed 
pending an expression of opinion of the students and faculty. A 
majority of students signed petitions supporting Campaign GM, the 
Faculty Council and the Faculty of Arts and Sciences endorsed the 
proposals, and an alumni poll showed about seventy-five per cent 
support for Campaign GM. The administration, however, stating 
that the issues were not to be decided by head count, proceeded to 
support management.428 University of Michigan President Robben 
Fleming initially disclosed a plan for dividing the vote of his school's 
426. Statement by the President and Fellows of Harvard College on the General 
Motors Proxy, Harvard University Press Release, May 18, 1970, at 2-3. 
427. Support was evidenced by favorable student editorials at Harvard, Princeton, 
and Pennsylvania, among others, see, e.g., Proxies Against GM, The Daily Pennsyl-
vanian, March 20, 1970, at 4, cols. 1-2, yet all of these schools voted for management. 
See note 425 supra and accompanying text. 
428. Mintz, supra note 425, § A, at .3, col. 2. 
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shares in accordance with the results of a referendum, but the uni-
versity's governing board rejected that procedure.429 
Finally, those universities that voted for the proposals, and even 
one college that did not, expressed a willingness to accept lower 
returns on their holdings in the public interest. One college, in a 
letter to Chairman James M. Roche of General Motors, stated: 
The Committee recognizes that acceptance of the concept of involve-
ment with the public interest and the shouldering of responsibility 
for promoting rapid progress toward pollution reduction and safety 
improvement would introduce added elements of cost for General 
Motors. The Committee regards such costs as being no less funda-
mental and important than the costs of raw materials and labor. It 
is prepared to have such costs impinge on profits on shares of the 
corporation which it owns. It does not believe that failure to accept 
social responsibility can be justified on the bottom line of an operating 
statement. 430 
5. Foundations 
Foundations voted unanimously with management, but two of 
Campaign GM's most sympathetic responses-as expressed directly 
to management-were from the Carnegie and Rockefeller Founda-
tions. The Rockefeller Foundation agreed with the goal and spirit 
of Campaign GM's proposals and was highly critical of General 
Motors' response to them. It also clearly stated a belief that corpora-
tions must help to solve the social problems of our time. In examin-
ing its investment policy in light of Campaign GM, the Foundation 
stated: 
The responsibility of the Foundation as a stockholder requires us to 
consider the needs and problems of management. But the responsi-
bility of the Foundation, committed in its charter to the mission of 
serving the well-being of mankind, requires us to recognize that more 
is at stake than our role as a stockholder.431 
The Carnegie Foundation was critical of both General Motors 
and Ford Motor Company for unsatisfactory progress in pollution 
control. It declared its willingness to accept a reduced return on 
investment because the problem demanded high priority and be-
cause the consequences of inaction were too dire. It said: 
429, See Wall St. J., April 20, 1970, at 10, col. 4. 
4l!0. Letter from a college investment committee to James M. Roche, Chairman, 
General Motors Corp., May 1, 1970. 
4lll. A Statement by the Rockefeller Foundation, May 12, 1970, at ll. The statement 
was the text of a communication sent earlier by the foundation to General Motors. 
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We also believe that, such is the growing state of public opinion on 
this issue today, GM and other car manufacturers will avoid onerous 
and possibly quite damaging new controls by public authorities or 
future loss of public confidence or both only by radically stepping up 
their efforts. We would, therefore, in regard to our stock in GM, 
consider any short-run loss of earnings resulting from such efforts as 
a small price to pay for assurance of the longer-term viability and 
profitability of the company.432 
Both foundations, however, voted with management: Rockefeller 
because it believed the proposals were unwieldy and impractical,433 
and Carnegie because it believed that they were not a reasonable 
means for stopping pollution, and because it disliked singling out and 
pressuring one corporation when many others were also involved.434 
Other foundations were far less sympathetic, generally feeling that 
General Motors had done an adequate job of furthering the pub-
lic interest and that the Campaign GM proposals were unreason-
able.435 
6. Pension Funds 
Campaign GM's major success in soliciting institutional proxies 
came when the New York City Pension Funds voted for and vocally 
supported its proposals at the annual meeting.436 By contrast with 
other institutions, the trustees for the funds made no mention of 
long-term viability or profitability despite short-term loss; rather 
they declared that the proposals were in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries. The trustees also grasped the symbolic significance of 
the proposals. The chairman of the City Pension Funds said at the 
meeting: 
We [the trustees] debated this issue; fiscal [and] financial responsibili-
ties ... were fully considered by the trustees, despite the fact they 
432. Letter from Alan Pifer, President, Carnegie Corp., to James M. Roche, 
Chairman, General Motors Corp., May 6, 1970, at 2. 
433. A Statement by the Rockefeller Foundation, May 12, 1970, at 2. 
434. Letter from Alan Pifer, President, Carnegie Corp., to James M. Roche, Chair-
man, General Motors Corp., May 6, 1970, at I. 
435. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1970, § I, at 31, col. I. Four of the largest foundation 
holders of General Motors stock, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation (2,700,000 shares), 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (1,540,000 shares), Charles F. Kettering Foundation (850,000 
shares), and the Richard King Mellon Foundation (54,000 shares), were all established 
by officers or directors of General Motors. Id. 
436. See Transcript, supra note 44, at 126. The Boston funds (city hospital and 
Iibrary-4000 shares), the San Francisco Pension Fund (4500 shares), the Iowa State 
Pension System (1000 shares), and the State of '\Visconsin State Investment Board 
(68,000 shares) also supported one or more of the proposals. See GM Scorecard, supra 
note 425, at I. 
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thought that [a vote for Campagin GM] may have some adverse effect 
on the equity of their stock, they felt the bigger issue was more im-
portant than the fiscal issue ... _4s1 
The trustees felt that the employee beneficiaries "have a right to 
live in a decent environment.''438 
Other pension fund trustees were generally reluctant to reveal 
how and why they voted.439 It is clear from the vote that no other 
major pension funds backed Campaign GM. However, two inter-
related funds did comment directly on the issue in letters to Chair-
man Roche accompanying their proxies. The College Retirement 
Equities Fund (CREF) and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Associ-
ation of America (TIAA) challenged the General Motors view that 
a corporation "can only discharge its obligation to society if it 
continues to be a profitable investment to its shareholders"440 by 
claiming that the priority should be reversed and that "[a] corpora-
tion can only continue to be a profitable investment for its stock-
holders if it discharges its obligations to society."441 Stressing an 
interest in "long term investment of pension funds,"442 a representa-
tive for the funds wrote that they expected their portfolio companies 
to take a leading role in solving social problems as a route to long-
range profit. 
The New York City Funds and CREF and TIAA are of a special 
character, however. Municipal retirement plans have public and not 
management-appointed trustees, and they are more responsive to the 
437. Transcript, supra note 44, at 123 (statement by Michael J. Dontzin). See N.Y. 
Times, May 20, 1970, at I, col. I, quoting Dontzin conceding that the funds' share of 
General Motors was insignificant but that the vote would be "a symbolic gesture" that 
"will awaken people to get one of the largest corporations more socially responsible to 
the country." As to the problem of diminished earnings, Mr. Dontzin expressed the 
following view: 
The heart of the arguments at [the trustees1 meeting was centered on the extent 
to which the proposals of the Nader group would affect General Motors' earnings. 
Our most persuasive arguments centered on the public interests and the belief 
that the value of the holding would not be substantially diminished if the proposals 
were to be adopted. 
Letter to the author from Michael J. Dontzin, July 22, 1970. 
438. N.Y. Times, May 20, 1970, at 1, col. I (statement by Jerome Kretchmer, New 
York City Environmental Protection Administrator). 
439. Only two of the commercial banks replied to the questionnaire sent by this 
·writer. They were two of the largest corporate trustees for pension fund accounts. One 
voted for management and the other refused to reveal how it voted. 
440. Statement by Roger Smith, Treasurer, General Motors Corp., at the debate be-
tween Campaign GM and General Motors held at M.I.T., April 13, 1970, reported in 
Harvard Crimson, April 24, 1970, at I, col. I. 
441. Letter from William C. Greenough, Chairman, Teachers Insurance and An-
nuity Assn. of America, College Retirement Equities Fund, to James M. Roche, Chair• 
man, General Motors Corp., May 13, 1970, at 2. 
442. Id. 
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political implications of an issue such as pollution.443 CREF and 
TIAA, which consider themselves more like educational institutions 
than pension funds, have been atypically concerned with responsible 
shareholding by institutions.444 
7. Mutual Funds 
Little effort was made actively to solicit the votes of mutual 
funds. No funds are known to have voted for Campaign GM, but 
responses to a questionnaire indicated that some may have given 
serious thought to the idea. Some funds referred the proposals to a 
special committee or to existing executive committees for considera-
tion. The major objections to the proposals were the potential they 
created for harassment, their impracticality, and the feeling that 
General Motors was a responsible corporation.445 
Some responses did express concern for the mutual funds' role 
as responsible shareholders. One fund president, commenting on the 
inadequacy of the "Wall Street Rule," expressed the following view: 
We believe that mutual funds-and indeed, all types of financial 
institutions-have a responsibility to consider these issues [public 
policy], and to vote proxies accordingly. 
Traditionally, institutional voting responsibilities have all too 
often been handled by automatically endorsing management, on the 
theory that, "if you don't like the management, sell the stock." I 
believe this relatively simplistic response is no longer appropriate. 
Rather, in fulfilling our responsibilities to the shareholders of our 
443. See note 438 supra. Mayor John Lindsay took an active role in support of Cam-
paign GM. Just two months prior to the General Motors annual meeting, New York City 
lost its legal campaign to prevent the federal government from settling its antitrust 
suits against the major automobile manufacturers, when the Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision handed down by a federal judge in Los Angeles holding that they and ten 
other governments and private parties lacked standing to intervene. United States v. 
Automobile Mfrs. Assn., 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), afjd. sub nom. City of New 
York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970) (per curiam). See N.Y. Times, March 17, 
1970, at 28, col. 3. 
444. See Galston, supra note 385, at 844. Mr.- Galston is Executive Vice President, 
General Counsel, and Secretary of TIAA. 
445. Letters to the author from various mutual funds. One letter expressed the 
belief that "the specific shareholder proposals would not be effective to advance the 
objectives of Campaign GM, and that • • • they might well interfere with effective 
management of the company." Another said, "'While it is difficult to make an accurate 
appraisal of the 'social conscience' of a corporation's management, in this particular 
case we were not overly impressed with the credentials of the people proposed for elec-
tion nor do we have any means of judging their 'social conscience.' " A third letter, in 
addition to feeling that the proposals were "somewhat inartfully drawn," said that the 
fund voted for management premised "on our belief that they had made significant 
progress in the areas in issue and were irrevocably committed to an appreciation of a 
proper balance between their responsibilities to GM shareholders and the general 
public." 
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mutual funds, we must continue to carefully examine each proxy, not 
only with respect to items with financial and corporate implications, 
but also with respect to public policy implications.446 
And an officer of one of the largest mutual-fund management com-
panies, in response to an inquiry about Campaign GM, closed with 
the following observation: "I would not close without assuring you 
that I do agree ... that the future of .financial institutions in Amer-
ica is best served by a greater acceptance of social responsibility and 
awareness. "447 
8. Contrasts Among Institutions 
What institutions have in common is large ownership of securi-
ties. But the differences among them should also be recognized. First, 
they accumulate their wealth from different sources. Universities 
receive donations from private individuals-primarily a few gener-
ous donors. Foundations are usually created by the contributions of 
a single wealthy donor. Pension funds, on the other hand, vary widely 
in their source of wealth, but the large employee trusts obtain their 
money in conformity with a contract between the union and the 
employer. These funds may be either contributory or noncontribu-
tory. Mutual funds receive their wealth from shares sold to investors. 
Furthermore, the supporters or creators of .financial institutions 
obviously have different expectations for them. Universities and 
foundations have purposes to fulfill that require vast expenditures 
of money, but their goals are not financially oriented. Pension 
funds, on the other hand, are solely concerned with providing 
adequate retirement funds for their beneficiaries. Mutual funds have 
various investment objectives, but in all cases the investor seeks 
either growth of principal or high income. Thus, the goals of pen-
sion plans and mutual funds are entirely .financially oriented while 
those of universities and foundations are not. 
The competition among institutions for funds, then, relates to 
the institution's performance vis-a-vis its objective. Universities may 
compete against each other for money, not on the basis of providing 
a return on invested capital, but rather on the basis of how well they 
perform their educational or research functions. The sharpest con-
trast is between competing mutual funds, which are sold on the basis 
446. Memorandum to directors, officers and department heads of an investment 
advisory company from the president, April 27, 1970 (confidential). 
447. Letter to the author from senior vice president of a mutual-fund organization, 
May 12, 1970. 
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either of growth or income, with growth receiving the major at-
tention in recent years. Pension funds do not have to compete for 
funds since they are committed contractually, but there is competi-
tion for management of the pension plan. As was noted earlier,448 
most pension fund portfolios are managed by corporate trustees who 
can be replaced by the committee managing the plan. Therefore, 
this threat of replacement creates a pressure on such trustees to 
perform financially which is of the same type as that felt by mutual-
fund managers.449 This reality often keeps the pension plans out of 
such poor profit investments as low-income housing.450 While uni-
versities and foundations do not have to compete for money or 
impress anyone with their financial performance, they must obtain 
the funds to do their job and they must in tum do their job well in 
order to attract funds. This problem is practical, not legal. But 
another aspect of the practical problem is the existence of a student 
body concerned with social action.451 
All of the institutions, except mutual funds, enjoy tax-free 
status.452 They pay no tax on their capital gains or on their dividend 
income; mutual funds typically pay no tax because their taxable 
income is passed along to their shareholders on a conduit theory.453 
The theory behind the tax-free status for universities and founda-
tions is that they perform good works, and that their ability to do so 
should not be diminished by the expense of paying taxes. In short, 
they are recognized as social instrumentalities. Pension funds to 
which employers contribute must observe the requirement that the 
funds be managed "for the exclusive benefit of ... employees" in 
order that contributions may lawfully be made and that the trust 
448. See notes 401-02 supra and accompanying text. 
449. Ironically, some of this pressure is coming from the companies themselves 
•••• They find out that their pension fund is not growing as fast as someone else's. 
So they put the heat on their banks. 
Sometimes, they do more than put on the heat. I know of one major New York 
City bank that has lost several pension fund accounts because other banks have 
performed better. 
Sherwood, The Growing Power of Institutional Investors, Bus. MANAGEMENT, July 1968, 
at 23, 27, quoting Edward A. Merkle, president of Madison Fund. 
450. See Hearings on Investment Policies of Pension Funds Before the Subcomm. 
on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 118 (1970) (statement 
of Roy A. Schotland). 
451. Landau, Do Institutional Investors Have a Social Responsibility?, !NSTlTUTlONAL 
INVESTOR, July 1970, at 25, 27-28. 
452. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 50l(a), 50l(c)(3). Eventually, beneficiaries of a 
pension plan have to pay tax on distributions they receive. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 402. 
453. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 852. 
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to which it is made may maintain its tax-exempt status.454 Either a 
beneficiary of the trust or the Internal Revenue Service can com-
plain about conduct inconsistent with this standard. Upon such a 
complaint, the trustee is then required to show that investment deci-
sions are related to the fund's objectives of providing income or 
other benefits for employees or their families. The trustee of such a 
fund, more than most trustees, may properly take a long-range view 
of the portfolio. Voting to sacrifice short-term gains for long-term 
profitability or survival in a free-enterprise system of the corpora-
tions whose shares are held in the portfolio should be considered 
action in the best interests of the beneficiaries. 
The distinctive features of the different types of institutions that 
have large portfolios point to an easier and more natural role for 
universities and foundations in voting shares to support social re-
sponsibility than for other institutions. Their financial performance 
is not so closely scrutinized as that of the other institutions, and 
their beneficiaries are quite unlike investors and pensioners. Still, 
monitoring the social responsibility of their portfolio companies is 
not their main job. And their main job-providing education or 
philanthropy-is financed in part by an endowment fund, which 
they would not wish impaired by unwise business management of 
companies in their portfolio.455 However, this risk of portfolio im-
pairment may not be so great as it seems since if universities and 
foundations find that an investment has turned sour by reason of 
lower profits, they are not locked in to the investment by the fear 
of potential capital gains tax liability. 
9. Institutional Responsibility in Voting Shares 
As institutional ownership of securities increases in importance, 
it becomes more important to define the role of the institutional 
454. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 § 302(c), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1964); 
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 40l(a). See Rev. Rul. 70-536, 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 42, 
at 16, which held that an amendment to a supplementary-unemployment-benefit trust 
permitting low-risk income-producing investments providing a lower rate of return 
than normal, that served social purposes, did not accrue to the benefit of related 
parties, and were not contrary to the employees' interests, will not affect the tax-exempt 
status under !NT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 501(c)(l7). 
455. See Editorial, Campaign GM, Washington Star, June 11, 1970, § A, at 12, 
col. 2. While generally approving of Campaign GM, the editorial concluded, "there 
is, however, a point that universities and other major investors must consider before 
they buy shares-or vote them-for social or moral purposes. Universities don't run on 
donations and tuition alone. Their endowment funds provide much of the financing. 
Endowment funds based on profitless corporations don't finance much education." 
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shareholder as it relates to the social responsibility of corporations.456 
Some suggest that the institution be treated as a controlling share-
holder, owing a fiduciary duty to the other shareholders.4117 Others see 
for the institutions no such formal role, but rather the obligation to 
act as informed and alert shareholders, thereby benefiting other 
shareholders.458 Still others see the institution as reviving expecta-
tions for shareholder democracy-in the sense of owners reasserting 
dominion over their property.459 
Campaign GM raised the question of the institutional share-
holder's responsibility in a different context, compelling owners to 
weigh the significance of considerations other than growth and profits. 
Since institutions can forego an interest in profits only at some 
potential cost to others, they must determine whether any rationale 
would justify voting their stock in favor of socially responsible cor-
porate action. 
The special position of the universities and foundations again 
should be noted. While investments are only an ancillary considera-
tion for them, the primary university-foundation function relates 
to social responsibility. It would be unconscionable, in the manage-
ment of their investments, ~or such institutions to support a policy 
of paying substandard wages or maintaining migrant workers in un-
livable conditions merely because it would be more profitable to 
do so. Few policy questions will ever take that form, however. In-
vestors have the privilege to think that the corporation is ultimately 
better served by strengthening the community, even at the risk of 
momentary profit reduction. This view does not abandon profits as 
a yardstick, but it measures them over a longer period. Universities 
and foundations, whose concerns need not be of the moment, are 
perhaps more privileged than most to take this longer perspective. 
More than a privilege, this should be their normative behavior. 
This norm relates to shareholder conduct; it does not dictate 
that an institution should not invest in a particular company because 
of its existing policies. Thus, Nathan Pusey's 1967 statement that 
456. An interesting analysis of the problem in the light of Campaign GM is found 
in Landau, supra note 451. 
457. See D. BAUM &: N. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS 159 (1965). But see Enstam &: 
Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAw. 289, 299 (1968), in which the 
authors argue that smaller investors hold no such expectations and seek no such 
protection. 
458. See Galston, supra note 385, at 851-54. See also Executive Comm. of Trust Div. 
of Am. Bankers Assn., A Statement of Policies for Voting Shares of Stock Held in 
Trust Accounts, Feb. 7, 1944, in A. Scorr, supra note 392, § 193.3, at 1603-04. 
459_ See J. LlvINGSTON, THE .AMERICAN SHAREHOLDER (1958). 
January 1971] Public-Interest Proxy Contest 513 
Harvard invests on the basis of what is selfishly best for Harvard460 
is valid under the norm. However, the decision to vote shares to 
support management policies without regard to the social impact of 
those policies is not valid.461 Buying stock in a racist corporation, for 
example, does not promote racism. Indeed, racism may be strength-
ened if all those who oppose it avoid buying stock in a racist corpora-
tion. But the decision to favor management when its policy of racism 
is challenged does implicate the shareholder in the decision, and, 
worse, it strengthens the objectionable policy. Thus, Harvard's trea-
surer's statement during the General Motors proxy contest that in-
vestments were managed only for income and growth is an extension 
of Pusey's policy, which, so extended, has the effect of choosing ir-
responsible conduct because it is profitable.462 
Hard calculations may be needed with respect to any particular 
issue. It is probably an oversimplification to regard all policy that 
favors social involvement by the corporation as diminishing profits, 
dividends, or capital gains. Even if that view were accurate, it is not 
a close enough calculation. How much the involvement would cost 
and how much benefit it would confer on society are appropriate 
questions. Institutional investors, particularly, should consider the 
value of corporate social responsibility in light of its effect on divi-
dends or stock market prices.463 
Some institutions have constituencies who often demand a voice 
in organizational policy. Universities particularly have experienced 
this response, but the pension fund has also, probably because it is 
an outgrowth of union activities in which the rank and file often 
participate. The concern of the managers of such institutions, in 
any event, is the best interest of their constituency, and frequently 
constituencies play a role in the actual decision-making process. The 
university authorities polled the opinion of their constituents regard-
ing Campaign GM by consulting students and faculty at Harvard, 
M.I.T., and Michigan, but the solicited views were ultimately dis-
regarded. And while university communities may not have been 
heeded in Campaign GM, pension fund beneficiaries were neither 
seen nor heard. 464 
460. See text accompanying note 423 supra. 
461. Cf. the statement of Harvard's treasurer, George F. Bennett, in note 424 supra. 
462. See note 424 supra. In all fairness to Mr. Bennett, he did express the belief that 
General Motors was acting responsibly, and he did not believe that he was supporting 
irresponsible conduct. Jacobs, supra note 424, at I, cols. 3-4. 
463. See Rose, The Economics of Environmental Quality, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970, at 120. 
464. Banks that manage investments so automatically voted their shares for man-
agement against Campaign GM that they frustrated the desire of some of their bene• 
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What is being suggested, then, as the institutional approach to 
public-policy questions, is the development of a norm, or a bias, in 
favor of responsible corporate conduct. At the same time there should 
be a broadening of the institutional decision-making process so that 
the constituencies can play a larger role in the determination of what 
is in their best interests. 
Several reforms appear to be appropriate. At present, only mutual 
funds report their common stock.holdings in a public place.4615 Other 
institutions should likewise be required to do so because of the im-
portant effect their votes can have in the affairs of public companies. 
This is especially so with regard to pension funds because of the 
size of their holdings. This proposed reform is significant not only 
because the shareholders of the companies involved should be aware 
of this sizable force within their ranks, but also because it would 
give the constituencies of institutions an opportunity to influence the 
decision makers. It would enable those waging a public-interest con-
test to discover which groups have an opportunity to affect the 
campaign. Of course, the same information could be obtained from 
a shareholders list, but there may be obstacles to obtaining the list.m 
Furthermore, the information should be available at the earliest 
planning stages of a campaign, perhaps before it is possible to com-
pel the production of the list. 
Second, institutions should be required to report publicly how 
they voted in a proxy contest. Senator Lehman once asked the SEC 
if it saw merit in such a proposal, and the Commission responded 
that it felt that it was important only if there existed some undis-
closed understanding regarding the voting of the shares.467 Of course, 
that response, understandably, was made with only the election con-
test in mind. But there are other factors to be considered. Institutions 
are powerful as independent forces and should operate less clandes-
tinely. There does exist the feeling, as C. Wright Mills has described 
it, 468 that there is a power elite-a ruling class-in America. There 
may be nothing sinister in this fact, but the men who dominate 
universities, banks, corporations, and government share the same 
ficiaries to vote for the other side. Campaign GM coordinators were told by persons 
whose trust funds were managed by the United States Trust Company in New York and 
by the Girard Trust Company in Philadelphia that the banks had already voted the 
stock for management, as presumably they were entitled to do under the trust agree-
ments. However, at least in the case of United States Trust Company, new voting 
instructions were subsequently given to the trustees. 
465. See notes 396-97 supra and accompanying text. 
466. See notes 360-78 supra and accompanying text. 
467, 1957 Hearings, supra note 64, at 116. 
468. C. Mn.Ls, THE POWER Eun: (1956). 
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viewpoint on life because they are drawn from the same small group. 
Indeed, they are often the same people. General Motors' board in-
cluded two university trustees and several bankers. These are the 
same people who decide how stock held by institutions will be voted. 
And, if they are honest men, they will think the same regardless of 
the capacity in which they act. Under these circumstances, it is par-
ticularly important that their decisions be more open. Disclosure 
of their voting record is hardly enough to democratize powerful in-
stitutions, but it is the minimum that can be expected of them. 
E. The Annual Meeting 
Nothing happens at annual meetings. Despite the nod to the 
chairman that "one day in the year you earn the money, and that is 
when you preside at this annual meeting,"469 less is done for the 
corporation by management on that day than on any other day. 
Votes are announced-but they have already been cast and most of 
them have even been counted.470 But the annual meeting was central 
to Campaign GM's planning and probably will be in any other 
public-interest proxy contest. In the first place, it is the event to 
which all prior activities are directed. It furnishes a framework for 
the discussion of the issues. Second, because it is a large gathering 
of people who will confront each other-often in heated dialogue-
the annual meeting can become a newsworthy event. The opinions 
expressed there may appear in the newspapers and on television.471 
Campaign GM's objectives for the annual meeting were as fol-
lows: (1) to place its issues on the agenda, with time allocated to 
discuss the questions; (2) to assure entry to the meeting for sufficient 
numbers of its supporters; (3) to repeat its charges against General 
Motors and to question management on the issues; (4) to accomplish 
these first three objectives in such a way that Campaign GM's 
actions would stand out in sharp contrast to the unruly behavior that 
had characterized annual meetings in other public-interest proxy 
contests. 
Both sides made efforts prior to the meeting to agree on proce-
dure. Thus, Campaign GM and General Motors' general counsel 
agreed on the content of the agenda. They also agreed that Campaign 
469. Transcript, supra note 44, at 93 (Mr. Lewis D. Gilbert). 
470. "Decisions which, in theory, are taken at meetings after discussion, are in 
practice taken before the meeting is even held, so that it becomes a solemn farce." 
L. GowER, MODERN COMPANY LAw 456 (2d ed. 1957). 
471. The General Motors meeting was reported on the front pages of the Detroit 
papers and the Washington Post, and in the New Yorker magazine and the New 
Republic, and extensively reported on television. It was. attended by 130 journalists. 
Carter, Commotion at GM, NEW REPUBuc, June 6, 1970, at 8. 
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GM would be allowed an uninterrupted fifteen minutes to present 
speakers on behalf of each proposal that was part of the formal 
agenda, and that it would have an opportunity at least to present the 
proposals that had been excluded from the proxy statement. Advance 
agreement was also reached on issuing admission passes to, and 
providing an area in the hall for, Campaign GM supporters. 
Problems of admission to the meeting are likely to confront 
every public-interest proxy contest. Management has a legitimate 
concern in preventing disruption of the meeting and imposing 
reasonable limitations on admission. Limiting the membership of a 
proxy committee to three or four persons is reasonable, for example. 
Requiring admission cards is also reasonable.m 
The meeting should be conducted in a manner consistent with 
its main purpose, which is to convey information. It is not a legis-
lative session, since decisions are not made after due deliberation. 
The analogy to a parliamentary body or a political convention is not 
accurate. Votes are not cast to decide the questions presented; the 
speeches that are made do not reach those who actually vote on the 
proposals. 
The responsibility for planning and conducting the meeting 
necessarily falls on the board and the chairman of the meeting. 
Bylaws frequently designate the presiding officer, while the agenda 
is determined in advance by the board of directors. For the agenda 
to be fair, public-interest proposals cannot automatically be deferred 
to the end of the meeting when patience has worn thin; rather, 
dealing with proposals in the order in which they were presented to 
management would be fair. 
The rules of the meeting are most often informal. Robert's Rules 
of Parliamentary Order are simply inappropriate, as is generally 
recognized,473 because the function of the meeting is to inform, not 
to decide. But a public-interest proxy contest contains elements that 
472. The letter from the chairman and the president that accompanied General 
Motors' proxy material stated, "[I]f you wish to attend [the meeting] please enclose 
a note with your proxy" (emphasis added). Letter to the Stockholders from James M. 
Roche, Chairman, and Edward N. Cole, President, General Motors Corp., April 6, 1970. 
Requiring notice of a shareholder's intention to attend the meeting to accompany 
management's proxy would be an unreasonable condition. It would in effect force all 
shareholders who wished to attend the meeting to vote on management's rather than 
Campaign GM's proxy. But General Motors did not really intend this result, as was 
made clear in the formal notice of meeting in which it was stated that passes would 
be sent on request. Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement of General Motors 
Corp., April 6, 1970, at 2. Nevertheless, the letter was unnecessarily confusing. 
473. Monaghan, Annual Stockholders' Meetings: Some Legal and Practical Problems, 
16 BAYLOR L. REv. 129, 140 (1964); Wetzel, Conduct of a Stockholders' Meeting, 22 Bus. 
LAW. 303, 306 (1967). But see L. GILBERT, THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCKHOLDER 
Acnvrm:s AT CORl'ORATION MEETINGS 22 (1969). • 
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may impair the conduct of a shareholder meeting. Long speeches are 
more likely to occur and the language may tend to become more 
inflammatory because of the liveliness of the issues. Demonstrations 
and disruptions may also occur. Should any attempt be made to pre-
vent these occurrences? Are there any feasible ways to do so? 
Most corporate chairmen will tolerate the long speeches and the 
occasional antics of the professional shareholders.474 At the General 
Motors meeting Chairman Roche only occasionally tried to curtail 
the length of speeches. A rule that would limit either the content or 
the duration of anyone's remarks could be used to silence the out-
numbered dissenter, and thus should not be the practice. Even a rule 
requiring germaneness could be abused, although certainly germane-
ness is a desirable goal. In essence, it may be difficult to formulate 
any rules regarding content or duration of speeches that are not 
subject to abuse. The proponents of public-interest proxy contests 
may thus have to rely on the sense of fairness of the chairman of 
the meeting to assure their right to be heard. 
Conduct that prevents speech may require a less tolerant attitude. 
While it is true that a long presentation holds other speech in abey-
ance, our society recognizes value in words that it does not recognize 
in demonstration, even acknowledging that demonstrations are sym-
bolic speech and may convey feelings.475 Management has, in some 
instances, had demonstrators evicted from the meetings,476 but there 
is a disinclination to use this police power. Probably the organized 
use of disruptive tactics would prompt stern action, but admittedly 
calling in the police may merely serve the purposes of some dissenters 
who seek physical rather than intellectual confrontation. Keeping the 
meeting on a verbal level is especially important in a public-interest 
proxy contest because the issues are complex and there is a great 
need to educate people. Again, the chairman of the meeting must in 
his fairness determine when the limits of propriety have been passed. 
III. LOOKING AfIEAD 
A. Possible Public-Interest Questions 
What other public-interest questions are likely to arise in the 
future and present similar issues-especially includibility-in proxy 
contests? The experience of Campaign GM may provide a clue. 
474. J. BROOKS, BUSINESS .ADVENTURES 91 (1968). 
475. Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 453 (1970). 
476. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 15, 1970, at 63, col. 4. 
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At the General Motors meeting, a shareholder suggested to Mr. 
Roche that the shareholders be polled to determine their willing-
ness to donate all of the company profits derived from the sale of 
weapons and the war to rehabilitate civilian war victims;m Dow 
Chemical Company was also a target of this type of attack by share-
holders for a number of years because of its sale of napalm, and a 
resolution was proposed in 1968 and 1969 that would have had the 
effect of preventing the company from selling napalm to the mili-
tary. 478 It is clear that the objection to these weapons relates not to 
profitability but to the moral issue of war because opponents of the 
war believe that American involvement results from policy shaped 
by leaders in and out of government. In any event, it is clear that 
corporate acquiescence enables the United States to wage the war. 
One could imagine a shareholder of a German corporation objecting 
to the sale of gas chamber apparatus to be used at Auschwitz, and 
that would approximate the attitude of an unhappy Dow share-
holder. 
2. Questions Dealing with Foreign Policy 
Shareholders have objected to certain overseas operations by 
corporations, which they contend support immoral policies of par-
ticular governments. The most common targets are corporations deal-
ing with South Africa, but those dealing with Angola have also been 
a target. At the General Motors meeting, a shareholder asked Mr. 
Roche to inform shareholders about the company's efforts to effect 
a change in South African racial policy or at least to state General 
Motors' opposition to government policy; Mr. Roche replied that 
this information could be supplied.479 
3. Questions Dealing with Race Relations 
Company policy on race relations has been a concern of share-
holders at annual meetings for years, the best example being the 
clash several years ago between Eastman Kodak and a group called 
FIGHT. The issue was whether the corporation should employ a 
stated number of black persons in its Rochester plant, pursuant to 
an agreement between a company vice president and a local com-
477. Transcript, supra note 44, at 210. 
478. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 661-63 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). 
479. Transcript, supra note 44, at 202. 
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munity group.480 No resolution was offered to that meeting, but a 
variety of types of resolutions could be presented on the issue. 
A widely reported confrontation at the General Motors meeting 
occurred when a shareholder persisted in finding out why no blacks 
or women were on the board of directors. Unsatisfied with the an-
swer that none had been elected or nominated, she said, "We will 
be back with that same question next year and we expect you to 
have done something about it."481 
4. Questions Dealing with the Environment 
Resolutions dealing with environmental pollution are likely to 
be presented in future proxy contests in light of the deep concern 
for the problem at last year's annual meetings.482 In fact the relation-
ship between corporations and the environment may prove to be 
the most significant public-interest proxy issue of the 1970's. 
The substantive proposals of public-interest issues are of two 
basic types: the first demands affirmative undertakings of the corpo-
ration, such as improving race relations and adopting antipollution 
measures; the second points out things that the company should not 
do, such as making war materiel or doing business in a country that 
engages in objectionable activities. In both instances shareholders 
ask to perform of their own initiative a function that is capable of 
being performed by the board of directors. 
Shareholders concerned with public-policy questions might also 
seek to effect a structural reform of the government of the corpora-
tion from within.483 Thus, one of the areas of inquiry for the pro-
posed General Motors Committee for Corporate Responsibility was 
to study "[t]he manner by which the participation of diverse sectors 
of society in corporate decision-making can be increased including 
480. Gottschalk, Kodak's Ordeal-How a Firm That Meant Well Won a Bad Name 
for Its Race Relations, Wall St. J., June 30, 1967, at 1, col. 1. 
481. Transcript, supra note 44, at 163. Possibly in anticipation of that same question 
at the 1971 meeting, General Motoxs recently announced the appointment of a black 
director, the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan, described as an "aggressive advocate of black 
self-help." Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1971, at 8, col. 3. 
482. See notes 5 8: 12 supra and accompanying text. 
483. Round II of Campaign GM, which was announced on November 19, 1970 (see 
Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1970, at 4, col. 3), proposes resolutions dealing with the decision-
making structure of General Motors. The fixst proposal would revise the method of 
nominating candidates for director by permitting shareholdexs to nominate candidates 
and include them on the corporation's proxy statement, and would require share-
holders, whether voting in pexson or by proxy, to specify individual choices for director. 
Proposal 2 would allow three so-called constituency groups-consumers, dealexs, and 
employees-the opportunity to nominate three candidates for director, although a 
majority vote of the shareholdexs would still be required to elect them. The third 
proposal would require the corporation's annual report to include certain information 
concerning pollution, safety, and minority opportunities. See BNA SEC. REG. 8: L. REP. 
No. 77, at A-13 to -14, K-1 (Nov. 18, 1970). 
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nomination and election of directors and selection of members of 
the committees of the Board of Directors. "484 
A number of commentators have seen political and structural 
questions as central to the involvement of the corporations in soci-
ety.485 Proposals dealing with the political organization of the cor-
poration could well be a major concern to shareholder groups. 
Structural questions are not peculiar to public-interest campaigns, 
however, as witnessed by the many resolutions dealing with cumula-
tive voting that arise each year.486 
B. Suggested Changes in the Proxy Rules 
The experience of Campaign GM has already given rise to sug-
gestions for a change in the proxy laws.487 On June 23, 1970, Senator 
Muskie introduced the Corporate Participation Bill,488 which would 
amend section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to add 
the following language: 
Inclusion in such solicitation of a proposal submitted by a security 
holder shall not be prohibited on the ground that such proposal may 
involve economic, political, racial, religious, or similar issues, unless 
the matter or action proposed is not within the control of the is-
suer.4so 
Senator Muskie explained that the bill was designed to "increase 
484. See Appendix B infra, proposal 3, para. 3(E). 
485. See notes 285-316 supra and accompanying text. 
486. Another area of possible shareholder concern beyond the scope of this Article 
concerns savings and loan associations. These companies are mutual companies, owned 
by their depositors who convey a proxy to management when they open an account-
although it is highly unlikely that depositors realize what they have done. In re-
sponse to criticism by a special outside panel (see Herman, Conflicts of Interest, in 2 
A STUDY OF THE SAVINGS &: LoAN INDUSTRY 763 (I. Friend ed. 1969)), the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board proposed proxy rules on July 21, 1970, which would facilitate dissi-
dent challenges to management (proposed new 12 C.F.R. § 569). 35 Fed. Reg. 12,219 
(1970). If the rules are adopted, one can expect public-interest groups to attempt to 
push savings and loan management more in the direction of community concern in 
their loan policy. Thus, 12 C.F.R. § 569.4 (1970) requires proxies to be revocable and 
prohibits a proxy from being part of another document (such as an account card). 
The institution is required to mail soliciting material of dissident security holders, 
unless certain defenses are available to it. 12 C.F.R. § 569.6 (1970). In many respects, 
the proposed rules reflect the rules existing under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has given indications, however, that it does not 
intend prompt adoption of the rules. See Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1970, § G, at 9, 
col. I. 
487. In Remarks of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, at the Advanced Management Institute, 
New York City, June 22, 1970, at 14-15, Senator Muskie explained that his bill (see notes 
488-89 infra and accompanying text) was inspired by the difficulties faced by Cam-
paign GM in light of the SEC's interpretation of the proxy rules. 
488. S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
489. S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. S9547 
(daily ed. June 23, 1970). 
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the effectiveness with which corporations serve society"490 by increas-
ing the shareholders' voice in deciding issues that affect them. The 
bill would provide "another channel for shareholders to direct their 
corporations to advance the general welfare."491 Senator Muskie ac-
knowledged, in light of Campaign GM, that the likelihood of share-
holder acceptance of socially motivated proxy proposals was not great, 
but that "the value of shareholder proxy proposals rests not alone 
in their immediate hope for success but also in their ability to ap-
prise management of the intensity of stockholder concern over the 
manner in which the corporation is conducting business."492 He saw 
the shareholder proposal as the only viable method for shareholders 
to communicate with each other and to challenge management. 
Moreover, he saw his proposed amendment as a return to the earlier 
interpretation of the shareholder proposal rule498 since it excluded 
only those proposals on which the corporation could not take any 
action. The measure was intended to halt the recent practice of 
preventing shareholder consideration of proposals that were within 
the corporation's control-such as whether it should discontinue 
manufacture of a product-because the purpose of the proposal was 
to promote a social or political cause.494 
To some extent, Senator Muskie describes a larger role for the 
bill than it is capable of playing. While he may intend to increase 
the shareholder voice in these issues, this end can only be achieved 
by changing the decision-making structure of the corporation. But 
the bill does not and cannot do this; the government of the corpora-
tion is not a matter of federal securities law, but is instead structured 
by state law. Thus, a shareholder resolution that the corporation 
build a pollution-free vehicle could not constitute corporate action 
until the board of directors approved it. But Senator Muskie seems 
less concerned with actual decision-making than with influencing 
policy through public opinion. And this, he argues, should be per-
mitted without regard to whether there are social or political im-
plications in the proposal. His supporting statement shows clearly 
that he does not regard the motive of the sponsor of the resolution 
to be a pertinent consideration.491! 
490. Id. (Remarks of Senator Muskie). 
491. Id. 
492. Id. 
493. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra. 
494. See text accompanying notes 116-26 supra. 
495. Senator Muskie's supporting statement indicated approval of the early in-
terpretation of rule 14a-8 (presumably Release No. 3638; see text accompanying notes 
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One problem with the proposal is that it leaves untouched the 
first clause of subparagraph (c)(2) of rule 14a-8, which permits ex-
clusion of a proposal if submitted "primarily for the purpose of 
enforcing a personal claim or redressing a personal grievance against 
the issuer or its management .... "496 Experience has shown that the 
SEC has allowed the exclusion of social-policy issues because they 
were advanced for an objectionable personal motive.497 While it is 
true that the administration of the rule on this point is likely to be-
come far more liberal as a result of the Dow and General Motors 
cases, there can be no assurance that the Commission would not 
allow this most subjective of exceptions to undercut seriously the 
thrust of Senator Muskie's proposal, should it be enacted.498 
It is submitted that another approach to proxy rule reform can 
and should be adopted, namely, rule changes by the SEC. This pro-
cedure would enable a wider area of reform than that proposed by 
Senator Muskie, who, understandably, was largely unaware of the 
other problems faced in a public-interest proxy contest, and it would 
also allow for greater flexibility in further revisions. The proxy 
rules have been amended frequently and they are reviewed "con-
tinuously.''499 If their major provisions were hardened into the legis-
lation, they would probably be far less workable than they are now. 
Accordingly, the following proposals for rule changes are suggested.1100 
I. Repeal Subparagraph ( c )(2) of Rule 14a-8 
Repeal of subparagraph (c)(2) would tum the clock back to the 
original interpretation of rule 14a-8,1501 thus achieving the result in-
tended by the Muskie bill. This procedure would still permit man-
agement to exclude questions for which the corporation is the wrong 
forum because they are "general" social questions. The comments 
98-99 supra), and implied disapproval of the SEC action in the Dow Chemical Co. case 
(see text accompanying notes 59-60, and note 74 supra). 116 CONG. REc. S9547 (daily ed. 
June 23, 1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie). He later wrote to Chairman Budge to 
praise the court's decision in that case. Letter to Hamer H. Budge, Chairman, SEC, 
from Sen. Edmund S. Muskie, July 8, 1970, in BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 59, at 
A-12 to -13 Guly 15, 1970). 
496. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2) (1969). 
497. See text accompanying notes 141-43 supra. 
498. The bill does not specifically mention all of the areas contained in sub-
paragraph (c)(2), since it omits reference to proposals that involve "social" issues. How-
ever, because of the reference to "similar" issues, it would probably be coextensive with 
subparagraph (c)(2). 
499. Remarks of Hamer H. Budge, Chairman, SEC, Before the Am. Soc. of 
Corporate Secretaries, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., June 12, 1970, at 12. 
500. These proposals were submitted to the SEC on September 10, 1970, and on 
November 13, 1970, the author appeared before a specially created task force to 
discuss reform of the proxy rules. 
501. See text accompanying notes 174-75 supra. 
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of Senator Muskie,is02 and of the court in the Dow case,isos not to 
mention those of the SEC in the General Motors decision,504 indicate 
that such is the correct interpretation of the statute. Repeal of sub-
paragraph (c)(2) is preferable to Senator Muskie's bill because it ac-
complishes the result with less ambiguity. The remaining subpara-
graphs would continue to screen those questions that are not the 
proper concern for shareholder action, or that impair the workings 
of the corporate machinery. 
2. Allow a More Substantial Supporting Statement To 
Accompany Management's Proxy 
Shareholder proposals are often complicated. This is particularly 
true of those that deal with public-interest questions since their 
economic relationship to the company is not readily apparent. For 
example, the Project used three pages in its own proxy statement to 
explain the proposal to create a shareholder's committee; manage-
ment likewise used almost three pages to argue against it in its own 
proxy statement. Yet the proxy rules limit the proponents to one 
hundred words in management's proxy statement to support its pro-
posal, while they do not so limit management.iso5 This rule is neither 
adequate nor reasonable. It compels proponents to seek other means 
to describe and support their proposals, but often such means will 
be prohibitively expensive. I propose, therefore, that rule 14a-8(b) 
be amended to permit the proponent to use both sides of a printed 
page in support of his proposal.506 
By allowing the proponent adequate space to support his pro-
posal, the proxy rules can accomplish a result equivalent to the 
proponent's use of his own proxy statement. Thus, under this pro-
502. See text accompanying notes 490-94 supra. 
503. See text accompanying notes 186 & 2ll supra. 
504. See text accompanying notes 166-73, 179-82, & 190-208 supra. 
505. Rule 14a-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (1969). Chairman Purcell explained at 
the 1943 House hearings that the one-hundred-word limitation was arbitrary. A num-
ber of staff members were asked to see how succinctly they could express their 
proposals, and one hundred words seemed to cover it. 1943 Hearings, supra note 88, at 
190. But when management chooses to spend pages (at shareholder expense) to reply 
to a one-hundred-word paragraph, then the limitation looks too severe. A month 
after the present rule was adopted, Commissioner O'Brien commented that while 
"this is an inadequate substitute for the right to give a full explanation of such 
proposals at a shareholders' meeting, it is a step in the direction of placing the share-
holder where he would be if it were physically possible to gather all shareholders at 
the annual meeting" (emphasis added). Address of Robert H. O'Brien, Commissioner, 
SEC, Before The Conference Board, New York City, Jan. 21, 1943, at 5. See also 
Hearings on Corporate Proxy Contests Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1601-02 (1955) (testimony of 
Wilfred May). 
506. See Appendix C infra, proposal 2. 
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posal, the proponent would be required to disclose information about 
his personal interests and background insofar as it relates to the 
proposal, and perhaps he would thereby reveal his motive for the 
proposal. While the proponent's motive is not material to the ques-
tion whether the shareholders should have an opportunity to consider 
the resolution, it may be considered significant by a shareholder in 
deciding how he should vote. 
Furthermore, the proposal would not be available to a share-
holder who is engaged in an economic struggle with management. 
If he is seeking votes for himself or an affiliated person for any other 
purpose, this means of supplying a proxy statement would not be 
open to him. In this regard, filing requirements and antifraud rules 
are clearly in order. 
Admittedly this proposal involves a substantial expense, but it 
is one that can easily be justified. The shareholder is communicating 
with his fellow shareholders on a matter of interest to the group 
(or else it could be excluded). Thus a benefit to the group is in-
volved. By analogy to the derivative suit, or even to a class suit, 607 
such a benefit justifies assessing the groups for its costs. It should 
be remembered that the proxy statement is a company document 
and not one which belongs to management alone.608 
3. Ease the Existing Requirement That a Proxy Statement 
Precede or Accompany All Solicitations 
Participants in a public-interest proxy contest should be able to 
publicize their efforts without regard to whether they have furnished 
a proxy statement to everyone, under certain circumstances enumer-
ated earlier.000 Moreover, if the expanded supporting statement is 
used, all shareholders will see a close equivalent of a proxy state-
ment; thus, a proposal to relax the definition of "solicitation"610 is 
less significant because a shareholder will presumably be adequately 
informed at least by the supporting statement before he votes on 
a proposal 
What is needed is an interpretation or definition of "solicitation" 
to exclude from its reach certain kinds of communications that 
presently are covered by such cases as Gittlin611 and Okin.612 With-
507. See Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
508. See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. R.Ev. 
1489 (1970). 
509. See text preceding note 348 supra. 
510. See note 335 supra. 
511. Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). 
512. SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943). See text accompanying notes 336·37 
supra. 
January 1971] Public-Interest Proxy Contest 525 
out this modification, the proxy rules may keep a concerned public 
from being informed about public-interest proposals, unless the pro-
ponents can afford to send a proxy statement to each shareholder. 
And, as discussed earlier,513 there are serious constitutional problems 
with the present interpretation. 
The proposed amendment would allow both sides to air the 
issues in public, so long as they speak in a genuinely public manner 
and not just to shareholders. When shareholders are the exclusive 
audience, the existing rules would apply. Moreover, the present rules 
would continue to apply to a contest for control or to an acquisition 
transaction having the same effect as a change of control. In such con-
tests, the shareholder interest is so overriding that the existing re-
quirements that a proxy contest begin with a proxy statement must 
be enforced. Furthermore, in such a contest usually no economic 
hardship is imposed by insisting that all shareholders receive a proxy 
statement. 514 
The proposed rule does not try to identify a public-interest proxy 
contest as such. It does require that the communication be with 
respect to a proposal that has been submitted under rule 14a-8; it 
does not, however, require that the proposal actually be included, 
since the solicitation may commence before that inclusion or may 
apply to a proposal rejected under the rule, or to one for which a 
limited solicitation is undertaken. Furthermore, by insisting that the 
communication be made in a public manner, it is assumed that only 
proposals affecting the public interest will be worth the expense of 
such an effort. The proposed rule by implication extends to manage-
ment the opportunity to respond to a communication before it issues 
a proxy statement, since otherwise management might be unfairly 
muzzled. Even if the proponents were engaged in an election contest 
with management, they could invoke the rule unless they were seek-
ing to elect a majority of directors to be elected at that meeting-
which might be less than a majority of the full board if the terms of 
the members are staggered.515 
Accordingly, it is suggested that rule 14a-3516 be amended as set 
forth in the Appendix to this Article. 517 The purpose in choosing 
that section for amendment, rather than the definition section, rule 
513. See text accompanying notes 352-57 supra. 
514. The victors in a control contest can usually anticipate reimbursement for 
their expenses. See Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld v. 
Fairchild Engine&: Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). 
515. See rule 14a-ll, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1969), for the special rules applicable 
to election contests. See also text accompanying notes 323-24 supra. 
516. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1969). 
517. See Appendix C infra, proposal 3. 
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14a-l,518 is that the exemption would not extend to the filing require-
ments of rule 14a-6519 or the antifraud requirements of rule 14a-9.520 
However, no specific suggestions for the filing requirements are con-
tained here since that subject involves more a detail than a princi-
ple. 
4. Expand the Use of Proxy Statments as Information-
Disseminating Devices 
Rule l 4a-8 was born out of the recognition that the proxy state-
ment serves as a substitute for a meeting.521 It is also true that the 
proxy statement has "become the pre-eminent medium for upgrading 
the quality and quantity of corporate disclosure."522 The proxy state-
ment's disclosure function should now be utilized to further the 
shareholder's knowledge about the public impact and concerns of 
his corporation. 523 
One practice common to shareholder meetings is the question-
and-answer session at which management deals with a wide range of 
inquiries. It is most likely that matters of public interest arise at 
this time. Some questions are intended not just to satisfy a share-
holder's curiosity, but to obtain or confirm information that might 
affect future action. What the questioner is seeking is an answer in 
a public forum. But questions asked at the open forum of a share-
holders' meeting do not carry very far. It is suggested that the proxy 
rules be amended to permit the use of the proxy statement to serve 
as such a forum for asking and obtaining the answers to questions. 
In this manner, the proxy statement would be serving its function 
as a substitute meeting.524 
The proposed rule takes account of the opportunity it could 
present to harass management. Therefore, the questions permitted 
518. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a•l (1969). 
519. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a•6 (1969). See notes 320·21 supra and accompanying text. 
520. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969). 
521. See note 88 supra and accompanying text. 
522. Cohen, Introduction to E. .ARANow 8: H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTES'l"S FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL at xvi (2d ed. 1968). 
523. An early comment on rule 14•8 noted that 
further expansion of Rule X-14A-8, moreover, seems justifiable as a means of in-
creasing the shareholder's understanding of his enterprise. Since stockholder 
proposals are themselves informative, in that they function as cross-currents of 
new ideas and information among the security holders, they might be subject to 
SEC regulation as mere proposals, if not as mandates to the directors. 
Note, Permissible Scope of Stockholder Proposals Under SEC Proxy Rules, 57 YALE L.J. 
874, 880 (1948). 
524. See Appendix C infra, proposal 4. An imaginative recent use of the proxy 
machinery was the inclusion in management's proxy statement (by court order) of a 
shareholder's objection to an acquisition also described therein. See Wall St. J., July 10, 
1970, at 16, col. 5. 
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can only be directed to the range of company activities, or to activi-
ties that the company could carry on (not necessarily only those 
things management contemplates), but protects confidential infor-
mation by the same formula used in the General Motors shareholder 
committee proposal.15215 The proposed rule also excludes personal 
questions. While it would be ideal in one sense to print the answers 
in the proxy statement or the annual report, this procedure could 
be excessively burdensome. But the shareholder should at least be 
able to obtain circulation of the information and have it made part 
of the public file. Therefore, the compromise is to require a post-
meeting report to be sent to shareholders526 containing the answers 
or a fair summary thereof. Answers should also be required to be 
filed by management in the same manner as a monthly report on 
form 8-K,1527 subject to antifraud rules.1528 
Another significant reason for providing this information, sub-
jecting it to antifraud rules, and causing it to be made public, is 
that it will serve as a check on the rhetorical answer by management 
that it is being responsible. Campaign GM demonstrated a tendency 
on the part of institutions that professed to desire the same objec-
tives as itself to rely on management's assertions that it was doing 
what was necessary to achieve those objectives.1529 The institutions 
indicated that they would continue to monitor the situation, 1530 and 
a means must be found to assist them in this endeavor. Otherwise, it 
is likely that management could withstand any public-interest asser-
tion by continued rhetoric. Thus, a new paragraph (e) is suggested 
for rule l 4a-8 as set forth in Appendix C to this Article. An amend-
ment to paragraph ( d) might also be desirable to establish a pro-
cedure for objections to questions. 
525. See Appendix B infra, proposal 3, para. 4. 
526. Lewis Gilbert has been trying to do this for years, with some success. See 
J. GILBEJIT &: L. GILBERT, TmRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCKHOLDER ACI'lVlTIES AT 
CORPORATION MEETINGS 38 (1969). 
527. 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (1969) requires that reports filed pursuant to 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.13a-ll, 240.15d-ll (1969), use form 8-K, which requires disclosure of the following 
information: changes in control of registrant; acquisition or disposition of significant 
amount of assets; material legal proceedings; changes in the rights of holders of secu-
rities; material withdrawal or substitution of assets securing any class of securities; 
defaults upon senior securities; increase or decrease in the amount of securities out-
standing; options to purchase securities; material revaluation of assets; matters sub-
mitted to security holders for a vote; any other matter that the registrant chooses to 
disclose. 
528. Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1969). 
529. See text accompanying note 435, and notes 445 &: 462 supra. 
530. See text accompanying notes 431-32, 440-42, and 446-47 supra. 
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5. Amend Procedures for Review of Questions Arising 
Under Rule 14a-8 
Certain procedural reforms will be necessary in view of the Dow 
decision. Chairman Budge has said that "[i]t has generally been the 
policy of the Commission to make an informal review of the staff's 
position on a particular proposal when it is requested to do so by 
either the management, the proponent or the staff."1131 The fact of 
Commission review was given decisive significance in the Dow case, 1132 
and obviously some orderly way must be found for making Commis-
sion, and hence judicial, review not arbitrary. Efficient means of 
rapidly processing resolutions, making a record, examining briefs, 
hearing arguments, and writing an opinion are needed. The opin-
ions and decisions would then be public documents. The best means 
of achieving these essential procedural reforms should probably come 
from within the agency. But there is clearly a need for procedural 
reform that should not be long neglected. 
6. Appoint a Group To Study Remedial Changes 
in the Proxy Rules 
A study group within the SEC should be formed, using outside 
consultants, to study other means of making proxy rules more respon-
sive to the public-interest concerns of a corporation. It would prob-
ably be helpful to elicit information from corporations about their 
social activities, and the social cost of their other activities, on a 
regular basis. For this purpose, the regular reporting obligation 
should perhaps be utilized. However, this is doubtless a very com-
plex subject, and the information furnished might vary considerably 
from company to company, or industry to industry. This is not an 
area in which the SEC has developed any particular competence 
over the years, and this vacuum of experience points to the advisability 
of consulting industry leaders, and others, who have been concerned 
with such problems. Methods of allowing the broadening of the 
decision-making base of the corporation should also be studied. For 
example, renewed consideration might be given to the SEC's 1943 
proposal1138 to allow nominations of directors to be made by share-
holders and included in the proxy statement.1184 When Justice Doug-
531. Remarks of Hamer H. Budge, Chairman, SEC, Before the Am. Soc. of 
Corporate Secretaries, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., June 12, 1970, at 14. 
532. See note 74 supra. 
533. 194J Hearings, supra note 88, at 34-36. 
534. This proposal was supported in Caplin, Shareholder Nominations of Directors: 
A Program for Fair Corporate Suffrage, 39 VA. L. Rev. 141, 152 (1953). It was also sup-
ported at the 1970 General Motors meeting. See Transcript, supra note 44, at 59. 
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las was chairman of the SEC he believed it appropriate to suggest 
that there be public, paid directors on the boards of major corpo-
rations.15315 The idea might be revived and thought through by the 
study group. Directors without a functioning staff would be of little 
value, as can be seen from the experience of investment compa-
nies, 1536 or worse, the Penn Central Railroad.1537 The group should 
also explore whether it is necessary for the SEC to adopt rules to 
require dissemination of soliciting material to beneficial owners, or 
whether existing stock exchange rules are adequate for this purpose. 
IV. REFLECTIONS 
Campaign GM was conceived as a test of our corporate system. 
It followed the law and it observed the accepted forms in asking 
the shareholders of a corporation to exercise the prerogatives and 
responsibility of ownership and to impose a curb on the abuses 
resulting from the use of their property. The press hailed the cam-
paign as the right way to attempt change; it was "working within 
the system." Others saw it as a most menacing threat to the system, 
which only appeared to use the forms of the system. 
More than one view is possible. One could see the campaign as 
a use of the established forms-knowing that they would fail-to 
permit the conclusion that the system has failed-ample justification 
for much sterner stuff the next time. This would not be working 
within the system; it is working against the system by mocking its 
means. But one could also see the campaign as a demonstration that 
things are not working well, and that improvements are necessary. 
If it is part of an educational campaign to show the need for change 
and inadequacy of present attitudes, then it is working within the 
system. Probably both views have validity in that some people may 
have been motivated by a desire to humiliate the system, and some 
by a desire to save it. But is it really important to explore for the 
motivations of the participants? The campaign revealed a uniform 
set of facts about the system in any case. And what the next step 
will be depends more on "the system" than on its challengers. 
Working within the system is viable only if it offers the partici-
535. W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE ch. 4 (1940). 
536. Glick, Mutual Fund Management Fees: In Search of a Standard, 25 Bus. LAw. 
1471, 1482 (1970). 
537. The deterioration of the Penn Central Railroad, which culminated in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, occurred without any serious probing by the directors into the 
company's state of affairs. It seems a reasonable inference that they were not sufficiently 
informed to ask the right questions, as it is inconceivable that a fully informed board 
would have permitted the continuation of the worsening conditions. See Loving, The 
Penn Central Bankruptcy Express, FORTUNE, Aug. 1970, at 104, 171. 
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pants an opportunity to succeed. If the system offers merely a safety 
valve for dissidents to let off steam harmlessly, they will reject the 
system. The question must be: can the challengers to the perfor-
mance of our corporate system possibly achieve their goals within 
that system? In part, the answer turns on how "success" is defined, 
For various reasons-inertia, economic disparity, and the like-it is 
highly unlikely that the dissidents can outpoll management. But, if 
by the combination of the effect dissidents can have on shareholders 
and the effect they can have on public opinion management will 
evolve broader decision-making structures and accomplish the social 
goals believed necessary, that could be considered victory. In fact 
the mere engaging in open debate is at least a partial victory. 
The resolution of many of the problems presented-what issues 
can be submitted to shareholders, the role of the modern corporation 
in society, what is required of our institutional investors-must be 
achieved in the context of the times that make these questions urgent. 
The conviction is widespread that the crisis of our times is largely 
a product of corporate conduct. Private goals have been pursued by 
corporations diligently and skillfully without regard to their social 
cost so that, to many, our large corporations have become not a 
national asset but an implacable foe. The thrust of Campaign GM 
was not war but an accommodation. Perhaps its theme was best 
summed up by the Reverend Channing E. Phillips, one of its candi-
dates for director, at the rally held in Detroit on the eve of the meet-
ing. Reverend Phillips said of Campaign GM: 
It is not an attempt to abolish corporations, but to preserve them, 
by altering their myopic decisions. It is not an attempt to eradicate 
profit, but to influence priorities, that society might be served rather 
than controlled by economic pursuits. And General Motors, as the 
world's largest corporation is a symbol-an important symbol-of 
this problem. So the cry, "Tame GM"-not abolish GM, but tame 
it, until it becomes the servant of society, harnessed to the principles 
of decency and justice for which this country stands in creed, moving 
us ahead toward the humane society where men live in harmony 
with each other and with nature. That is our concern.538 
The problem, as seen by Reverend Phillips, was that our eco-
nomic state had come to be dominated by men who were informed 
"narrowly and deeply" and who had ignored the broader concerns 
necessary for the management of our economy.539 
The social involvement of corporations, then, offers a path 
538. Address of Rev. Channing Phillips, Detroit, Mich., May 21, 1970, at 2. 
539. See R. FULLER, OPERATING l\fANuAL FOR SPACESHIP EARTH (1968); J. GALBRArrH, 
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 73 (1967). 
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through the crisis of our times. If that path is not followed, and 
if "business as usual" remains the usual business, the crisis must 
deepen. If corporate shareholders stiffen the resistance of corpora-
tions to change, a greater crisis will ensue. 
The public-interest proxy contest provides a useful means of 
furthering corporate involvement in resolving the crisis. It places 
the issues squarely before the corporate owner-the shareholder-
who increasingly is broadly representative of the public. It main-
tains pressure on decision makers by alerting the public and the 
legislature to the problems created by the corporation and to the 
possible means of dealing with those problems. It is an excellent 
means of gathering information and developing insights into the 
problems. Its techniques are to emphasize discussion and orderly 
resolution. 
The law, thus, should recognize the value of the public-interest 
proxy contest and rules and interpretations favorable to it should 
develop. Campaign GM demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses 
of such a contest. Campaign GM also posed challenges to the institu-
tions, which are an integral part of the system. The law can do little 
of an affirmative nature here, but it should continue to allow the 
use of institutional power in the public interest. That power remains 
to be used, of course. The law should, however, provide more infor-
mation about the institutional relationships to corporations and the 
conduct of institutions in this respect. 
Few changes in laws are required. Mainly the job is up to the 
people. 
APPENDIX A 
RULE 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969). 
PROPOSALS OF SECURITY HOLDERS 
(a) If any security holder entitled to vote at a meeting of security 
holders of the issuer shall submit to the management of the issuer, 
within the time hereinafter specified, a proposal which is accom-
panied by notice of his intention to present the proposal for action 
at the meeting, the management shall set forth the proposal in its 
proxy statement and shall identify it in its form of proxy and pro-
vide means by which security holders can make the specification 
provided for by Rule 14a-4(b) (§ 240.14a-4(b)). The management of 
the issuer shall not be required by this rule to include the proposal 
in its proxy statement for an annual meeting unless the proposal is 
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submitted to the management not less than 60 days in advance of 
a day corresponding to the first date on which the management's 
proxy soliciting material was released to security holders in connec-
tion with the last annual meeting of security holders, except that if 
the date of the annual meeting has been changed as a result of a 
change in the fiscal year, a proposal shall be submitted a reasonable 
time before the solicitation is made. A proposal to be presented at 
any other meeting shall be submitted to the management of the 
issuer a reasonable time before the solicitation is made. This section 
does not apply, however, to elections to office or to counter proposals 
to matters to be submitted by the management. 
(b) If the management opposes the proposal it shall also, at the 
request of the security holder, include in its proxy statement a state-
ment of the security holder, in not more than 100 words, in support 
of the proposal, which statement shall not include the name and 
address of the security holder. The proxy statement shall also in-
clude either the name and address of the security holder or a state-
ment that such information will be furnished by the issuer or by 
the Commission to any person, orally or in writing as requested, 
promptly upon the receipt of any oral or written request therefor. 
If the name and address of the security holder is omitted from the 
proxy statement, it shall be furnished to the Commission at the time 
of filing the management's preliminary proxy material pursuant to 
Rule 14a-6(a) (§ 240.14a-6(a)). The statement and request of the 
security holder shall be furnished to the management at the same 
time that the proposal is furnished. Neither the management nor 
the issuer shall be responsible for such statement. 
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the management may omit 
a proposal and any statement in support thereof from its proxy state-
ment and form of proxy under any of the following circumstances: 
(I) If the proposal as submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's 
domicile, not a proper subject for action by security holders; or 
(2) If it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the 
security holder primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal 
claim or redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its 
management, or primarily for the purpose of promoting general 
economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes; or 
(3) If the management has at the security holder's request in-
cluded a proposal in its proxy statement and form of proxy relating 
to either of the last two annual meetings of security holders or any 
special meeting held subsequent to the earlier of such two annual 
meetings and such security holder has failed. without good cause to 
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present the proposal, in person or by proxy, for action at the meet-
ing; or 
(4) If substantially the same proposal has previously been sub-
mitted to security holders, in the management's proxy statement and 
form of proxy, relating to any annual or special meeting of security 
holders held within the preceding five calendar years, it may be 
omitted from the management's proxy material relating to any meet-
ing of security holders held within the three calendar years after 
the latest such previous submission: Provided, That: 
(i) If the proposal was submitted at only one meeting during 
such preceding period, it received less than 3 percent of the total 
number of votes cast in regard thereto; or 
(ii) If the proposal was submitted at only two meetings during 
such preceding period it received at the time of its second submission 
less than 6 percent of the total number of votes cast in regard 
thereto; or 
(iii) If the proposal was submitted at three or more meetings 
during such preceding period, it received at the time of its latest 
submission less than 10 percent of the total number of votes cast in 
regard thereto. 
(5) If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that 
the management take action with respect to a matter relating to the 
conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer. 
( d) Whenever the management asserts that a proposal and any 
statement in support thereof may properly be omitted from its 
proxy statement and form of proxy, it shall file with the Commis-
sion, not later than 20 days prior to the date the preliminary copies 
of the proxy statement and form of proxy are filed pursuant to § 240. 
14a-6(a), or such shorter period prior to such date as the Commission 
may permit, a copy of the proposal and any statement in support 
thereof as received from the security holder, together with a state-
ment of the reasons why the management deems such omission to 
be proper in the particular case, and, where such reasons are based 
on matters of law, a supporting opinion of counsel. The manage-
ment shall at the same time, if it has not already done so, notify the 
security holder submitting the proposal of its intention to omit the 
proposal from its proxy statement and form of proxy and shall for-
ward to him a copy of the statement of the reasons why the manage-
ment deems the omission of the proposal to be proper and a copy 
of such supporting opinion of counsel. 
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APPENDIX B 
PROPOSAL NUMBER 1 
Resolved: 
[Vol. 69:419 
That the Board of Directors amend Article Third subsection 
(i) of the Certificate of Incorporation by adding the following lan-
guage: 
, provided that none of the purposes enumerated in sub-
sections (a) through (i) of Article Third shall be implemented in a 
manner which is detrimental to the public health, safety or welfare, 
or in a manner which violates any law of the U.S. or of any state in 
w~ich the Corporation does business. 
PROPOSAL NUMBER 2 
Resolved: 
That Number 15 of the By-Laws of the Corporation be amended 
to read as follows: 
15. The business of the Corporation shall be managed by a board 
of twenty-six members. 
PROPOSAL NUMBER 3 
WHEREAS the shareholders of General Motors are concerned 
that the present policies and priorities pursued by the Management 
have failed to take into account the possible adverse social impact of 
the Corporation's activities, it is 
RESOLVED that: 
1. There be established the General Motors Shareholders Com-
mittee for Corporate Responsibility. 
2. The Committee for Corporate Responsibility shall consist 
of no less than fifteen and no more than twenty-five persons, to be 
appointed by a representative of the Board of Directors, a repre-
sentative of the Campaign to Make General Motors Responsible, 
and a representative of United Auto Workers, acting by majority 
vote. The members of the Committee for Corporate Responsibility 
shall be chosen to represent the following: General Motors Manage-
ment, the United Auto Workers, environmental and conservation 
groups, consumers, and the academic community, civil rights organi-
zations, labor, the scientific community, religious and social service 
organizations, and small shareholders. 
3. The Committee for Corporate Responsibility shall prepare 
a report and make recommendations to the shareholders with respect 
to the role of the corporation in modem society and how to achieve 
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a proper balance between the rights and interest of shareholders, 
employees, consumers and the general public. The Committee shall 
specifically examine, among other things 
A. The Corporation's past and present efforts to produce an 
automobile which: 
(1) is non-polluting 
(2) reduces the potentiality for accidents 
(3) reduces personal injury resulting from accidents 
(4) reduces property damage resulting from accidents 
(5) reduces the costs of repair and maintenance whether from 
accidents or extended use. 
B. The extent to which the Corporation's policies toward sup-
pliers, employees, consumers and dealers are contributing to the 
goals of providing safe and reliable products. 
C. The extent to which the Corporation's past and present 
efforts have contributed to a sound national transportation policy 
and an effective low cost mass transportation system. 
D. The manner in which the Corporation has used its vast eco-
nomic power to contribute to the social welfare of the nation. 
E. The manner by which the participation of diverse sectors of 
society in corporate decision-making can be increased including 
nomination and election of directors and selection of members of 
the committees of the Board of Directors. 
4. The Committee's report shall be distributed to the share-
holders and to the public no later than March 31, 1971. The Commit-
tee shall be authorized to employ staff members in the performance 
of its duties. The Board of Directors shall allocate to the Committee 
those funds the Board of Directors determines reasonably necessary 
for the Committee to accomplish its tasks. The Committee may ob-
tain any information from the Corporation and its employees reason-
ably deemed relevant by the Committee, provided, however, that 
the Board of Directors may restrict the information to be made 
available to the Committee to information which the Board of 
Directors reasonably determined to be not privileged for business or 
competitive reasons. 
PROPOSAL NUMBER 4 
Resolved: 
That General Motors announce and act upon a commitment to 
a greatly increased role for public mass transportation-by rail, by 
bus, and by methods yet to be developed. 
536 
Resolved: 
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PROPOSAL NUMBER 5 
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That, by January I, 1974, all General Motors vehicles be de-
signed so as to be capable of being crash-tested-front, rear, and 
side-against a solid barrier at sixty miles per hour, without causing 
any harm to passengers wearing shoulder restraints. 
PROPOSAL NUMBER 6 
Resolved: 
First, that General Motors support and commit whatever funds 
and manpower are necessary to comply with the vehicle emission 
standards recently recommended by the National Air Pollution 
Control Administration for the 1975 model year; and to comply 
with these standards before 1975 if in the course of developing the 
emission controls this is shown to be technologically feasible. 
Second, that General Motors commit itself to an extensive re-
search program (with an annual budget as large as its present adver-
tising budget of about a quarter billion dollars) on the long-range 
effects on health and the environment of all those contaminants 
released into the air by automobiles which are not now regulated by 
government. These would include, but not be limited to asbestos 
and particulate matter from tires. The results of this research would 
be periodically published. 
PROPOSAL NUMBER 7 
Resolved: 
That first, the warranty for all General Motors cars and trucks 
produced after January I, 1971, be written to incorporate the fol-
lowing: 
(1) General Motors warrants that the vehicle is fit for normal 
and anticipated uses for a period of five years or 50,000 miles, which-
ever occurs first. 
(2) General Motors will bear the cost of remedying any defects 
in manufacture or workmanship whenever or wherever they appear, 
for the life of the vehicle. Neither time nor mileage limitations nor 
exclusions of successive purchasers nor other limitations shall apply 
with respect to such defects. 
(3) General Motors accepts responsibility for loss of use of vehicle, 
loss of time, and all other incidental and consequential personal in-
juries shown to have resulted from such defects. 
Second, General Motors raise its reimbursement rates to dealers 
on warranty work, making them competitive with other repair work. 
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PROPOSAL NUMBER 8 
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That General Motors undertake to monitor daily the in-plant 
air contaminants and other environmental hazards to which em-
ployees are exposed in each plant owned or operated by General 
Motors; that the Corporation report weekly the results of its moni-
toring to a safety committee of employees in each plant; that if such 
monitoring discloses a danger to the health or safety of the workers 
in any plant, or in any part of a plant, the Corporation shall take 
immediate steps to eliminate such hazard, and that no employee 
shall be required to work in the affected area so long as the hazard 
exists. 
PROPOSAL NUMBER 9 
Resolved: 
That General Motors take immediate and effective action to allot 
a fair proportion of its franchised new car dealerships to minority 
owners; furthermore, that General Motors act to increase signifi-
cantly the proportion of minority employees of General Motors in 
managerial and other skilled positions. 
APPENDIX C 
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PROXY RULE CHANGES 
I. Repeal subparagraph (c)(2) of rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
. 8 (c)(2) (1969). 
2. Amend rule 14a-8(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (1969), to read as 
follows: 
If the management opposes the proposal, it shall also, at the 
request of the security holder, include either in its proxy statement 
or accompanying said proxy statement, a statement of the security 
holder in support of the proposal, which statement shall not exceed 
both sides of a single printed page of the same size as was used the 
previous year, or is now being used, whichever is larger. No security 
holder whose statement exceeds 100 words, nor any person affiliated 
with such security holder, shall also be entitled to solicit proxies 
with respect to the same meeting for any other purpose. The state-
ment shall include the name, address, and principal occupation of 
the security holder, the amount of securities beneficially owned, and 
any transaction, material to the shareholder, which h~, or persons 
affiliated with him, have had with the corporation during the pre-
ceding two years. A copy of the statement in preliminary form shall 
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be filed with the Commission and sent to management, at the same 
time the proposal is furnished. Neither the management nor the 
issuer shall be responsible for such statement. 
3. Amend rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1969), by adding a new 
paragraph (d) as follows: 
(d) For purposes of the Rule only, the following shall not be 
deemed to be a "solicitation": 
A communication made in a public manner, not addressed ex-
clusively to shareholders, with respect to any shareholder proposal 
which has been submitted under Rule 14a-8, unless the proponents 
of the proposal, or the person making the communication, are at 
the same time: 
(I) participants in an election contest, as such terms are defined 
in Rule 14a-ll, involving a majority of the directors to be elected; 
or 
(2) persons affiliated with any of the parties to or the opponents 
of a merger, consolidation, acquisition or similar matter; provided, 
however, that no proxy or request for proxy may be furnished with 
such communication. 
4. Add new paragraph (e) to rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969): 
(e) If a security holder submits a question to management within 
the time set forth in paragraph (a) of this rule relating to any activity 
or contemplated activity of the corporation; or with respect to the 
policy regarding any such activity, or contemplated or potential ac-
tivity; or with respect to the functioning of the board of directors 
or management; the proxy statement used by management shall set 
forth the questions, and such questions shall be answered at the 
meeting. The answers shall also be set forth, or fairly summarized, 
in a post-meeting report which shall be sent to all shareholders 
within 30 days following the meeting and shall be filed with the 
Commission. The answers shall also be filed with the Commission in 
the same manner as a report on Form 8-K and shall be subject to 
Rule 14a-9. Provided, however, management may refuse to answer 
any question it reasonably determines is privileged for business or 
competitive reasons, or which relates to personal information about 
any payments or other compensation from the corporation, and pro-
vided further that management may omit any question and answer 
which substantially duplicates another question submitted at the 
same meeting. 
5. Amend procedures for review of questions arising under rule 
14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969). 
6. Appoint a study group. 
